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Abstract 
The failure to simultaneously explore and exploit (i.e. achieve ambidexterity) 
continues to present an ongoing challenge for Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs). Here, exploration involves “experimentation with new alternatives” and 
exploitation, “refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies 
and paradigms”. This problem is particularly acute for MNCs exploring 
disenfranchised/poverty prone segments (such as the Base of the Pyramid), 
whilst exploiting existing strongholds in wealthier segments of emerging market 
contexts. Yet there continues to be a dearth of academic scholarship on this 
phenomenon. 
This thesis aims to address this gap. It comprises two sections - The first section 
presents a systematic review of ambidexterity failure literature (referred to as 
ambisinisterity), which is then paired with insights from institutional theory to 
examine factors that account for MNC failure, specifically within low munificence 
emerging market contexts. The second section investigates one theoretical 
perspective within the ambisinisterity tradition, viz. a success trap. 
Fundamentally, a success trap refers to the tendency of an organisation to 
overspecialise in exploitation at the expense of exploration. This thesis examines 
this theory from the countervailing perspective of exploration under-adaptation 
and draws on a longitudinal inductive qualitative single case study of XXX India’s 
Healthcare Division to develop theoretical insights.   
My findings illustrate that exploration under-adaptation in emerging markets 
results from the dynamic interplay of accelerated learning and divergence 
mechanisms. Should these processes not be constrained and monitored with like 
rigour, MNC failure to explore in resource-constrained environments will 
continue to confound Top Management Teams.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The growth in scale and influence of large multinationals (MNCs) has been 
accompanied by a commensurate rise in FDI1 in emerging markets, with the 
lion’s share concentrated on Asia, Latin America and then Africa (See Figure 1). 
Yet despite its centrality to MNC strategy, a growing body of literature suggests 
that most MNCs find it challenging to explore and exploit in emerging markets. 
Prior studies such as Tushman & O’Reilly (1996), Benner & Tushman (2003) and 
He & Wong (2004), have explicitly embraced the idea that exploration involves 
the development of new products and services for emerging markets where 
experimentation, speed and flexibility are critical. On the other hand, 
exploitation involves meeting the needs of existing customers in mature markets, 
where cost efficiency and incremental innovation are critical. Extant literature 
also concedes that achieving both simultaneously (known as ambidexterity) 
proves challenging (Levinthal & March, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Gupta 
et al., 2006) due to a host of trade-offs that are difficult to reconcile, or 
alternatively, because exploration and exploitation exposes the firm to a host of 
paradoxes that frustrate the achievement of ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). Regardless of the reason, the failure to achieve 
ambidexterity has been associated with negative survival consequences, as too 
little exploration beckons an inability to adapt to changing environments, and 
too little exploitation beckons an inability to capitalise on existing assets and 
capabilities (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003; Simsek, 2009). These negative survival 
consequences appear most severe for MNCs attempting to explore economically 
deprived segments of emerging markets (the BOP), despite significant 
experience and success in exploiting top tier segments (the TOP) within the same 
                                                     
1
 FDI – Foreign Direct Investment: An investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
control of a resident entity in one economy (“parent enterprise”) into an enterprise resident in another 
economy (“foreign enterprise”).  
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country (Anderson & Markides, 2007; Markides et al., 2004; Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; Prahalad, 2005; London & Hart, 2004). 
As examples, HP (e-Inclusion initiative), Proctor and Gamble (Pur drinking water 
sachets) and GE (launch of a low-cost ultrasound), have all found success to be 
illusive, and at times even socially detrimental (Simanis et al., 2008) to 
indigenous populations. Yet academic scholarship continues to remain silent on 
the issue of ambidexterity failure in emerging market contexts, causing the 
drivers of the aforementioned phenomenon to be poorly understood. 
Figure 1 – FDI in emerging markets 
 
This thesis therefore focuses on the much neglected research domain of 
ambidexterity failure or ambisinisterity. A key reason for this paucity of 
knowledge is that much of the literature is preoccupied with a success 
orientation, due to a bias in the sampling frame that focuses on successful 
ventures, or a research orientation that focuses on solutions that alleviate, 
rather than factors that exacerbate the tensions in the pursuit of ambidexterity.  
Raisch et al. (2009) state that much of the literature has been dedicated to the 
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use of structural configurations (spatial separation2 and parallel structures3) that 
essentially separate exploration from exploitation into loosely coupled 
organisational architectures (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986; Ambos et al, 2008) as a means of achieving ambidexterity4. By contrast, a 
smaller subset of the literature explores non-structural solutions. The first, 
contextual ambidexterity, assumes that “a ‘supportive organisation context’ 
(characterised by stretch, discipline, support and trust) encourages and 
facilitates the behavioural capacity [of employees] to simultaneously 
demonstrate alignment and adaptability” (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004:209). 
Scholars who share this view (see Adler et al., 1999) assert that ambidexterity 
can be achieved at the individual and team level and under certain conditions 
exploration and exploitation can interact synergistically rather than 
competitively, a radical departure from the structural perspective. In reality 
however, Ambos et al. (2008:1429) in their study of ambidexterity in an 
academic setting states that: “While not impossible, Adler et al. (1999) and 
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) both acknowledge that [contextual ambidexterity] 
may be very difficult to achieve on a consistent basis.”  
 
The second non-structural solution, coined strategic ambidexterity (Aulakh & 
Sarkar, 2005 in Prange & Verdier, 2011:131) addresses the organisation’s “ability 
to combine exploration and exploitation strategies across product, market, and 
resource domains.” Han (2005) and Han & Celly (2008) define strategic 
ambidexterity as the ability to execute paradoxical strategies of pro-profit and 
                                                     
2 Spatial separation/structural separation/organisational ambidexterity refers to establishment of stand-
alone autonomous units for exploration and exploitation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Raisch, 2008).  
3 Parallel structures refers to the establishment of a matrix organisation by the introduction of task forces, 
communities of practice or working groups, as a means of achieving ambidexterity (Raisch, 2008). 
4
 A corollary is that the firm must also effect integration mechanisms at the team (e.g. contingency rewards 
and social integration), organisational (e.g. cross-functional interfaces) and leadership (behavioural 
integration) levels (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004/2008), in order to capitalise on the dispersed contradictory 
efforts across differentiated exploratory and exploitative units in order to be successful.  
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pro-growth, whilst Markides & Charitou (2004) and Markides & Oyon (2010) 
operationalise the concept by proposing the use of dual business models as a 
means of pursuing conflicting strategies.  
In addition to the abovementioned ambidexterity typologies, drivers of 
ambidexterity success take expression in literature on the environmental factors 
and other moderators that affect the relationship between the antecedents, 
elements of ambidexterity, and firm performance. Jansen et al. (2008) show 
that senior team attributes of shared vision and contingency rewards in a large 
Dutch financial institution help to achieve organisational ambidexterity. Gulati & 
Puranam (2009), in the case study of CISCO, show that informal organisational 
operation can complement the formal structure, causing ‘compensatory fit’ that 
can aid ambidexterity. Furthermore, Revilla & Rodriguez’s (2011) study of 
seventy-eight (78) new product developments in Spain, illustrated that 
ambidexterity is associated with having a strong team vision, and higher levels of 
strategic fit.  
In sum, it is proposed that such emphasis on improving performance across the 
literature sheds little light on failure, or performance deterioration, associated 
with the simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation, because 
conditions that promote ambidexterity are not necessarily the direct reverse of 
the conditions that inhibit it. This makes research on failure particularly 
interesting and necessary, especially in environments where more organisations 
fail to meet aspirations than succeed, or where, despite employing a range of 
success prescriptions, failure still occurred. 
Furthermore, concerns over sampling biases aside, there are unexplored 
domains as the current stock of ambidexterity knowledge is adduced in the 
developed world contexts where institutions are assumed to work.  Thus there 
are likely to be bounds on the applicability of existing theory when considering 
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the most deviant conditions in emerging markets like the BOP, where there are 
high levels of institutional dysfunction characterised by voids5, fragmentation, 
conflicts and other complexities (Pache & Santos, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011). 
At their best therefore, the present theories are likely to under-specify the 
dynamics in emerging markets, and at their worst, a whole new set of dynamics 
may emerge that invalidate current propositions.  
In the light of the aforementioned gaps, this thesis examines the under 
researched domain of ambisinisterity, which grows increasingly central to the 
contemporary operations of the modern day MNCs. The remainder of this 
chapter provides an outline of my thesis: an overview of the structure, research 
questions, principle arguments, literatures, research methods and theoretical 
contribution.  
1.2. Research Overview  
The prior section acknowledges that open questions continue to abound with 
respect to the specific mechanisms associated with failure of firms to achieve 
ambidexterity6 in emerging market settings. Conceptually, to the best of my 
knowledge, this area of research has not been treated as a coherent whole, with 
insufficient scrutiny afforded to its precepts, antecedents and theoretical 
perspectives. Even amidst several systematic reviews of the longstanding, but 
frequently non-cumulative/fragmented ambidexterity research (see Lavie et al., 
2010; Raisch et al., 2009; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), 
little attention has been specifically afforded to failure.   
                                                     
5
  Whilst I acknowledge the theoretical concept of institutional voids in emerging markets, it warrants 
mentioning that this concept has been criticised as being ‘western-biased’; i.e., it assumes that in Asia, 
because there are no (western-type) institutions that characterises a void. With the same logic, theory 
emerging from China would probably argue that ‘guanxi’  (relational networks) are underdeveloped in the 
West, and that this ‘void’ may explain all kinds of ‘dysfunctional’ results.  
6
 By this statement I refer to the mechanisms specific to ambidexterity failure, as distinct from quantitative 
research, that identifies factors influencing success and failure and attribute failure to, for example, lack of 
vision of the Top Management Team, because it was not present in the data examined.   
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The first section of this thesis (Chapter 1) aims to formalise and acknowledge 
the importance of the concept of ambidexterity failure by undertaking a review 
of the corpus of published scholarly articles, in order to answer the research 
question:  What mechanisms influence failure to explore and exploit? How can 
this concept be extended to low munificence emerging market contexts? 
Within this literature stream, the dominant failure/ambisinisterity theories 
accord with one of two perspectives – the traps and the embeddedness/inertia 
nexus. The traps associate ambisinisterity with a myopia of learning (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). This theory emphasises that specialising in either 
exploration/exploitation is self-reinforcing and constrains the organisation’s 
ability to adapt to environmental changes (competency trap) with adverse 
survival consequences. Whilst it is true that the scholarly works underpinning 
this theoretical stream provide a certain level of consistency in terms of analytic 
foci, empirical research on the traps (although widely cited) remain relatively 
rare (Walrave et al., 2011) and limited to developed world contexts, resulting in 
little scrutiny of its established precepts within emerging market contexts. These 
gaps duly acknowledge the potential of further empirical research to facilitate 
theoretical advancement.  
The second dominant theoretical tradition is referred to as the 
embeddedness/inertia nexus. This attributes ambidexterity failure to an 
increasing entrenchment of mindsets, capabilities and routines over time 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). These 
obstacles constrain management’s attention/beliefs and channels search 
activities, or directs resource allocation, away from exploration towards existing 
capabilities. This precipitates inertia, which is defined as the inability to enact 
internal change in the face of significant external change (Miller & Friesen, 1980; 
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). In the end, the incumbent firm fails to explore and 
misses out on opportunities offered by disruptive technologies, impelling 
ambisinisterity.   
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Beyond these two dominant theories, the first chapter also highlights a limited 
number of moderators/antecedents/determinants of failure. I append this with 
institutional theory, extending analysis beyond market and intra-firm forces 
(typically associated with ambidexterity literature), drawing attention to the 
impact of institutional factors. The purpose of this was three-fold. Firstly, joint 
consideration of both theoretical traditions, is not only novel, but allows for a 
more comprehensive analysis, illustrating how ambisinisterity can be applied to 
emerging market contexts, which is often characterised by tenuous institutional 
arrangements. Secondly, I address a key criticism of institutional theory that 
organisations are treated as unitary and tightly integrated entities making 
univocal decisions (Kim, Shin, Oh & Jeong, 2007; Selznick, 1996), passively 
conforming to institutional pressures. Instead, I provide support that a firm’s 
proclivity towards ambidexterity failure is rarely a direct expression of its 
institutional environment. Although there is some degree of determinism, 
institutional demands do not dictate firm action, but are subject to reflexive 
interpretation, and as such MNCs and their actors have a role in filtering and 
resolving institutional pressures (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Thirdly, and 
perhaps most importantly, whilst it is interesting to examine and assimilate the 
field’s current state of knowledge, to truly establish ambisinisterity as a useful 
distinctive domain, this chapter seeks to illustrate that considerable scope 
exists for exploring new research avenues concerning this challenging and 
strategically important phenomenon. In so doing, formalising this line of 
research can help to provide fresh insight into areas where there has been a 
dearth of academic scholarship. This includes helping to respond to calls for “far 
greater efforts to understand the interconnection between poverty and 
business” in emerging market contexts (Bruton, 2010:9).  
Having established ambisinisterity as an important and valuable theoretical 
domain, the second section of this thesis (Chapters 3 to 6) aims to empirically 
examine one of its dominant theories, the success trap.  To reiterate, a success 
trap results when the short-term positive feedback from exploitation “drives out 
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exploration due to self reinforcing dynamics of learning” (Levinthal & March, 
1993:106). Notably, Levinthal & March’s (1993) conception of the success trap 
focuses on the over-specialisation of  exploitation but does not consider the 
reverse, which is the under-adaptation of exploration, thereby treating the 
success trap in a largely undifferentiated manner (Sato, 2012). Furthermore, Sato 
(2012) suggests that the processes that suppress exploration are distinct from 
the processes that over emphasise exploitation. Accordingly, the mechanisms 
would naturally differ between an over-specialised exploitation view and an 
under-adapted exploration view of the success trap.  
The difference here is not merely taxonomical, as the traditional success trap 
does not directly address the mechanisms associated with the development, 
implementation and performance of exploration, but rather infers that it plays 
a role in perpetuating a company’s continued focus on exploitation. 
Practitioner accounts (Semanis & Milstein, 2012; Semanis, 2012) of MNC 
exploration of disenfranchised segments (such as the BOP) in emerging market 
contexts beg to differ. Semanis (2012) in his article ‘Reality check at the Bottom 
of the Pyramid’ cites many examples of MNCs which traditionally engaged in 
exploitation of the top tier segments of emerging markets that failed to explore 
at the BOP.7 The MNC’s seeming preoccupation with the single trajectory of 
exploitation could not be solely attributed to over-adaptation in its top tier 
segment. Very importantly, exploration failed to mature due to challenges in 
understanding the needs of the BOP market, or innovating solutions to overcome 
debilitating costs of village scale high-touch product distribution models. These 
examples aptly describe the centrality of exploration mechanisms having a 
directive influence on how exploration-oriented activities are paired with the 
existing exploitation-oriented activities within the firm, and by extension how 
                                                     
7
 As an example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) could not generate a competitive return on its Pur water-
purification powder after launching the product on a large scale in 2001 at the Base of the Pyramid. P&G 
gave up on Pur as a business in 2005 and announced that the sachets would be sold only to humanitarian 
organisations. 
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the success trap evolves. These very specific conditions of MNC exploration at 
the BOP in emerging markets therefore appear to highlight the conceptual 
limitations of the success trap, prompting the following research questions, 
which guide the empirical part of this study: How and why does exploration 
under-adaptation evolve in resource-constrained emerging market contexts 
from a learning and risk perspective? What are the mechanisms by which it 
occurs? 
1.2.1. An Outline of the Empirical Chapters 
In order to investigate the research question above, this section provides a 
brief overview of each of the chapters that follow, which form part of the 
empirical study, as well as the concluding chapter. A visual representation of 
the structure of this thesis is provided in Figure 2. 
Chapter 3 examines more closely the literature of the success traps theory as a 
first step to migrating from the more holistic concept of ambisinisterity 
developed in chapter 2, to a scope that can be fruitfully examined within the 
confines of a thesis. Consistent with the theoretical direction advocated by 
Levinthal & March (1993) and Levitt & March (1988), this chapter outlines briefly 
the two complementary dimensions of success traps: the learning and risk-taking 
perspectives, which are used to sensitise the empirical research. However, as 
stated above, I address a success trap from the vantage point of exploration 
under-adaptation because, arguably, the true black box in success trap theory 
depends ultimately on answering questions surrounding what is happening with 
exploration to allow exploitation to prosper. Another notable departure from 
typical success trap theory is the definition of risk-taking. I coin and introduce 
the term intra-operative to define the process of risk-taking in situations where 
there is a high threat of morbidity/hazards to the exploration initiative in the 
context of an over-specialised history of exploitation (success trap). Arguably, 
introducing this concept enables a far more comprehensive picture to be built up 
as the ultimate aim of intra-operative risk-taking is to allow exploration room to 
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grow and become consequential, and as such can be considered a balancing 
force to the learning view, which, according to Levinthal & March (1993), will 
always pre-select exploitation at the expense of exploration. Thus, a learning 
combined with an intra-operative risk-taking perspective, allows for the 
recognition of the web of conflicting interests, which surround exploration and 
exploitation. Combined, they provide coherent constructs for the analysis of the 
process of exploration under-adaptation.  
Chapter 4 provides an outline of the methodology.  Given the relatively under-
explored nature of the process of exploration under-adaptation in resource-
constrained emerging market contexts, a longitudinal, inductive qualitative 
approach was deemed an effective methodology for theory building (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1994).  I utilised a multi-phase field research design to investigate the 
single case study of XXX Healthcare in India. First, in-depth exploratory 
interviews and participant observations were conducted prior to the 
commencement of the formal research, in order to understand current practices 
and eschew egregious misconceptions about MNC operations in resource-
constrained environments. Then longitudinal data was collected via semi 
structured interviews, participant observation and archival data in relation to an 
exploratory initiative, from its inception to its subsequent retraction. Four 
rounds of data collected over an eighteen-month period were analysed, primarily 
by thematic analysis (Flick, 2009). An overview of the results is briefly outlined in 
chapters 5 and 6 that follow. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings – It is the first of two findings chapters, and 
starts with an outline of the chronology of key events leading up to exploration 
under-adaptation and then suggests an emerging (but not finalised) conceptual 
model. The vast majority of the chapter however, is devoted to the results of the 
thematic analysis. This chapter proposes that the primary reasons for exploration 
under-adaptation is due to the maladaptive consequences of accelerated 
learning (which aim to facilitate faster entry and knowledge accumulation 
 23
related to exploration) and divergence mechanisms (which aim to evade or defer 
scrutiny to allow the exploration initiative space to become consequential). 
Paradoxically, it appeared that efforts aiming to perpetuate exploration led to its 
eventual demise.  
Chapter 6, the second of the findings chapters, presents the refined conceptual 
model and insights related to a dynamic assessment of the exploration under-
adaptation process. Drawing on the mechanisms from the previous chapter, a 
few key insights emerged. Firstly, accelerated learning and divergence interacted 
(triggered by threats). This interaction took two forms, either force fitting or 
force fixing. The former forces a fit, and the latter prioritises a fix for exploration 
when there are incompatibilities between the exploitation and exploration. By 
examining the patterns amongst these interactions, as well as the dynamic 
changes, this chapter proposed new insights about exploration under-adaptation 
and also presents a revised conceptual model, thereby answering the question, 
How and why does exploration under-adaptation evolve? 
Chapter 7 presents my theoretical contributions, conclusions, limitations and 
recommendations for future research. In particular, it lays out my contribution 
to ambisinisterity, success traps and the BOP literature streams, which are the 
foci of my research. It also suggests a host of practical applications and calls for 
more qualitative, as well as multi-case studies, in order to advance the 
theoretical propositions herein.  
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Figure 2 – Overview of Thesis Structure 
 
 
1.3. The BOP Postulate 
Frequent mention is made in this thesis about the BOP. It therefore warrants 
brief explanation with respect to its significance to this research. The Base of the 
Pyramid refers to approximately 4 billion people worldwide, earning an annual 
purchasing power parity of US$1500 or less (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). In 2004, 
Prahalad propelled the BOP to the forefront of business discourse: “If we stop 
thinking about the poor as victims, or as a burden, and start recognising them as 
resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers, a whole new 
world of opportunity will open up” (Prahalad, 2005:1) where both companies and 
society can benefit. This proposition saw MNCs move from absent or 
underdeveloped actors in this arena (Hammond et al., 2007) to pivotal players in 
 
 25
bringing market mechanisms to bear on poverty alleviation. However, in reality, 
the postulate of the BOP has been falsified thus far. 
The BOP postulate is based on the logic that the poor live in very high-cost sub-
economies (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) that are unorganized and full of 
intermediaries who exploit inefficiencies (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). MNCs can 
create value by establishing real markets amongst the poor, with adequate 
information and competition. MNCs can also generate employment 
opportunities, incorporate previously marginalised members of society (Hart & 
Sharma, 2004), build local capacity, increase standards of employment and 
provide a wider range of choices for the impoverished (Karnani, 2007). Of 
particular importance, is MNC’s munificence, which can be used to foster 
increased access to basic necessities (e.g. sanitation, hygiene) at a scale that is 
unrivalled by most NGOs or Social entrepreneurs (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). In the 
long run, the BOP postulate assumes that the cumulative effective of multiple 
MNC pro-poor initiatives could potentially minimise the poverty penalty 8 
(Hammond et al., 2007), making markets work for, rather than against, the poor.  
At the same time, Hammond et al. (2007) proposed that the BOP offers MNCs 
access to an estimated US$5 trillion per year of unmet/untapped market needs. 
Furthermore, the combined lack of legacy infrastructure and ‘institutional voids’ 
make the BOP catalytic hotbeds for innovation, technology leapfrogging 
(Mukasa, 1990) and reverse innovation9 (Hart & Christensen, 2002; Hart & 
London, 2005), affording MNCs additional opportunities for sustainable benefits. 
 
                                                     
8
 Poverty penalty - “The poor pay higher prices for basic goods and services than do wealthier consumers—
either in cash, or in the effort they must expend to obtain them—and they often receive lower quality as 
well” (Hammond et al., 2007:5). 
9
 Technology leapfrogging – Skipping a generation of technology; e.g., parts of the BOP have skipped the 
fixed-line technology of the twentieth century and moved straight to the mobile technology of the twenty-
first. Reverse innovation – Trickle up innovation that migrates from the BOP to the TOP, or alternatively 
developing ideas in an emerging market and adapting them to fit developed markets.  
 26
In reality, with the exception of a few cases, MNC performance within this 
environment has been lacklustre (Hart & London, 2005, London & Rondinelli, 
2003). This is because differences in not only customer profiles, but also in local 
institutions and partnering requirements (see Table 1 below) mean that BOP 
markets are unfamiliar and intractable business environments for most MNCs, 
even those with significant international experience (Anderson & Markides, 
2007; Markides et al., 2004; Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; 
Prahalad, 2005; London & Hart, 2004). (See Table 1 below for differences 
between the BOP and the TOP). Furthermore, the proposition of the US$5 trillion 
in market potential for MNCs has since been criticised. Beyond questions of the 
accuracy (the more relevant figure for MNCs is US$1.3 trillion, assuming it is not 
corrected for purchasing power parity), it represents the total spending power, 
which would not be available to MNCs without the destruction of employment 
and jobs within the informal economy which sustains people living in poverty.  
And finally, there is increasing evidence of negative externalities associated with 
some MNCs’ attempts to explore the BOP (e.g., low safety records at Rana Plaza 
where 1,000 plus people died). Thus, the BOP’s dualistic postulate that benefits 
MNCs and the poor, has so far failed to materialise.   
However, with top tier markets becoming more saturated, the greatest growth 
potential in many emerging markets is coming from the lower income tiers, 
including the BOP. Take for example the Indian Healthcare Industry, in which the 
case of XXX Healthcare is situated. It was valued at Rs.2.8 lakh crores in FY’11, 
and expected to double up to Rs.5 lakh crores in another five years at the 
present growth rate of 13.1% per annum (CARE India Annual Report 2013), with 
the majority of the growth in healthcare spending shifting significantly to smaller 
towns and low income categories. This appears to make the exploration of the 
BOP an economic compulsion for many MNCs, despite its marred history and 
select success stories. A review of several of the top 500 MNCs’ websites 
highlights the pervasiveness of the concept, whether its XXX India’s Tier B/C 
strategy, GE’s Healthymagination or HP’s e-inclusion, the BOP or quasi-BOP 
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strategy continues to thrive. Yet despite the growth in interest, from an 
academic perspective, little is known about MNC operations at the BOP, as 
practitioner literature continues to dominate this field with prescriptive 
untested, ‘positive’ assumptions about the BOP,  that – if they remain untested – 
may do more damage than good to the poor. As Barkema et al. (2015:464) state 
“far too limited a repertoire of solutions and empirical evidence [exists] to aid 
practitioners and policymakers in these economically disadvantaged regions of 
the East (George, McGahan & Prabhu, 2012)”. A central ambition of this thesis 
therefore is to extend beyond the theoretical in order to bear additional practical 
benefits, helping to uncover ‘what is really happening’ as a means of providing 
more robust insight into MNC failure in low munificence emerging market 
environments.  
With this as a backdrop, I now examine the state of the literature on 
ambidexterity failure as a precursor to focusing on one of its theories, which in 
turn will inform the empirical chapters within this thesis. 
Table 1 - The Top of the Pyramid versus the Bottom of the Pyramid 
Dimension TOP paradigm BOP paradigm 
Focus Creation of new solutions 
Firm is the centre of analysis 
Profit oriented 
Creation of new customers 
The ecosystem is the centre of analysis 
(Fiorina, 2000) 
Triple bottom line oriented 
Market 
structure  
 
Competitive mature markets 
Institutions supporting market 
exchange, such as property rights or 
specialist intermediaries are present 
Less of a market, more of a constellation of 
geographically dispersed groups (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997) 
Institutions supporting market exchange are 
weak or absent, huge information asymmetries 
Revenue 
model  
Large scale production, economies of 
scale, global supply chains, marketing 
High-turnover, low-value transactions that 
topple existing price-performance ratios 
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driven differentiation that increases 
the price performance ratio of 
products and services 
(Anderson & Markides, 2007) 
 
Resources/ 
capabilities 
Available or can easily be bought or 
transferred 
Lack of availability of strategic resources and 
capabilities (Denrell et al 2003) 
Where they exist, it is difficult to understand 
how to configure/mix capabilities  for value-
creation (Sirmon et al., 2007) 
 
 29
 
 
SECTION I: AMBISINISTERITY 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL CHAPTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30
CHAPTER 2: Ambisinisterity (Ambidexterity Failure)  
2.1. Chapter Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to formalise and acknowledge the importance of the 
concept of ambidexterity failure (ambisinisterity) by undertaking a review of the 
corpus of published scholarly articles. Whilst it is interesting to examine and 
assimilate the field’s current state of knowledge, to truly establish ambisinisterity 
as a useful distinctive domain, this chapter also seeks to illustrate that 
considerable scope exists for exploring new research avenues by appending 
insights from institutional theory. In so doing, formalising this line of research 
can help to provide fresh insight into areas where there has been a dearth of 
academic scholarship, such as helping to respond to calls for “far greater efforts 
to understand the interconnection between poverty and business” in emerging 
market contexts (Burton, 2010:9). In the end, this provides the broader context 
and serves as a backdrop to the empirical chapters that follow, which focus on 
and examine one of its dominant theories, success traps.  
2.2. Defining the Problem 
Building a theory of ambidexterity failure/ambisinisterity is a daunting task 
(Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004), but is increasingly more interesting. Whether it is 
the prevalence of large-scale failures during the recent global financial crisis, or 
the recurrent smaller scale failures associated with MNC’s inability to penetrate 
non-traditional segments of emerging markets, such as the Base of the Pyramid, 
scholarly enquiry appears both urgent and necessary.  However, Whetten (1980, 
in Schmitt et al., 2010:134) emphasises “failure was long considered a social 
taboo, which led to a ‘failure paranoia’ with managers, often refusing to 
admit that their organization was in trouble” resulting in a lack of focus on 
this domain. It therefore follows that within the vast and ever increasing 
literature on ambidexterity, only a relatively small subset has focused on either 
defining failure, or explicating the mechanisms of failure. To be clear, as the 
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ambidexterity literature matured, quantitative studies hypothesised the 
presence of positive attributes (e.g., vision of management) that promote 
ambidexterity success, and therefore find empirical support for the factors that 
contribute to failure (less success). This is not the type of failure that is the 
primary focus of this paper. The focus of this type of failure implies the presence 
of mechanisms (e.g., escalation of commitment to exploitation) specific to 
failure.  
I therefore start by defining ambidexterity failure, and introduce the term 
ambisinisterity10 to describe the phenomenon. I then systematically review key 
studies on the subject between 1962 and 2014 that have been published or 
referenced in leading management journals11, as well as select discussion papers 
yet to be published. In line with Gibson & Birkinshaw’s (2004) comprehensive 
review of ambidexterity literature, these papers were drawn from vast literature 
streams, including organisational learning, technological innovation, 
organisational adaptation, strategic management, and organisational design. 
Furthermore, these papers specifically focused on studies using labels, inter alia: 
induced and autonomous strategy processes, incremental and discontinuous 
innovation, search and stability, alignment and adaptability, as they tend to refer 
to the same underlying construct as exploitation and exploration. Then, based on 
institutional theory, I integrate additional antecedents and moderators of 
ambidexterity failure. The aim here is to answer the research question: What 
mechanisms influence failure to explore and exploit? How can this concept be 
extended to low munificence emerging market contexts?, where the BOP refers 
to the poorest and most disenfranchised segments in emerging markets earning 
an annual purchasing power parity of US$1,500 or less (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). 
                                                     
10
 Oxford dictionary meaning: Awkward or clumsy with both, or either hand. 
11
 Such as Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Organization Science, and Strategic 
Management Journal. 
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2.3. Defining Ambisinisterity 
Ambidexterity, defined as being equally expert or adept with both hands, is a 
loosely adapted metaphor, initially utilised by Duncan (1976) to describe a 
central dilemma facing organisations in reconciling exploration and exploitation. 
Increasingly, ambidexterity is defined as the simultaneous achievement of 
exploration and exploitation (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Birkinshaw & Gibson, 
2004; O‘Reilly & Tushman, 2008). It is therefore logical to purport that 
ambidexterity failure, or ambisinisterity (its antonym), is the inability to pursue 
both exploitation and exploration simultaneously. However, an emerging body 
of research (He & Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009) advocates differing 
conceptions of simultaneity across ambidexterity scholarship. He & Wong’s 
(2004) seminal paper, which surveyed 206 manufacturing firms in Singapore 
and Malaysia, illustrated that ambidexterity, measured as a high score on both 
exploration and exploitation, was positively related to sales growth. Similarly, a 
lack of ambidexterity, due to a relative imbalance between exploration and 
exploitation, was negatively related to sales growth. Whilst acknowledging 
limitations in their research methodology12, this paper postulates that both the 
relative magnitude (henceforth referred to as balance) and the combined 
magnitude (henceforth referred to as synergy) of a firm’s exploration and 
exploitation initiatives are important and distinct elements of ambidexterity. 
Cao et al. (2009) later nested the balanced view within the ‘trade-off’ tradition, 
and the synergistic view within the orthogonal tradition. 
 
                                                     
12
 The limitations: Eight (8) survey items capture only limited aspects of ambidexterity, three years may be 
insufficient to establish long-term performance, sales growth may be a limited construct in determining 
performance and ideally outcome measures should seek to identify more dimensions on which to assess 
superior results. 
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2.3.1. The Balance versus the Synergistic Perspective 
The balance perspective can be grounded in the theories of March (1991) and 
others following in his wake. They see exploration and exploitation as two ends 
of a single continuum in opposition to each other, insofar as they compete for 
resources and orient the organization in the pursuit of different goals. In March’s 
view, exploration requires “experimentation with new alternatives” and hinges 
on organisational adaptability, and exploitation requires the “refinement and 
extension of existing competencies, technologies and paradigms” and is 
dependent on organisational alignment (March, 1991:85). Trade-offs between 
exploration and exploitation are seen as unavoidable due to conflicting goals 
(innovation versus efficiency), competition over scarce resources (March, 1991), 
contradictory knowledge processes (Floyd & Lane, 2000) and the prioritisation of 
different administrative routines (Lubatkin et al., 2006). Ambidexterity therefore 
largely involves the management of these trade-offs to find the appropriate 
balance between the two (Adler et al., 1999; Brown & Duguid, 2001; Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 1991; Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Gupta et al, 2006; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996).   
Whereas the ‘balance’ argument focuses on the relative distribution of 
exploration and exploitation, the synergistic view focuses on the absolute 
magnitude of a firm’s combined exploratory and exploitative activities (He and 
Wong, 2004; Cao et al., 2009). It addresses the sufficiency anomaly in the 
balance perspective, recognising that safeguarding both exploitative and 
explorative activities present in the firm’s agenda may simply equate to 
substandard performance in both areas. What also matters to the realisation of 
ambidexterity is the interactive effect of the two. Hence, the synergistic 
approach characterises exploration and exploitation as independent activities, 
orthogonal to each other, that may take place in complementary domains (e.g., 
technologies and markets), not necessarily competing for the same resources 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Cao et al. (2009:784) illustrate the positive 
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interactive effects of exploitation on exploration as a “high degree of exploitative 
effort can often improve a firm’s effectiveness in exploring new knowledge and 
in developing resources that support new products and markets”. Lavie et al. 
(2010) further illustrate this principle in terms of knowledge application, where 
the newly acquired knowledge (exploration) becomes exploited in the firm’s 
main operations.  
Given that both conceptualisations of ambidexterity bear prominence in the 
literature, ambisinisterity is defined as the failure of the firm to balance and/or 
synergistically reconcile the tensions between exploration and exploitation. A 
corollary is that failure to balance implies the number of successful initiatives, 
which are harnessed and scaled in one orientation (exploration or exploitation), 
is continually higher than the prevailing rate in the other orientation. Whilst 
failure to synergise implies that the firm is unable to develop supportive 
environmental contexts that foster contextual ambidexterity, effective dual 
business models that foster strategic ambidexterity, or productive integration 
mechanisms that capitalises on structural ambidexterity (or a combination of 
these factors).  
At its worst, by introducing and defining the term ambisinisterity, this chapter 
shines a light on the concept of ambidexterity failure, a widespread, yet poorly 
explained phenomenon. At its best, the abovementioned definition begins to 
remove some ambiguity surrounding the concept, whilst recognising that more 
work remains to be done before extensive scholarly discourse can develop.  
2.4. A Review of the Research on Ambisinisterity 
Dating back to neoclassical economic theory, there was an indirect reference to 
ambisinisterity in the form of explanations about firms’ failure to pursue 
exploration and prioritise exploitation, specifically under conditions of 
discontinuous change. Arrow (1962) claimed that firms with an existing strong 
market position have low incentives to invest in innovation/exploration 
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initiatives. Later, Cooper & Schendel (1976) observed that established firms 
facing a new technology often intensified investment in traditional technical 
approaches, and that those that did make initial investments in new technology 
rarely maintained adequate resource commitments to exploration. Despite the 
clear link to exploration and exploitation, these and other scholars presenting 
similar logic, focused more on why firms chose to be monodextrous13 (Güttel & 
Konlechner, 2009), rather than why firms fail to balance or synergise the two 
constructs, the topic of this article.  It was not until the late 1980s and early 
1990s, through the works of Tushman & Anderson (1986), Leonard-Barton 
(1992) and Levinthal & March (1993) that research on failure to achieve balance 
between exploration and exploitation was addressed.  
Grounded in an organisational learning perspective, early theorists purported 
that the imbalance in exploration and exploitations occurs due to a series of path 
dependent traps (failure traps, success traps and competency traps), which 
result in negative performance consequences for the firm. The failure trap 
results when a firm persistently overspecialises in exploration initiatives, despite 
recurrent past failures. Levinthal & March (1993) argue that the firm is made 
vulnerable by its own persistence, as each successive failure heightens risk-
seeking behaviour due to insufficient adjustment in aspirations and desperation 
for future exploratory success. Levinthal & March (1993:105-106) postulate that 
“Failure [in exploration] leads to search and change, which leads to failure, which 
leads to more search, and so on”. In contrast, the success trap results when a 
firm overspecialises in exploitation activities/initiatives. As the firm achieves 
success, the positive feedback mobilises/impels the business entity to further 
refine and improve current technologies, allowing for a virtuous circle of 
exploitation. Adopting a trade-off perspective, Levinthal & March (1993) state 
that over specialising in one mode (exploration or exploitation) crowds out the 
                                                     
13
 Focus exclusively on either exploratory or exploitative activities. 
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other. This in turn diminishes the long-term viability of a business entity when 
conditions that warrant variation emerge. This perspective is associated with a 
competency trap where the specialist competencies associated with the 
dominant mode of operation (exploitation) develop into trajectories that limit 
the firm’s possible deviations, impeding learning and renewal.   
The elegance and simplicity of the ‘traps’ associated with imbalances in 
exploration and exploitation resulted in a wide body of research in the 
ambidexterity tradition drawing on these few classic works, irrespective of the 
fact that most of the propositions remain largely untested14. The analytic 
concerns underlying the failure trap/investment in exploration at the expense of 
exploration has been associated with an endless cycle of search, unrewarding 
change (Volberda & Lewin, 2003) and organisational chaos, if continuity is not 
taken into account (Huy, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993). The logic 
underpinning the success trap/investment in exploitation at the expense of 
exploration strongly resonates with the capability–rigidity paradox, risk 
obsolescence and co-evolutionary lock-in concepts. Less focus has been afforded 
to the traps associated with a lack of synergy between exploration and 
exploitation (which have been included in Table 2 below for completeness), 
perhaps reflective of the fact that the synergistic perspective is often 
underrepresented in general accounts. 
                                                     
14
 To date there is only one study (Walrave et al., 2011) in a peer-reviewed journal, to the best of my 
knowledge, using a simulation approach. More details are provided in subsequent chapters. 
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Table 2 – Proximal theories with similar logics as the traps 
Types of 
ambidexterity 
failure 
Similar logics 
Exploitation 
imbalance- 
Success trap 
due to over-
specialisation 
of exploitation 
Leonard-Barton (1992) describes a capability–rigidity paradox in product 
innovation, where exploiting existing product innovation capabilities may 
have restrictive rigidity affects that crowd out exploration of new 
competencies. 
Tushman & Anderson (1986) illustrate that where the magnitude of 
exploitation far exceeds that of exploration, there exists a propensity for 
risk of obsolescence, where firms may enjoy short-term success from 
exploiting existing products and markets. However, this success may be 
ephemeral—unsustainable when the firm is faced with significant market 
and technological change.  
Christensen & Overdorf (2000) state that existing competencies can 
rapidly become out-dated (lacking relevance), leading to path 
dependencies or core rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992) that impede the 
firm’s learning and renewal.  
(Burgelman, 2002:326) describe Co-evolutionary lock-in as “a positive 
feedback process that increasingly ties the previous success of a company’s 
strategy to that of its existing product-market environment, thereby making it 
difficult to change strategic direction.” 
Exploration 
imbalance- 
failure trap 
due to over-
specialisation 
of exploration 
Volberda & Lewin (2003) illustrated that whilst a one-sided focus on 
exploration may enhance a firm’s ability to renew its knowledge base, it 
can also trap organizations in an endless cycle of unrewarding change 
and search. Stated differently, when a firm overemphasizes exploration 
at the expense of exploitation, it decreases its ability to appropriate 
returns from its costly search and experimentation activities.  
Levinthal & March (1993) illustrate that too many radical changes and 
initiatives can result in organisational chaos if continuity is ignored.  
Teece’s (1986) example of EMI’s experience with the CT scanner 
illustrates that investment in innovation without a plan to develop the 
complimentary processes to exploit the benefits of such exploration is 
futile.  
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) state that future opportunities are sought at 
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Regardless, the traps and its offshoots emphasise reinforcing loops in 
organisational learning as the cause of ambisinisterity, where positive, or 
potential for positive feedback spurs an organisation to myopically concentrate 
on either exploration or exploitation. A corollary is that the deviation from the 
dominant mode must be constrained by some sort of opportunity cost (so that 
the imbalance would continue to persist), although the analysis does not directly 
address the issue, but rather infers it. In this sense, the traps more aptly focus on 
explaining the persistence of ambisinisterity, rather than the determinants of 
ambisinisterity, which largely remain a black box. 
Beyond the traps, significant insights into ambisinisterity took a major step 
forward with the single firm/industry case study, which acquiesce with a theory I 
refer to as the embeddedness/inertia nexus. These case studies marked the 
beginning of a period in which the work on antecedents of failure would mature, 
albeit in cycles of surging, then waning interest. Like the ‘traps’, these papers 
emphasise negative performance effects for incumbent firms. However, they 
differ in one important respect: the richness and detail of the qualitative 
inductive cases prove more robust in delineating key constructs and mechanisms 
(beyond learning constructs), including those countervailing the impetus towards 
ambisinisterity.  
the expense of today’s operations.  
Lack of 
synergy 
between 
exploration 
and 
exploitation 
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) highlight the isolation and lack of 
coordination between activities, where two separate cultures arise and 
there is little communication and coordination among them, which limits 
the impact.  
Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) reference the erosion effect, that occurs 
when top management’s ambidexterity fails to reach middle and lower 
levels of the organization, thus “eroding” ambidexterity implementation 
efforts down the organisational hierarchy (in Karrer & Fleck, 2013). 
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At a macro level, the case studies appear to adhere to a consistent line of 
reasoning – they identify an incumbent firm/an industry facing radical 
technological discontinuities, and then attribute incumbent firm failure to one or 
more forms of embeddedness (e.g., within existing cognitions, capabilities, 
dominant logic 15  and/or customer value networks). These constrain 
management’s attention/beliefs, channel search activities and direct resource 
allocation towards existing capabilities causing organisational inertia or active 
inertia16 to set in. This precipitates a form of ambisinisterity, necessitating a 
crisis. In the end, the incumbent firm fails to synergise or balance its 
exploration/exploitation agenda and misses out on opportunities offered by 
disruptive technologies, despite often having the technical competence/the 
foresight to address these.  For example, Tripsas & Gavetti’s (2000:1158) seminal 
paper illustrates Polaroid’s failure to explore its early knowledge of digital 
camera technology – “In short, if on one hand Polaroid’s beliefs allowed the 
company to develop the necessary technological knowledge for competing in 
digital media, they became a powerful source of inertia when decisions were 
taken on how to further develop such knowledge in specific products and 
activities”. In a similar vein, Christensen & Bower (1996) illustrated that a firm’s 
embeddedness in certain value and customer networks drove resource 
allocation processes and created an impetus towards sustaining 
innovations/exploitation in incumbent firms in the disk drive industry. 
Further examination of these cases ( See table 3 below) also indicates, with 
peculiar consistency, that the firms were initially compelled towards 
simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation in the short-term (during 
the variation phase). This arose out of a need to manage the contrarian position 
                                                     
15
 The dominant logic among the dominant coalition of organisational members in the firm will determine 
the firm’s inclination towards explorative or exploitative learning modes. This is because the dominant logic 
acts a selection mechanism filtering out ideas and behaviours that are not congruent with existing beliefs.  
16
 Inertia: Little change in response to environmental shifts. Active inertia: frenzied activities that fail to 
define new and effective business models. 
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of leveraging its current capability, whilst finding new market solutions in 
response to the market discontinuities they faced. However, as internal 
organisational challenges arose in the selection and retention phases, and 
solutions became less anchored in its existing experience, knowledge and 
capabilities, ambisinisterity, or the tendency to retreat to one dominant mode, 
set in. This raises a provocative point, as to whether an organisation is skewed 
towards over-specialisation in exploitation and exploration as outlined by the 
traps (and other path dependent theories like dominant logic), or whether firms 
tend to pursue a more balanced orientation, until a tipping point prompts a 
singular focus. If both propositions are empirically sound, it would imply that 
firms follow dissimilar trajectories of ambisinisterity development, some 
unfolding in a cumulative manner, while others may display considerable 
discontinuity. Within the current literature, the relative conditions 
(environmental and organisational) favouring the various patterns remain 
unknown. 
Having outlined the areas of convergence across the cases, there is also 
significant divergence. More specifically, a firm’s proclivity towards 
ambisinisterity appears to emerge as a result of a heterogeneous mix of theories 
and mechanisms. Tripsas & Gavetti’s (2000:1157) case illustrates that 
ambisinisterity is strongly influenced by problemistic (Cyert & March, 1963) 
search, and purports that “search processes [related to exploration] in a new 
learning environment are deeply interconnected to the way managers model the 
new problem space and develop strategic prescriptions premised on this view of 
the world” causing management to favour exploitation (in this case) over 
exploration.  In contrast, Daneel’s (2011) paper focused on leadership dynamics 
and purported that a lack of constructive conﬂict in the leadership team allowed 
inaccurate resource cognitions to go unquestioned and unexamined, resulting in 
the inability of Smith Carona to explore new options, in spite of mounting 
disconﬁrming evidence that it will fail if it continues to focus on exploitation. This 
high level of heterogeneity within the cases makes it difficult to disentangle 
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causal relationships between the decisions, or actions taken and the 
performance outcomes obtained, in order to develop a parsimonious theory of 
ambisinisterity. Thus, despite the richness, depth, and typical benefits associated 
with the case approach, its value tends to lie in post-hoc explanation, rather than 
prediction of success of failure. So, as similar empirical evidence continues to 
abound – such as the Blackberry RIM – the theory of ambisinisterity, which might 
fully explain it, does not. 
Table 3 – Embeddedness / Inertia nexus papers 
Studies / year Exploration 
failure 
Type of embeddedness/Inertia 
1.Trying to become a 
different type of company: 
Dynamic capabilities at 
Smith Corona.  
Danneels, E. (2011). 
Smith Corona 
failed to 
successfully 
explore 
substitutes for 
typewriters. 
Embeddedness in managerial cognitions 
about two key market-related assets, 
brand and customer understandings 
created inertia in the organisation’s 
exploration capability precipitating 
exploration failure. 
2. (De-)institutionalizing 
organisational competence: 
Olivetti’s transition from 
mechanical to electronic 
technology.  
Danneels, E., Verona, G., 
Provera, B. (2013) 
Olivetti office, 
Italian office 
machine firm 
failed to enter 
new technology. 
Embeddedness within what electronics 
engineers at the company referred to as 
“the mechanical establishment” 
impelled inertia, inhibiting it from 
transitioning to electronic technology. 
3. The dynamics of standing 
still: Firestone Tire & 
Rubber and the radial 
revolution. 
Sull, Donald N. (1999). 
 
Firestone Tire 
and Rubber 
failure to explore 
new technology 
in radial tiers. 
Embeddedness within managers' 
existing strategic frames and values, and 
the company's processes and long-
standing relationships with customers 
and employees resulting in active inertia 
- accelerated activities that had 
contributed to its past success which led 
to a failure to explore. 
4. Capabilities, Cognition 
and Inertia: Evidence from 
Digital Imaging. 
Tripsas and Gavetti’s 
(2000). 
Polaroids 
inability to 
explore new 
technology 
(digital cameras). 
Embeddedness within the firm’s 
dominant logic (razor blade business 
model), existing cognitions and 
capabilities created inertia in the 
company’s ability to develop a new 
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Studies / year Exploration 
failure 
Type of embeddedness/Inertia 
business model.   
5. Technological 
discontinuities and flexible 
production networks: The 
case of Switzerland and the 
world watch industry.  
Glasmeier, A. (1991)  
The Swiss watch 
industry’s 
restrained 
response to the 
rise of digital 
watches.  
When technology shifted from 
electronic to digital to quartz, a myriad 
of organisational voices dis-unified the 
Swiss region's elaborate network of 
watch producers, causing institutional 
inertia, limiting the firm’s ability to 
explore.  
6. Customer Power, 
Strategic Investment, and 
the Failure of Leading Firms. 
Christensen & Bower (1996) 
Failure to 
explore via 
investing in new 
technology in 
the disk drive 
industry. 
Inertia was associated with firms’ 
embeddedness within existing markets. 
More specifically, incumbent firms’ 
existing customers drove resource 
allocation processes, which created an 
impetus towards sustaining innovations. 
7. Unravelling the process 
of creative destruction: 
complimentary assets and 
incumbent survival in the 
typesetter industry.  
Tripsas (1997) 
Failure to 
‘authentically’ 
explore in the 
typesetter 
industry 
Although firm invested in exploration of 
a new generation of competence 
destroying technology, they were 
handicapped by their embedded 
approach to new product development.  
8.  Architectural Innovation: 
The Reconfiguration of 
Existing Product 
Technologies and the 
Failure of Established Firms 
Henderson and Clark (1991) 
Failure to 
explore due to 
structural 
barriers 
Structural barriers inhibited 
architectural innovation in the 
photolithography firms. 
 
2.5. Ambisinisterity in Emerging Market Contexts 
Whilst the contribution of theories of the traps and the embeddedness/inertia 
nexus cannot be understated, their emphasis on the path-dependent/ 
evolutionary nature of ambisinisterity (fuelled by a tendency towards inductive 
and theoretic concept development), does not sufficiently account for the 
differences in the rate of ambisinisterity across firms/business units within the 
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same firm. Furthermore, these theories focus attention on the impact of the task 
environment and resource dependency on MNCs in first world contexts, and by 
extension, view institutional pressures that impinge on firm performance as 
peripheral, because institutional environments are assumed to be relatively 
stable. By contrast, extant theory purports that MNCs operating in emerging 
markets are subjugated to weak institutional environments (Khaima & Palepu, 
1997 in Mair et al., 2012), which create additional constraints on strategic 
choices available to them and places pressure on their ability to commercialise 
and scale. More recent research (e.g., See Mair et al., 2012) however suggests, 
that the institutional environment can instead be considered different, as 
opposed to weak, with Rodrik (2007:162-163 in Mair et al., 2012) highlighting the 
“need to maintain a healthy scepticism towards the idea that a specific type of 
institution is the only type that is compatible with a well-functioning market 
economy". Thus, the fact that emerging markets do not have ‘western’ 
institutional environments does not undermine their productive functioning, in 
theory, as they have very different cultures as well. As an example, a legalistic 
approach to contracts, as is dominating in the UK and in the US, may not 
necessarily function as well in emerging markets, which are very ‘rich’ in other 
aspects/features derived from a “relationship-centered pervasiveness, which 
explains why trust building, social capital, networks, relational governance, and 
reciprocity maintenance are critical” (Barkema et al, 2015:462). Regardless of 
these differing positions, the fundamental axiom of institutional theory is that 
market-based activities are significantly influenced by non-market institutional 
factors (Ingram & Silverman, 2002; Oliver, 1991; Peng, 2003) that comprise 
formal institutions – “the rules of the game” – laws, court systems, financial 
systems (or a proxy) and Informal institutions – culture, ethics and norms (North, 
1990). Such institutional influences are exerted on organizations through rules 
and regulations, normative prescriptions, and cultural-cognitive expectations 
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(Scott, 2008) 17 . Whilst within-country institutional differences can be less 
attributed to differences in regulatory regimes, differences in normative and 
cognitive-cultural regimes can be significant18, especially when there are extreme 
economic and sociocultural disparities like those that exist between the TOP and 
BOP in the same emerging market. In particular, there tends to be differences in: 
(1) collective actors, such as accreditation bodies (e.g., Greenwood et al 2002; 
Purdy & Gray, 2009; Washington, 2004) at the TOP and village tribunals at the 
BOP;  (2) primary  “social control agents”, such as professional associations 
(Greve et al., 2010) at the TOP and village chiefs/NGOs at the BOP; and (3) 
“infomediaries”, such as the media and consultants at the TOP (Deephouse & 
Heugens, 2009; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001) and word of mouth and market place 
coordinators at the BOP.   
 Normatively, personal relationships (rather than market exchange 
structures) are often emphasized more at the BOP over the task or 
company (Hofstede, 1980), and the social network represents the primary 
source of information, legitimacy and economic exchange (Hofstede, 
2001). For example, Banerjee & Duflo (2007) explained how social 
networks provide informal insurance in Nigeria, with a large percentage 
of individuals (50%) both borrowing and lending to other poor villagers. 
Furthermore, Munshi & Rosenzweig (2005, in Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) 
argue that there exists a similar approach through the jati or subcaste 
networks in India.  
                                                     
17
 Normative elements: emphasise a “prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” 
(Scott, 2008:54). Regulative elements: stress “rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities” (Scott, 
2008:54). Cultural-cognitive elements focus on the “shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social 
reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 2008:57). Each offers “a different rationale 
for claiming legitimacy, whether by virtue of being legally sanctioned, morally authorized, or culturally 
supported” (Scott, 2008:51). 
18
 Although there is a school of thought that Institutional differences are not greatly relevant in 
understanding variations in performance within a single country I posit that this is short-sighted, as there 
are critical differences in the maturity of the field in the TOP and BOP, and by extension patterns of 
interaction among institutions and articulated institutional infrastructure. Further, Greenwood et al (2011) 
illustrate that regional pressures are not uniform in their influence on firm operations. 
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 Cognitively, whilst it is difficult to make broad sweeping statements due 
to the heterogeneity across the BOP, there exist vast differences in 
exposure and educational experiences between the TOP and the BOP 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2007), which impact the skill sets available to MNCs at 
the BOP, as well as the product acceptance and use by the poor. As an 
example, Banerjee & Duflo (2007:152) indicated that poor workers tend 
to be less specialised due to the need to manage risks, which lead “47 
percent of the urban households in Cote d’Ivoire and Indonesia to get 
their income from more than one source; 36 percent in Pakistan; 20.5 
percent in Peru; and 24 percent in Mexico.” Additionally, Simanis 
(2012:122) states “Consumers at the bottom of the pyramid lack what 
anthropologists call a “cultural competence” for product consumption 
[when] they aren’t accustomed to using and experimenting with 
products. The adoption of new products entails a steep learning curve for 
them.” 
Lack of consideration of these institutional factors results in potentially 
incomplete analyses, overly simplistic rationales, or mismatch between 
theoretical constructs and empirical observations. It is therefore prudent to 
integrate insights from ambidexterity theory with complimentary institutional 
insights, in order to address my research question: What antecedents and 
factors influence the predicted failure of MNCs to balance or synergise efforts 
at exploiting existing TOP segments, whilst simultaneously exploring the BOP 
segments within the same emerging market context?  
This approach not only provides a more holistic picture, but also extends MNC 
motives beyond financial success/adaptability that is often associated with 
ambidexterity, to consider issues of legitimacy and survival, which are pivotal 
forces in emerging markets (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988). In the end, I show that 
these combined insights are not substitutive, but represent a valuable extension 
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of, rather than a break from, or contradiction of the logic in extant ambidexterity 
literature.   
2.5.1. Environmental factors 
Following ambidexterity scholars Chao & Kavadias (2008), ambisinisterity is 
impacted by environmental complexity19, which shifts the MNC’s balance toward 
innovation/exploration, while environmental instability shifts the balance toward 
improvement/exploitation20.  This perspective contrasts heavily with the work of 
Raisch & Hotz (2008), which illustrates that companies moved toward a more 
balanced orientation in their strategic and structural alignment when 
environmental conditions became increasingly hostile, and that of Jansen et al.  
(2008), which explains that becoming ambidextrous appears to be instrumental 
in attenuating, although not fully eliminating, the inherent destabilising 
tendencies of environmental dynamism. Ambidexterity literature is therefore 
undecided in this regard. Considerations from institutional theory tend to be 
linked to the former predicate and reveal additional antecedents (e.g. 
institutional distance and conflicting institutional demands), which increase 
complexity and exert strain on the MNC, increasing its proclivity towards 
ambisinisterity in emerging markets.  
Firstly, a high degree of institutional distance between the TOP and the BOP has 
a crucial formative influence on ambisinisterity. The institutional difference 
arises from differences in the communal logics, norms, values, customer profiles 
and beliefs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Ricart et al., 2004), which exposes the 
MNCs with TOP experience to significant knowledge gaps when exploring the 
BOP.  This increases its search and information costs (cost to obtain information 
                                                     
19
 Chao & Kavadias (2008) define environmental complexity as the number of unknown interdependencies 
among technology and market parameters which impact/determine product performance.   
20
 Chao & Kavadias (2008) define environmental instability as the probability of changes to the underlying 
performance functions. 
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regarding BOP market participants, and the cost to protect oneself against 
opportunism)21 and impairs the organisation’s ability to assess ex ante credible 
exploration opportunities/potential utility/externalities of alternative solution 
technologies. As a result, the firm may experience error amplifying ‘decision 
traps’ (Schulman, 1989) 22 , where uninformed responses and resource 
commitments in the early stages of development may propel the organisation 
into a path which may inadvertently constrain BOP exploration (Ghemawat, 
1991) in the long-term, precipitating ambisinisterity. 
The abovementioned logic emphasises that an MNC’s choices in the early stages 
of exploration can create/limit the space within which its knowledge of the BOP’s 
institutional dynamics develops and matures. Naturally, the early behaviour of 
the firm is likely to be more limiting when the approach to exploring the BOP is 
deliberate/predefined, rather than emergent/modular. Deliberate approaches 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) to a market specify all or most elements of the 
business model ex ante and aim to leverage familiar problem-solving methods 
and solutions, which may inhibit appropriate changes as institutional knowledge 
unfolds23. In contrast, an emergent approach is designed to inculcate learnings 
about institutional and other factors into the firm’s business model in a more 
accretive fashion, unfolding through a series of stages and transformations 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Often, with the latter approach, firms tend to 
refrain from large investments in specialized competencies up front and focus on 
more fungible investments, increasing its resource commitment as its knowledge 
unfolds. As such, the probability of irreversible strategic commitments early in 
                                                     
21
 Increase in costs as there are less formal intermediaries; as an example, consulting firms who would 
bridge the knowledge divide. Furthermore, Semanis (2012) outlines that operating on a village scale means 
that the organization needs to deploy and spend large sums collecting necessary product knowledge.  
22
 This relates to Ghemawat’s (1991) insight that irrevocable strategic commitments made at a given point in 
time may limit the flexibility of incumbents, and constrain their ability to respond to subsequent changes in 
the environment. 
23
 As the MNC’s institutional knowledge matures however, the impact on institutional distance on 
ambisinisterity is expected to dampen. 
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the process decreases and the MNC is less constrained in its ability to respond to 
new institutional knowledge in the BOP environment. In light of this, I conclude 
that whilst high institutional distance increases environmental complexity and 
exposes the firm to additional risks early in the process, a deliberate as opposed 
to an emergent approach to the market, further constrains its ability to adapt as 
new knowledge unfolds, placing the exploratory agenda at risk, and increasing 
the organisation’s proclivity towards ambisinisterity.   
A similar effect on ambisinisterity is associated with the extent to which the MNC 
can transfer institutional relatedness between the TOP and the BOP. 
Institutional relatedness is “the degree of informal embeddedness or 
interconnectedness with dominant institutions” (Peng et al., 2005:623). A high 
degree of institutional relatedness reduces environmental complexity, because it 
means that the MNC shares a dense network of ties with dominant institutions 
that confer resources (to obtain licenses from the state, arrange financing, 
secure technology, and hire and train labour forces) and increase their legitimacy 
(Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1997; Powell & Di-Maggio, 1991). MNCs operating at 
the TOP in emerging markets often have fairly well established institutional 
relatedness, built on a constituency of institutions whose relationships increase 
the firm’s social capital, political capital, and reputational capital in those 
markets. To the extent that MNCs are able to transfer this benefit from the TOP 
to the BOP, the complexity of their environment will reduce and they will be 
better able to traverse the institutional challenges and decrease the risks 
associated with exploration at the BOP. However, where such spill-overs may not 
be particularly appropriable or transferable to the BOP because institutional 
relatedness appears idiosyncratic to the TOP24, the firm is ill-equipped to deal 
                                                     
24
 Embodied in knowledge, contacts, established supply chains and distribution networks and routines only 
relevant to the TOP markets. 
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with the high levels of uncertainty at the onset of exploration, increasing its risks 
of unrewarding search, and with this, its proclivity towards ambisinisterity25.  
Of course, the degree to which these institutional relationships are valuable 
when transferred to the BOP is a logical point of contention. To address this, one 
needs to distinguish carefully between the transfer of upstream and downstream 
institutional relatedness. I propose that the transfer of downstream (Hill & 
Rothaermel, 2003) institutional arrangements, which are more proximal to 
commercialisation, tend to be less valuable because success within the BOP 
requires engagement with indigenous social, cultural and political institutions 
and intricate relational networks, which exert considerable influence over 
purchasing choices. Given the dependence on these conditions in furnishing 
market exchange and directing decisions related to appropriate pricing, product 
naming and marketing pitches at the BOP (as examples), the value of transferring 
downstream institutional relatedness is expected to be limited. In contrast, 
upstream institutional relatedness focuses more on the production process (Hill 
& Rothaermel, 2003), and some of the formal relationships from the TOP are 
more likely to retain their value. This may be in the form of access to scientific 
research, ability to obtain permits, and other situations where MNCs can utilise 
their formidable clout and existing ties in regulatory/bureaucratic systems from 
its TOP markets. Furthermore, where there are gaps in transferring upstream 
institutional relatedness from the TOP to the BOP, the MNC can often leverage 
its international networks to gather knowledge/technologies from other 
branches serving low-income markets, to provide parsimonious solutions, 
circumventing its dependence on local partnerships and relationships with 
dominant institutions, as appropriate. Thus the transfer of upstream institutional 
                                                     
25 Stated differently, an MNC’s ‘institutional bridging capabilities’ that allow the firm to transfer institutional 
relatedness from the TOP to the BOP as a means of reducing environmental complexity, is expected to 
impact ambisinisterity.  
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relatedness appears more valuable in reducing complexity, enhancing the MNC’s 
ability to explore, by reducing the need to reinvent its relationships with 
dominant institutions, thereby dampening its proclivity towards ambisinisterity.  
Finally, environmental complexity associated with high levels of conflicting 
institutional demands is also pertinent to ambisinisterity.  
MNCs exploring and exploiting in the diametric segments of BOP and TOP in 
emerging markets are more likely to face different degrees of conflicting 
institutional demands. Such conflicting institutional demands result from 
multiple and contradictory regulatory regimes, normative orders, and/or cultural 
logics (Kraatz & Block, 2008), which increases organisational complexity and may 
require the development of some incompatible prescriptions within the firm. At 
the TOP, these conflicts are more often worked out at the field level, either by 
negotiation between field-level actors and/or by dominant actors enforcing 
compliance, such as market leaders, regulatory and accreditation bodies 
(Greenwood et al, 2011). As a result, MNCs experience a relatively more 
predictable and consistent set of competing institutional demands at the TOP 
(Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). This makes them 
better able to develop appropriate internal structures and business models in 
response to their institutional environment. By contrast, the institutional 
structure at the BOP tends to be more fragmented, less formally structured and 
decentralised26, comprising of more non-formal players (village chief, etc.) upon 
which MNCs are dependent for legitimacy or material resources. Within this 
plurality, Pache & Santos (2010) state that many institutions may be 
influential/potent enough to be imposed on organization, but not dominant 
enough to unify the host of demands on MNCs. As such, the “constitutive 
                                                     
26
 Fragmented: The number of uncoordinated constituents upon which an organization is dependent 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as well as in the complexity of their resource and power arrangements. Formal 
structuring refers to whether those demands are formally organized; e.g., through sovereigns, and 
constituency groups, organized groups, communities, or associations Meyer et al. (1987).   
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institutional rules defining legitimate activities, membership and boundaries, 
often remain ambiguous, permeable, or are not widely understood“ (Greenwood 
et al., 2011:336). This makes it more difficult for MNCs to capture options 
effectively in relatively simple analytical models, or broker and assimilate the 
demands of such conflicting institutional regimes via innovative business models, 
and apply these to commercial ends. As a consequence, exploratory efforts are 
jeopardised, and by extension, the firm exhibits a proclivity towards 
ambisinisterity.  
The degree of complexity is however tempered by the nature (incrementally or 
radically innovative) of the MNC’s BOP exploration aspirations (e.g., Gatignon et 
al., 2002; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Incremental innovation often manifests 
in simple product modifications, such as creating sachet-size versions of goods 
currently available at the TOP, which address the liquidity and financial 
constraints of the BOP. Whilst incremental innovation may necessitate working 
with additional institutions which may play a pivotal role in commercialising the 
products, it is less likely to require the profound uprooting/abrogation of long 
established institutional relationships. In contrast, more radical approaches (e.g., 
Christensen & Bower, 1996; Tushman & Anderson, 1986) to the BOP market that 
develop pioneering/new to the world products do not only necessitate 
developing new technologies, but also creating, as opposed to simply capturing 
new markets. This is likely to require the engagement of a larger group and 
develop a wider range of institutional arrangements than with incremental 
innovation. These new relationships may expose the firm to conflicting 
institutional demands, especially when they antagonise hard-won existing 
institutional compromises between players in the field that benefit the firm’s 
exploitation agenda. As a result, the exploration agenda may be compromised, 
increasing the firm’s proclivity towards ambisinisterity.  
Whilst the argument linking high levels of institutional plurality at the BOP to 
complexity, and by extension ambidexterity, is relatively easy to establish, the 
literature contains a counter argument. In particular, the line of reasoning 
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represented by Jackson (2005) suggests a reverse relationship, namely that the 
ambiguity created by such institutional plurality creates room for a larger range 
of strategic responses and for creative reinterpretation, increasing MNC 
flexibility to innovate (Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011). This in turn enhances 
the MNC’s ability to explore without having to accede to dominant or established 
institutional norms, reducing its proclivity towards ambisinisterity. Within this 
tradition, institutions are seen as resources to solve coordination problems, or 
develop specific capabilities that enhance exploration rather than constraints 
that restrict it (Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011). This line of reasoning is 
supported by the ‘institutional void’ theory (Dacin et al., 2010; Mair & Marti, 
2009), which postulates that a lack of strong formal institutions creates a ‘void’ 
that MNCs can leverage to exploit new markets (Mair & Marti, 2009). However, 
logically, the MNC’s ability to fill those voids is likely hampered by the same 
conflicting institutional frameworks, which increase ambiguity, opportunity costs 
and discourages commercial exploration. For an MNC to therefore develop 
strategically creative responses to voids, it must be incentivised to do so, either 
internally through a metrics and rewards system that emphasises 
experimentation, or externally through seeing other success cases of firms that 
have assuaged substantial institutional pressures (mimetic isomorphism induced 
by competitors) towards profitable ends (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The former 
provides clear signals of the organisational commitment to this endeavour, and 
the latter provides a supportive context for more creative behaviours, buffering 
the significant/perceived risks. I therefore argue that whilst it is plausible that 
high levels of institutional ambiguity may increase the opportunity to leverage 
loopholes and enhance the MNC’s exploratory agenda, it is far more probable 
that (barring specific aforementioned incentives) ambiguity increases 
institutional conflict, which increases complexity, and by extension the MNC’s 
propensity towards ambisinisterity.  
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2.5.2. Firm Factors 
We now shift our attention from external factors to firm factors. Within 
ambidexterity theory, ambisinisterity has been associated with organisational 
size, mode and mode of development. With respect to organisational mode, 
organisational crisis increases a firm’s proclivity towards ambisinisterity. 
Hermann (1963) argues that organisational crisis leads to restricted 
information processing, consideration of fewer decision alternatives, and 
‘threat-rigidity responses’ (Staw et al., 1981), resulting in reduced attention 
to developing new capabilities and competences required for exploration. 
Furthermore, Levinthal & March (1993) and March (1991) identify drivers 
(environmental scarcity and the need for proximate outcomes), which 
precipitate exploitation to drive out exploration in crisis situations.   
With respect to size, Lubatkin et al. (2006) argue that small firms with fewer 
resources may not be able to manage contradictory knowledge processes, which 
thus increases chances of ambisinisterity. Other scholars support this view and 
illustrate that SMEs are on average, biased toward exploratory processes, such as 
“the proactive acquisition of new information (Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000), 
higher level learning (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), product leadership (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1990), and the aggressive use of resources in new arenas 
(Romanelli, 1987)” (Lubatkin et al., 2006:649). Finally, there is some indication 
from the alliance literature that mode of development has a direct impact on 
ambisinisterity. Although studies are limited, external development through 
acquisitions was found to stimulate the exploration of new capabilities, as well as 
have negative consequences on exploitation by redirecting attention and 
resources away from internal growth innovation (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998).  
The abovementioned propositions appear rooted within a broader 
understanding that firm factors associated with resource endowments have a 
crucial formative influence on ambisinisterity. Resource constraints (emanating 
from crisis, firm size, or its acquisition strategy) appear to reduce the firm’s 
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ability to develop structural designs and sustain complex strategies required to 
simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation (Lubatkin et al., 2006). 
However, this perhaps offers a short-sighted view as organizations often have 
access to, not only the resources that they own, but also to resources in their 
external environments (Powell et al., 1996). Access to such external resources 
result from either resources that constitute public goods, or from strategic 
alliances with other stakeholders who own or control complementary resources. 
This suggests that a firm with low resource endowments may have high resource 
muniﬁcence27  (Anderson & Tushman 2001) through access to resources in its 
networks. These resources would allow the firm to pursue the structural and 
complex strategies associated with ambidexterity, and as such dampens the 
linkage between resource endowments and ambisinisterity. 
Beyond resource-related factors, institutional theory illustrates that firm 
characteristics (the MNC’s structure, ownership, governance and identity) 
impacts upon its location in the institutional field (periphery/central) making it 
particularly sensitive to certain logics and less so to others. An institutional logic 
is an overarching set of principles that prescribe “how to interpret organisational 
reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and how to succeed” (Thornton, 
2004:70) within an institutional environment. Leblebici et al. (1991) noted that 
organizations located at the “periphery”, like social enterprises and SME 
indigenous players, are more motivated to deviate from established practices 
because they are less likely to receive the social nudging and policing that 
reaffirms existing practices (Westphal & Zajac, 2001). By contrast, central 
organisations (by virtue of size, age, international governance and status), like 
MNCs, experience intensified institutional demands because of their visibility, 
and thus are subjected to the intense scrutiny of more formalized, coordinated 
constituent groups (Leblebici et al., 1991). These groups comprise governments 
                                                     
27
 Munificence: The extent that resources available to firms are plentiful or scarce. 
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(who supply infrastructure), the business community (who supply legitimacy), 
professional associations (who supply graduates) and ranking and accreditation 
agencies (who provide varying degrees of endorsement). This line of reasoning 
implies that the cost of institutional compliance/costs for coordinating activities 
cross-nationally to meet institutional demands is higher for MNCs than for their 
local counterparts, who are less likely to be sanctioned for violations of 
institutional logics. This places the MNC at a cost disadvantage in the price 
sensitive BOP market, increasing the risks associated with exploration and 
resulting in ambisinisterity.   
At the same time, a countervailing argument is advanced that peripheral 
organisations are more disadvantaged by institutional regimes (Greenwood et al., 
2011), and central organisations like MNCs, due to their size and status, retain a 
measure of immunity from institutional pressures, reducing their cost of 
compliance. This second line of argumentation assumes that MNCs have 
discretion over the institutional demands it accedes to. This is generally the 
case when: 
- the specificity of institutional prescriptions is low (more mimetic and 
normative, rather than coercive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)28; 
- the firm’s organisational identity29 is not threatened (to the extent that 
the firm will lose legitimacy in the eye of critical constituencies 
(Greenwood et al., 20011) if it chooses not to respond to institutional 
pressures; 
                                                     
28
 Coercive pressures stem from the regulative structures and are the least flexible, whilst normative 
processes impel organizations to conform to other actors’ expectations and obtain their approval. These 
pressures derive primarily from professionalization, and the society at large (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Finally, mimetic processes impel organizations to mimic practices of other successful organizations 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
29
 Organisational identity: How the organization sees itself as different from other organizations 
(Greenwood et al., 2011) 
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- institutional referents are not able to  exert pressures on the MNC to 
conform to various institutional demands by resource dependence 
relationships (Pache & Santos, 2010);  
- the MNC’s Head Office is less attentive to details of the terra incognita 
because it has devolved the loci of power, or authority to respond to local 
institutional pressures, to the host company, and therefore does not 
monitor subsidiary refractions from norms of practice.   
Once discretion is high, MNCs can be more discriminate in terms of which 
institutional pressures they accede to, which in turn lowers the costs of 
compliance, reducing the likelihood of exploration hazards in the price sensitive 
BOP, thereby reducing the proclivity towards ambisinisterity.  
2.5.3. Leadership Factors Process-based and Cognitive 
Finally, I discuss leadership factors, which are thought to play a decisive role 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Smith & Tushman, 2005) in determining 
ambisinisterity. Conventional ambidexterity literature (see Table 4 below) 
explores a host of leadership antecedents that enhance the firm’s ability to 
balance exploitation and exploration, or other associated concepts like managing 
the challenges of incremental and discontinuous change. Although some of the 
factors display certain salient similarities to the factors that lead to 
ambisinisterity, the rationale differs significantly. 
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Table 4 – Leadership factors that impact ambidexterity 
Author Type of 
paper 
Summary 
C
o
gn
it
io
n
 
B
e
h
av
io
u
ra
l I
n
te
gr
at
io
n
 
V
is
io
n
 
Te
am
 c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
se
n
su
s 
/ 
C
o
h
e
si
o
n
 
Le
ad
e
rs
h
ip
 s
ty
le
 
R
e
w
ar
d
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
Smith & 
Tushman 
(2005) 
 
Theoretical  Achieving ambidexterity is associated with 
paradoxical cognition (a frame embracing 
contradiction) among senior managers. 
This is developed by following either a 
team-centric approach (shared mental 
models), or a leader-centric approach 
(emphasis on team interactions, supportive 
coaching). 
x       
Tushman 
et al. 
(2004) 
Empirical: 
Multi-case 
design (36 
cases, 15 
business 
units) 
Ambidextrous SBUs (Strategic Business 
Units) comprise a combination of high 
structural differentiation, high senior team 
integration and targeted structural 
integration. 
 x      
O’Reilly & 
Tushman 
(2004) 
Theoretical Ambidextrous organizations need 
ambidextrous senior teams – executives 
who have the ability to understand the 
needs of very different businesses, 
articulate a clear and compelling vision, 
and demonstrate commitment to 
ambidexterity. 
x  x     
Benner & 
Tushman 
(2003) 
Theoretical Ambidextrous organisations, which 
comprise internally tightly-coupled 
subunits (i.e. the culture, tasks etc. within 
the sub units are well aligned), which are 
also loosely coupled across subunits 
(distinct from other subunits) require 
(heterogeneous) senior teams who can 
promote the development of common 
aspirations and strategic integration across 
the different loosely-coupled subunits. 
  x x    
Tushman 
& 
O’Reilly 
(1997) 
Theoretical Leadership plays a crucial role in 
minimising the tensions associated with 
balancing exploration and exploitation by 
articulating and communicating a 
compelling vision. This involves both the 
use of software (e.g., culture, norms, social 
networks) and hardware (e.g., rewards and 
  x     
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structure, systems and rewards). 
Tushman 
& 
O’Reilly 
(1996) 
Theoretical Ambidextrous Managers’ coherent vision 
plus structural (autonomous business 
units) and cultural (loose-tight culture) 
factors facilitate the simultaneous pursuit 
of incremental (exploitation) and 
discontinuous innovation (exploration). 
x  x     
Lubatkin 
et al. 
(2006) 
Empirical: 
Multi-
source 
survey data 
from 139 
SMEs 
Top management teams (TMT) behavioural 
integration by virtue of their information 
exchange, high levels of collaboration and 
joint decision-making and, are better able 
to handle the informational contradictions 
and conflicts associated with balancing 
exploration and exploitation, and is 
therefore positively associated with 
achieving ambidexterity within SMEs. 
 x      
Beckman 
(2006) 
Empirical: 
Longitudinal 
study of 
141 high-
technology 
ventures, 
using 
interview, 
survey, and 
archival 
data. 
Ambidextrous firms draw on TMTs’ unique 
affiliations, leveraging their common and 
diverse experiences and affiliations at 
founding.  
   x    
O’Reilly & 
Tushman 
(2007) 
Theoretical: 
n.a. 
The following TMT processes and actions 
improve the propensity of firms to 
simultaneously explore and exploit: the 
presence of a compelling strategic intent, 
the articulation of a common vision, a clear 
strategic consensus among the senior 
team, the use of separate aligned 
organisational architectures, and the ability 
of senior leaders to manage contradiction. 
x  x  x   
Jansen et 
al. 
(2008) 
Empirical: 
Survey of 89 
branches of 
a Dutch 
Senior team shared vision and contingency 
rewards are positively related to balancing 
exploration and exploitation. In addition, 
transformational leadership behaviour was 
  x   x x 
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financial 
services 
corporation. 
found to positively moderate the impact of 
senior team social integration and 
negatively moderate the effect of 
contingency rewards on ambidexterity. 
 Adapted from   Simsek, Heavey, Veiga and Souder (2009) 
 
Drawing from a small stream of relevant literature, ambisinisterity has been 
associated with an overstrained capacity of management to conceive, design, 
manage, support and adapt to the complexity of ambidexterity. Daellenbach et al. 
(1999) state that durable commitment of senior managers to all traditional and 
emerging business can be difficult to maintain over time when some business 
units fare better than others.  Gibson & Birkinshaw (2004) speak of a cognitive 
tug of war, which comes about when decision-makers face different competing 
demands.  
Ambisinisterity has also been linked to the characteristics of the leadership 
collective – the Top Management Team (TMT), which represents the 
“dominant coalition” of individuals in charge of the strategic decision-making of 
firms (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963). In particular, research suggests that TMTs 
comprised of longer-tenured top management are associated with increased 
rigidity and commitment to standardized practices (Miller, 1991; Katz, 1982) / 
exploitation and high levels of senior team cohesion, which facilitates increasing 
reliance on narrow and restricted sources of information (Michel & Hambrick, 
1992), resulting in lesser recognition of the need for exploration. By contrast, 
Smith et al. (1994) illustrate that TMTs, which are not sufficiently 
behaviourally integrated, are more prone to divert their attention to team 
maintenance, which increases the firm’s proclivity towards ambisinisterity.  
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From an institutional perspective, TMTs play a role in interpreting institutional 
arrangements which are conceptual and discursive points of reference, creating 
expectations and delineating a space in which a legitimate TMT response can 
unfold in the light of the firm’s resource constraints (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). 
Managing businesses that simultaneously exploit the TOP and explore the BOP 
places additional pressure on the TOP to process and resolve contradictory 
information streams from two differing institutional environments, thereby 
increasing their information-processing demands. Particularly difficult for TMTs, 
is the information-processing demands of the unsophisticated, geographically 
expansive BOP market. Its mere breadth requires the handling of large volumes 
of context-specific knowledge, to effectively identify and craft appropriate sales 
pitches and product solutions (Semanis, 2012), and its depth requires a wide 
range of mechanisms for problem-solving, as breaches are harder to punish 
through legal avenues (Mair & Marti, 2012; Khanna et al., 2005).  It therefore 
follows that factors that affect TMT’s ability to engage in complex information 
processing like TMT turnover, team size and team diversity will affect the 
degree to which the organisation is capable of managing the different 
institutional demands required to simultaneously explore and exploit, thereby 
impacting ambisinisterity (Halevi et al., 2015).  As examples:  
 High levels of turnover curtail the abilities of TMT members to build and 
accumulate knowledge in institutionally plural environments of the TOP 
and BOP. Particularly damaging is turnover among executives who occupy 
central network positions, have deep institutional support in the 
communities (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) and provide/exchange 
information, resources and legitimacy with other members of the TMT. 
This is also made worse when their replacements are foreigners who do 
not understand the fluid institutional context of the emerging markets in 
which the firm operates. 
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 Lack of diversity or its proxy and size of the TMT (Halevi et al., 2015)  
constrains the range of institutional logics socialised/represented at the 
leadership level, inhibiting the MNC’s understanding of the plurality of 
institutional pressures at the TOP and BOP. A less diversified and smaller 
team also reduces the MNC’s exposure to inter-institutional 
inconsistencies, decreasing awareness of alternative possibilities, thereby 
limiting the available repertoires of responses.  
Thus, high levels of TMT turnover and low levels of TMT diversity reduce the 
firm’s ability to respond to the contrarian institutional pressures at the TOP and 
BOP, increasing the likelihood of ambisinisterity. However, the other extreme 
also proves non-optimal, namely, high levels of TMT diversity leads to too many 
competing logics about what constitutes effective (Whetten, 1978) or legitimate 
(Deephouse, 1996; Ruef & Scott, 1998) responses to institutional pressures. 
Absence of strong leadership may descend into turf battles, directing attention 
away from task performance and diluting firms’ ability to exploit and explore, 
increasing their proclivity towards ambisinisterity.   
The propensity for turf battles appears to be amplified when the TMT conflict is 
centred around ideological goals versus the means (courses of action the 
organisation deems a legitimate response to those institutional demands) 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Pache & Santos (2010) state that conflicts over means 
are less likely to have negative consequences, because deviation from prevailing 
expectations are less likely to jeopardise institutional support (Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992). By extension, high levels of TMT diversity may not spiral into turf battles 
over ‘means’ because they would naturally be more flexible and willing to 
negotiate, or even delegate these decisions, given the limited institutional 
repercussions (Pache & Santos, 2010). However, conflict over goals is more 
difficult to navigate in highly diversified TMTs. Within the context of the BOP, the 
most severe conflicts over goals are often manifested in institutional pressures 
related to social, environmental or welfare logics that aim to protect the most 
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vulnerable in society. In response to these institutional pressures for social 
contribution, TMTs often accompany their exploration of BOP markets with 
morally loaded discourse, including ‘positively impacting poverty’ and ‘bettering 
of the human condition’. This somewhat ‘fashionable’ rhetoric often represents a 
symbolic rather than a purposeful commitment initially referred to as decoupling 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). However, Pache & Santos 
(2010) indicate in the long-run, TMTs may be pressured to stop faking 
institutional compliance (Pache & Santos, 2010), or jeopardize the 
legitimacy/resources required for exploration at the BOP, as well as the support 
of employees whose faith or moral conviction had been mobilised in the process. 
Given the high stakes, the more diverse the TMT, the higher the probability of 
turf battles, as each individual may have their own ideas of how to accede to 
institutional demands for social contribution. Where this cannot be reconciled 
(due to the oft idiosyncratic nature of social pressures and the considerable 
ambiguity around future resources required to attenuate pervasive externalities 
associated with them), the unifying focus of fiscal discipline often precipitates a 
repositioning of managerial attention and migration of organisational strategies 
away from BOP markets. This may lead to the broad remit of exploration being 
retracted, curtailed or abandoned, resulting in ambisinisterity.   
Finally, institutional pressures do not just “enter” an organization — they are 
interpreted/given meaning by individual actors, the most important of which is 
leadership. It is well established that leadership has a disincentive to invest in 
new institutional relationships at the BOP that, if successful, might 
cannibalise/create disequilibrium conditions in its core markets at the TOP (e.g., 
Ghemawat, 1991; Reinganum, 1985). This is particularly so if the disequilibrium 
affects the core/proprietary technology (Reinganum, 1985), or flagship product 
of the firm, or disturbs institutional relationships that produce predictability and 
reduce the risk of organisational decline. As a consequence, leadership is 
predisposed to engaging in exploitative productive processes and detracted from 
the pursuit of exploratory initiatives, increasing the firm’s proclivity towards 
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ambisinisterity. This predisposition may be further enhanced where there are 
long gestation periods (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) associated with the exploratory 
BOP initiative. This may be due to a mix of exogenous factors, such as 
Government regulation/industry standards, and endogenous factors, such as the 
scale and complexity of engineering problems. These long gestation periods 
allow for coalitions against exploration to build up and leadership may address 
the conflicts via embellishing original targets so as not to threaten TOP 
strongholds.  McCarthy & Puffer (1995 in Peng, 2000) refer to this as "muddling 
through", which may result in the leader altering the original target to focus on 
less arduous segments, like the Middle of the Pyramid. Should this persist, 
ambisinisterity may result, unless there is a routinized (March & Simon, 1958) 
and disciplined process for committing legitimacy and resources to the 
exploratory BOP projects. These create expectations with regards to appropriate 
behaviours and reduce the potential for politicising, prompting greater 
forbearance for the institutional trade-offs associated with the BOP.  
2.6. Limitations 
One of the main virtues of this chapter is trying to pull together the diverse 
perspectives of ambidexterity and institutional theory to guide a more focused 
and systematic investigation into ambidexterity failure in emerging markets. 
Whilst it is more likely that the move from the TOP to the BOP will result in more 
contestation and conflict (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Zilber, 2002) in institutional 
regimes, Hall & Soskice state “institutions can be … complementary if the 
presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the 
other” (2001:17). As a next step, more focus on the coexistence (McPherson & 
Sauder, 2013) or logic blending (Binder, 2007) of institutional regimes could be 
explored in greater detail.  
In addition, this chapter establishes two baseline propositions:- (1) that 
economic behaviour is shaped by institutional, in addition to market logic, and 
(2) institutional demands do not dictate firm action, but are subject to reflexive 
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interpretation, and as such, MNCs and their actors have a role in filtering and 
resolving institutional pressures (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). I recognise that 
there are conflicting sentiments in institutional theory with regard to the second 
proposition, with some perspectives supporting a more deterministic role of 
institutional pressures than that which is put forward in this chapter. I however 
feel that my approach is in line with more contemporary (Greenwood et al, 2011) 
and empirically sound perspectives. 
Finally, I have not explored the dynamic effects of institutional pressures. Given 
that the MNC’s institutional environment in emerging markets is constructible, 
and thus may dynamically change over time, the MNC’s ability to source and 
share information, legitimacy and resources, may also change over time, 
impacting its proclivity towards ambisinisterity. In the end, the field of 
knowledge is still young and there remain many unexplored questions yet to be 
resolved. 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter was opened by illustrating ambisinisterity is a prevalent 
phenomenon for MNCs exploring and exploiting distal segments of emerging 
markets. Despite having some explanatory power, it was suggested that 
ambidexterity theory did not provide the whole story and elucidated a number 
of institutional factors, which increase the MNC’s proclivity towards 
ambisinisterity. In doing so, I have integrated two complimentary literatures and 
have come up with perspectives that have few precedents in the extant 
literature. It is recognised that this chapter is not exhaustive, but I have focused 
on the most relevant institutional factors that impact the relationship between 
the BOP and TOP. Until further work is conducted, the theoretical extensions put 
forward in this chapter will remain suggestive, rather than definitive. However, 
they represent a most fruitful line of enquiry, with significant possibilities to 
explicate the forces that are associated with MNC failure to explore and exploit 
in emerging markets. 
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SECTION II 
 
 
EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
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CHAPTER 3: Reconstituting the Success Trap (Exploration 
Under-adaptation) 
3.1. Chapter Overview  
The central ambition of the prior chapter was to establish ambisinisterity as a 
worthwhile and distinctive theoretical field and illustrate its potential and 
usefulness in explaining challenges faced by multinationals in emerging market 
contexts. This required an examination of a wide breadth of research, as well as 
integration with non-traditional literature streams, like institutional theory, in 
the hope of exhibiting novel insight. This chapter signals the beginning of the 
empirical research, by migrating from the more holistic concept of 
ambisinisterity developed in chapter 2, to a scope that can be fruitfully examined 
within the confines of a thesis. In this regard, I focus on one of the most widely 
referenced, but seldom investigated elements of ambisinisterity: the success 
traps theory, in order to answer the research question: How and why does 
exploration under-adaptation evolve in resource-constrained emerging market 
contexts from a learning and risk perspective? What are the mechanisms by 
which it occurs? Consistent with the theoretical direction advocated by Levinthal 
& March (1993), this chapter briefly outlines the success trap and its two 
dimensions: the learning and risk-taking trajectory, which is used to sensitise the 
empirical research. 
3.2. An Overview of the Research Domains 
Early learning theorists purported that the imbalance in exploration and 
exploitations occurs due to a series of path dependent traps (failure traps, 
success traps and competency traps), which result in negative performance 
consequences for the firm (March, 1993; Levinthal & March, 1993). Here, 
exploration is defined as “experimentation with new alternatives” and 
exploitation “refinement and extension of existing competencies, technologies 
and paradigms” (March, 1991:85). Despite its prominence within management 
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scholarship, research on the theory of the traps in general is still fairly embryonic 
(See Walrave et al., 2011). This thesis focuses on the analytic concerns of the 
success trap (only), which has been duly acknowledged to be far more prevalent, 
making the dearth of empirical scholarship particularly noteworthy  (Levinthal & 
March, 1993).  
The success trap results when a firm overspecialises in exploitation-oriented 
activities. As the firm achieves success, the positive feedback mobilises/impels 
the business entity to further refine and improve current technologies, allowing 
for a virtuous circle of exploitation (Levinthal & March, 1993). The success trap 
theory is rooted in two perspectives/research domains. The scope of the first 
research domain I call the learning trajectory. The logic underpinning this 
trajectory posits that a firm, having had prior knowledge and experience in 
exploitation, will overspecialise, build more experience and knowledge, which 
leads to more success, and so on and so on (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & 
March, 1988) (area A in Figure 3 below). Thus, the mutual positive feedback 
between prior knowledge and experience makes trying alternative strategies 
unlikely, precipitating myopic tendencies (Levinthal & March, 1993:101). Over 
time, persistent specialization in exploitation increases the vulnerability of the 
firm by reducing its ability to survive in conditions that warrant new learning (zig 
zag lines in area A, Figure 3 below). 
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Figure 3 – Success trap overview 
 
The scope of the second research domain, namely the risk-taking trajectory, is 
represented by area B in Figure 3 above, which includes the elements in the 
dotted line. This is arguably peripheral to the learning trajectory, but nonetheless 
equally important. At its most fundamental (which is what is mapped in Figure 
3), Levinthal & March (1993:104) state that during a series of successes, 
individuals (as a collective) become biased in their perception of risk and 
causality. They become over confident about their abilities and optimistic about 
the odds of success, or any favourable occurrences in their exploited area of 
specialisation. As a result, search and practice become focused on well-known 
alternatives, underestimating the potential benefits of the unknown (March, 
1994) until the point of survival. Levinthal & March (1993) also link the concept 
of risk-taking to a series of individual level constructs, but because the success 
traps theory operates at an organisational level of abstraction, those have not 
been included in this thesis.  
 
At a first glance, scholarly examples of success traps in developed markets 
appear to abound in diverse industries: disk drive (Christensen & Bower, 1996), 
photolithographic equipment (Henderson & Clark, 1990), and watch (Glasmeier, 
1991) industries. However, many of these studies, as established in Chapter 2, 
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have embeddedness/inertia foci30, focusing on resistance to change, rather than 
the process of adaptation, which is the primary vantage point of the success trap 
theory. To the best of my knowledge, there has only been one theoretical 
simulation study (in the peer reviewed Journal of Management) by Walrave et al. 
(2011) that attempts to focus on an adaptation view of success traps as a 
springboard for theoretical advancement. The authors found that the interplay 
between management and the Board precipitates the success trap, but failed to 
define mechanisms. Furthermore, Walrave et al.’s (2011) study displays a 
number of systematic limitations. One being the assumptions of extreme risks, 
such as economic downturn that underpins the simulation, and two, as per all 
simulation research, it raises questions regarding the generalisability of their 
findings to non-experimental, ‘everyday’ settings. 
Sato (2012) perhaps points to one of the most significant gaps in the success trap 
literature: “Since March’s view on organizational learning tends to advocate an 
excess of exploitation, Levinthal & March (1993) also treat over-adaptation as a 
problem, and do not acknowledge under-adaptation. However, if we look at the 
respective phases, it is normal for both over-adaptation and under-adaptation to 
occur” (Sato, 2012:51).  Importantly, the difference between an over-adaptation 
of exploitation, versus an under-adaptation of exploration view of a success 
trap, is not merely taxonomical for two reasons:  
1. Firstly, and logically, the processes are expected to be different 
because exploration-oriented activities are more uncertain in their 
outputs, and operate on a longer time frame, whilst exploitation-
oriented activities are more able to deliver measurable short-term 
results (Fast, 1981).  
                                                     
30
 Embeddedness/ inertia foci: How embeddedness within existing cognitions, capabilities, etc., constrains 
management’s attention/beliefs directing search/resource allocation towards existing capabilities, causing 
organisational inertia to set in. 
 70
2. Secondly, without considering under-adaptation, the traditional 
success trap does not address the constructs/mechanisms associated 
with the development and implementation of exploration-oriented 
initiatives. Rather, it infers that Management are either neglectful of 
the need for exploration (Walrave et al., 2011; Levinthal & March, 
1993), or alternatively, if the need is recognised, management 
refrains from allocating resources (Sato, 2012; Levinthal & March, 
1993), because the opportunity cost of investing in exploration 
becomes comparatively more costly than investing in exploitation.  
However, a cursory examination of the dynamics of MNCs operating at the BOP 
proves otherwise. Semanis (2012), in his article, ‘Reality check at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid’, cites many examples of MNCs with strong roots in exploitation of 
the top tier segments of emerging markets (typical of a success trap), being 
motivated to explore the BOP with limited success. Here, exploration failed to 
mature due to challenges in understanding the needs of the BOP market, or 
innovating solutions to overcome the debilitating costs of village scale high-touch 
product distribution models required to serve the geographically scattered BOP 
(Semanis, 2012). Failures also resulted from an incapacity to fully consider the 
range of externalities as was the case of GE’s low cost ultrasound technology, 
which made it possible to tell the sex of a baby in the womb for the first time in 
disenfranchised markets in India. This led to sex-selective abortions and mass 
female infanticide (referred to as Kokh Me Katl, or Murder in the Womb), given 
India’s cultural preference for male children due to their ability to carry on the 
family bloodline and inherit wealth (Prasad & Ramesh, 2007). This example aptly 
describes the centrality of exploration to MNCs stuck in a success trap, and 
necessitates a recognition that MNCs’ motives expand beyond exploitation.  It 
also concurrently recognises that the inability to achieve success via exploration, 
shapes and perpetuates the underlying processes in a success trap. These very 
specific conditions of MNC exploration at the BOP in emerging markets 
therefore appear to highlight the conceptual limitations of the success trap. 
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Thus, by extending the scope of enquiry to understand exploration under-
adaptation; i.e., how exploration oriented initiatives evolve (are initiated and 
retracted) and impel a refocus on exploitation, I attempt to overcome the 
shortcoming outlined by Sato (2012). I also increase the propensity for the 
success trap theory to be of use in analysing MNC failure in resource-
constrained environments. In these respects therefore, the under-adaptation 
view of a success trap provides a missing link, illuminating what was previously 
somewhat of a ‘black box’ in the success trap literature.  In consequence, this 
thesis and the forthcoming chapters focus on an under-adaptation of the 
exploration view of success traps. 
Furthermore, within the context of the under-adaptation of exploration view, I 
address the final critique of success traps theory, namely the “underlying 
processes have remained largely unstudied” (Walrave et al., 2011:1745), by 
showing how learning and risk-taking processes dynamically develop over time 
(and possibly even interact) to result in a single trajectory of exploitation. 
Learning processes: Argote (1999) states that fundamentally, learning processes 
relate to the means by which a firm attains experience and repeat engagement 
facilitates the ability to both gain insights and draw inferences from the 
outcomes of its actions. Across the breadth of learning theory, processes have 
been divided into types of learning, which include “organization's learning from 
its own experience versus learning from others, experimentation, trial-and-error 
learning, refinement versus exploration, forgetting, knowledge sharing, and 
knowledge generation” (Miner et al., 2001:304), as examples. There has also 
been a focus on the output of learning processes, which can take the form of 
new activities, knowledge, or insight gained (see Miner et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
the outcome of the learning process has also been defined with exploitation 
expected to “generate clearer, earlier, and closer feedback ……[which] corrects 
itself sooner” (Levinthal & March, 1993:107), as opposed to exploration which is 
expected to generate returns that are “uncertain, distant and often negative” 
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(March, 1991:85), making causality harder to unravel. In this way, “learning 
[processes are expected to] give advantage to results in the spatial 
neighbourhood of current action” (Levinthal & March, 1993:103). There is also a 
tradition of using performance outcomes/changes (in part or in full) as a 
measure of learning outcomes (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). For example, 
Vermeulen & Barkema (2001) determined the degree to which acquisitions 
broadened a firm’s knowledge base by measuring subsidiary success. And 
Inkpen’s (2005) case study of the NUMMI alliance measured the outcome of 
learning based on a combination of objective data and statements from senior 
management. And finally, the use of the word process has also been associated 
with the sequence of different types of learning. Examples include Miner et al.’s 
(2001) description of how a trial and error learning process was initiated by 
improvised learning and more recently Sonsa et al. (2010), who illustrated that 
learning mechanisms varied across stages of business model development, with 
second order learning surfacing during the early exploration phase, and first 
order learning being prioritised during the exploitation phase when the business 
model achieved scale. Thus the mechanisms of learning are likely to change as 
the exploration project progresses. I chose to sensitise my study of exploration 
under-adaptation with such a broad range of learning insights for two reasons; 
firstly because research into the success traps is embryonic, and secondly in an 
attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment by not only examining the 
types, outputs and outcomes of learning inductively, but also their sequencing 
and interdependencies.  
Risk-taking process: Given that exploration is inherently risky by definition there 
is some expectation that risk-taking processes would play a prominent role in the 
under-adaptation process. Not just because of challenges associated with the 
newness of the BOP target market, but also because the experimental, 
unpredictable, uncertain nature of exploration (March, 1991) is expected to 
exert strain on long developed and favoured systems and processes that 
generate stability and reliability, typically associated with a firm that has over 
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specialised in exploitation (Lubatkin, 2006; Güttel & Konlechner, 2009). Even 
where the exploration and exploitation are established as separate units, some 
lateral processes are expected to link them together (Ambos et al., 2008). These 
may take the form of protocols, schedules, and routines, which may become 
largely inadequate if they promote standardisation, resulting in destabilizing 
tendencies for the exploratory agenda with potentially dreadful outcomes. I coin 
the term intra-operative – to define the process of risk-taking in situations 
where there is a high threat of morbidity/hazards to the exploration initiative, in 
the context of an over-specialised history of exploitation (success trap).  
Intuitively, an MNC would not need to engage in intra-operative risk-taking if 
formal discretionary space is created (through new protocols, schedules, and 
routines), to allow for egalitarian outcomes where both exploration and 
exploitation can perpetuate. But if space for exploration is not convened, the 
strain exerted by exploitation-oriented systems, processes, business models, 
distribution systems, etc. on exploration can be exacerbated and can precipitate 
crisis, necessitating risk-taking (intra-operative) to allow exploration to survive/ 
prosper. The ultimate aim of intra-operative risk-taking therefore is to allow 
exploration room to grow and become consequential, and as such can be 
considered a balancing force to the learning view, which, according to Levinthal 
& March (1993), will always pre-select exploitation at the expense of exploration. 
Thus, a learning combined with an intra-operative risk-taking perspective allows 
for the recognition of the web of conflicting interests, which surround 
exploration and exploitation. Combined, they provide coherent constructs for 
the analysis of the process of exploration under-adaptation, and are better 
suited to deal with the idiosyncrasies of the MNC case at the BOP, which 
confound research within the current vein of success traps.  
3.3. Conclusion 
To reiterate, a success trap results when the short-term positive feedback from 
exploitation “drives out exploration due to self reinforcing dynamics of learning” 
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(Levinthal & March, 1993:106). Notably, Levinthal & March’s (1993) conception 
of the success trap focuses on the over-specialisation of exploitation, but does 
not consider the reverse, which is the under-adaptation of exploration, thereby 
treating the success trap in a largely undifferentiated manner (Sato, 2012). 
Furthermore, Sato (2012) suggests that the processes of exploration under-
adaptation are distinct from the processes that over emphasise exploitation. 
Accordingly, the mechanisms would naturally differ between the two contrary 
views of a success trap. In this thesis, I explore the exploration under-adaptation 
process because, arguably, the true black box in success trap theory depends 
ultimately on answering questions surrounding what is happening with 
exploration to allow exploitation to prosper. Furthermore, this perspective 
seems to accord better with the observed behaviours of MNCs at the BOP, a 
focus of this research. Finally, to examine exploration under-adaptation, I focus 
on both learning and intra-operative risk-taking, two behavioural constructs. I 
coin the term intra-operative to define the process of risk-taking in situations 
where there is a high threat of morbidity/hazards to the exploration initiative in 
the context of an overspecialised history of exploitation (success trap). My aim is 
to unearth the mechanisms, processes and interplay (if relevant) between the 
two views, details of which are not forthcoming in the present traps theory. And 
finally, before proceeding with a detailed description of the methodology that 
underpins my empirical research, it is worth reiterating that the theme of this 
thesis is ambisinisterity, with a success trap being a specific type of 
ambisinisterity. Thus, in advancing the logic of exploration under-adaptation, my 
immediate motivation is to contribute to ambisinisterity, traps and process 
theory, and as a secondary objective, to learning and risk literature streams as 
the opportunities arise.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY (The XXX Case Study) 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter explores the methodology for the empirical part of this thesis, which 
addresses the much neglected theoretical domain of a success trap from the 
perspective of exploration under-adaptation in low munificence segments of 
emerging market contexts. Specifically, in this chapter I outline the research 
context, design and rationale, followed by the data collection and analysis 
procedures.  
 
4.2. Research Design, Setting and Rationale 
My research examines how learning and intra-operative risk-taking processes 
(and their possible interaction) precipitated exploration under-adaptation. Given 
the lack of prior theoretical insight, I utilised an inductive qualitative case study 
methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989). As Attride-Stirling (2001:403) argues, “the value 
of qualitative research lies in its exploratory and explanatory power”. It enables 
the researcher to make sense of the process by which events and actions take 
place (Maxwell, 1996) and is particularly apposite for theory building of novel 
phenomena which extant theory neglects to explain (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2003). 
As is typical with inductive research, I utilised purposive sampling (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Flick, 2009). My overall sampling logic was to find a MNC encumbered by a 
success trap in an emerging market in which I could track the development of an 
exploratory project. This would allow me to examine the learning and intra-
operative risk-taking at the level of a single unit of analysis (the exploratory 
project), whilst concurrently situating it as part of a larger set of experiences 
within the rest of the (exploitation-oriented) organisation (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2011). On the basis of this sampling logic, XXX Healthcare in India proved the 
perfect fit. Firstly, India was particularly interesting because historically under-
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adaptation of exploration has resulted in the most heinous consequences, such 
as infanticide (associated with GE low cost ultrasound machine), suicides 
(associated with micro-financing) and other socially destabilising outcomes for 
the disenfranchised (Hart & London, 2005; London & Rondinelli, 2003). As such, 
the Indian context would benefit greatly from a scholarly review that sheds light 
on this phenomenon. Furthermore, XXX Healthcare presented an environment 
with both a strong systemic proclivity towards exploitation (evidenced by a 
historical focus on the top of the pyramid markets), combined with a highly 
motivated drive towards the implementation of an exploratory project focused 
on the disenfranchised market segments, which was later rescinded, making it a 
perfect fit for my research. The following section provides a more detailed 
breakdown of the research setting.  
4.2.1. Research setting 
XXX Healthcare, India, is part of the premier XXX Group, known for innovation 
and product excellence. XXX India’s operations comprise a number of specialised 
units, one of which is its Healthcare division. Until recently, this division focused 
on B2B (business to business) transactions, selling imported products from 
various global XXX subsidiaries to healthcare providers in Tier A (the wealthiest) 
markets across India. Healthcare providers include: large multi-specialty 
hospitals and small clinics, dental and orthodontic practitioners and 
pharmaceutical companies. Given its focus on imported products, XXX’s major 
competency had historically been trade related, including but not limited to 
logistics, distribution and sales. Its business model was decidedly exploitation-
oriented, premised on pushing high-quality, high-margin, imported products. 
Growth was largely driven by product differentiation, introducing new product 
categories and building exceptional customer relationships with high-income 
healthcare providers. 
Within the last three years however, XXX Healthcare began developing the 
infrastructure to penetrate lower income, or Tier B and C markets (low income, 
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disenfranchised segments of the market), as part of a wider strategy, termed 
localisation. This would not only attenuate some of the challenges of operating in 
a mature market, but also leverage the vast potential opening up in lower 
income segments of the Indian market (see a detailed list of reasons in Table 5 
below and additional evidence in Figure 4 below). The first step of localisation 
was acquiring funding from its Global Investments Divisions to construct a 
factory to manufacture low cost products. As the construction of the factory 
progressed, the Executives became concerned over the inherent limit to which 
the existing sales force (hereinafter the Core Team) could (a) absorb the factory’s 
surplus/utilise its full capacity when it ramps up, and (b) effectively generate 
growth in market segments beyond its Tier A stronghold, given its lack of prior 
experience in poverty prone markets. This precipitated the development of a 
new Unit called Project Break Out or PBO. 
At the outset, the PBO focused specifically on the sale of locally produced 
medical consumables for Tier B/C in India. This unit is characterised as 
exploration-oriented (Levinthal & March, 1993) because XXX could not leverage 
existing internal assets and replicate current business models (Tallman, 1991; 
Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998) to serve this new customer segment. Instead, it had 
to engage in “experimentation with new alternatives” with returns that are 
“uncertain, distant and often negative” (March, 1991:85). In less than eighteen 
(18) months, XXX retracted this exploratory agenda, which was signalled by 
refocusing the PBO on market segments closer to Tier A (see Table 5 below for 
additional details). The case follows the PBO unit from its conceptualisation to 
the point where it was rescinded, and presents a fascinating story of exploration 
under-adaptation, in which learning and intra-operative risk processes unfolded. 
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Table 5 - Research setting 
Historical 
business in India 
focused on Tier A 
Rationale for Localisation & 
exploration of Tier B/C 
Rescinding of exploration (Tier 
B/C) and refocus on exploitation 
“XXX India has 
always been a 
trading sort of a 
company where 
they import 
products and sell 
them to the top 
markets in India” 
 
“We traditionally 
always focused on 
metros in the Tier 
A cities, so while 
that will always be 
our core market, 
we have not 
explored the other 
markets at all. “ 
 
“We don’t have a 
large glaring 
history, or a 
project example in 
the past, which I 
can share with 
you that shows a 
grand Tier B and 
Tier C play.” 
 
 
 
“The whole idea was to increase our 
local footprints to meet the local 
market requirements, and improve our 
whole understanding of the Indian 
market and customise our offering to 
what the Indian market needs, rather 
than just to look at US products to be 
sold in the Indian market” 
 
“The rationalisation for it was to 
appeal to a broader cross section of 
society; i.e., make the transaction 
costs more affordable by bringing 
down costs per purchase and 
customising what is required in India.” 
 
“Healthcare growing at around 13 to 
14% growth over the last few years 
and then going forward, that’s what 
all positions say, but actually it is not a 
homogenous growth where 12-14% 
grows to 10-11% in your metros and 
top cities, actually around 18-19% in 
Tier B and C, so the real growth that 
comes from B and C and so much from 
Tier A, so that has been a powerful 
driver.” 
 
 
 
Rescinding of exploration: 
“It is now a coverage model, so 
there is some movement towards 
the lower end, but nowhere close 
to the bottom of the pyramid, but 
there is definitely still some 
movement towards a lower end 
from where we started.” 
 
“So we are clear now that we are 
only talking about skimming Tier B, 
and even in the way we define it 
may be misleading; we are looking 
at all those cities where we are not 
present as a XXX person, so it is 
just a penetration strategy.”  
 
“When you think about it, we are 
still very small compared to what 
the entire market, so even the 
penetration of the top part of Tier 
B itself is such a huge leap for us, 
so to really look at the bottom of 
the pyramid is a bit unreasonable.” 
 
“We are at this point in time not 
totally aiming the Tier C ….. we are 
basically trying to fit  ourselves into 
the upper crest of Tier B …. we are 
well placed in Tier A, we are well 
placed in core business, we already 
have some coverage in the upper 
crest of Tier B, but still we have 
some gaps which we will address 
through Project Outbreak.” 
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Historical 
business in India 
focused on Tier A 
Rationale for Localisation & 
exploration of Tier B/C 
Rescinding of exploration (Tier 
B/C) and refocus on exploitation 
 
 
 
“Take the currency impact, for 
example, as the first point, that’s only 
made the vision on localization even 
stronger; now we realized that the 
lesser we are dependent on the 
imports, the better it is, and then we 
have protection from currency 
fluctuations ‘ the rationalisation for it 
was to appeal to a broader cross 
section of society i.e. make the 
transaction costs more affordable, by 
bringing down costs per purchase and 
customising what is required in India” 
 
“Basically, [the idea] was there for 
over a decade in mind of one or two 
individuals and maybe in the past 5-6 
years we started pitching it. We 
thought we could really help to create 
a differentiation and small economic 
value to the customer where customer 
looking for a lower price point and a 
higher economic value so we had some 
idea, but finally this concrete thing 
came up when we had a chance to 
have our own local manufacturing in 
India so we could make customize as 
per the requirement, and that’s the 
time we started working on [Tier 
B/C].” 
 
“Going ahead is actually an economic 
compulsion ....in India is happening 
there so you better ...., you don’t want 
to be the one left out because getting 
left out means that one day Tier A will 
also be taken away from you; we just 
can’t hold onto it by not doing 
anything else.” 
Re-establishment of exploitation: 
 
“Under X (the old MD) and I guess 
the healthcare global team before 
the current one, we were growth 
focused so I guess this is where 
localisation came in. Now, with the 
new MD in India and global, I guess 
productivity, and efficiency, 
reduced costs and increased profit 
and margin game – all these things 
are key words right now in India. 
Yes, 3 years ago growth and 
expansion was the focus, right now 
it’s consolidation, right now its 
operational efficiency and 
removing all the flab completely, 
removing unnecessary cost!  
Because of this mandate efficiency 
people do look at the PBO with a 
bit more with vigor in terms of are 
we getting maximum impact for 
our initiatives.” 
 
“So there is a lot of investment in 
localisation and that I think is 
going to stop for some time 
because we want to see what we 
are doing and get some benefits 
from what we have invested 
already.” 
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Historical 
business in India 
focused on Tier A 
Rationale for Localisation & 
exploration of Tier B/C 
Rescinding of exploration (Tier 
B/C) and refocus on exploitation 
 
 
 
“Our market is absolutely mature …… 
extremely; each and every person sells 
the [medical plasters and bandages] 
today, and we found that some people 
from the lower tiers are now 
encroaching on our space, so we need 
to find new avenues for growth fast.” 
 
“One day it starts shrinking then you 
are worried and one day when 
something from there starts attacking 
your core things, that’s when you 
really get worried so that’s what we 
have seen happening especially in my 
business that there are products and 
companies which are catering to the 
customers, and for them it will be a 
very simple up move; they will not 
have any challenge of cannibalization 
this side and that side, they will make 
their moves much more quickly. So we 
think it is good to engage at that level; 
of course you will gain growth in 
business, but I think when we started 
this it was a in fact keeping that 
competition at an arm’s length, we will 
engage you in your market only and 
we will not let you come over to our 
side and fight the battle so it’s like that 
is how we had started thinking about 
it.” 
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Figure 4 - Overview of XXX’s market penetration illustrating negligible presence in Tier B/C   
 
 
4.3.  Data Collection 
4.3.1. Background 
Data was collected over a one and a half year period, from March 2013 to August 
2014. It warrants brief mention here that prior to the commencement of the 
study I spent two weeks in Bangalore and Chennai in India, to get a sense of the 
landscape, as it specifically relates to MNC operations in disenfranchised market 
segments. This involved meeting with Senior Executives at FMCGs, owners of 
intermediary firms who consult to MNCs wishing to penetrate low income 
markets (e.g. VISHESH), indigenous Indian MNCs that focus on poverty prone 
market segments, as well as site visits to rural BOP communities in Hyderabad 
and Umbra Pradesh. This was beneficial for two reasons. Firstly, it afforded me 
the ability to acquire information that would facilitate my purposive sampling of 
the most appropriate case based on first hand interaction with Executives within 
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MNCs. Secondly, given the under-explored nature of my phenomenon of interest 
(the BOP), especially in the setting of large, established firms, it precipitated a 
number of significant changes en route, regarding how I viewed the key 
constructs. In particular, the experience provided valuable contextual 
information and directed me to eschew Business Model innovation as a 
promising theoretical approach, as ambisinisterity (failure to explore and exploit) 
appeared more relevant. 
Securing XXX as a research setting perhaps constituted the most difficult part of 
the process, which took more than six months. However, once the XXX 
confidentiality agreement was signed, access to the organisation and its key 
members proved relatively straightforward until the end of the case, when the 
organisation fell into a state of flux. Thus, the time I invested to secure the 
organisation was well worth the effort based on the fit with my phenomenon of 
interest and the dearth of similar comparative longitudinal single case studies in 
the literature in resource-constrained settings (Linna, 2013). 
4.3.2. Research Methods 
My study relied on several sources of data with semi-structured interviews being 
the primary source of insight and the participant observation and archival data 
being used mainly to contextualise or corroborate the former. This approach was 
adopted in line with Flick (2009), who states that utilising multiple methods 
allows for between method triangulation, which improves the degree of 
accuracy of the emergent theory.  
4.3.2.1. Archival Data 
Starting with archival data, I analysed more than 1200 pages from secondary 
sources. Publicly available data included: press clippings on XXX’s position on the 
BOP, Healthcare industry reports and XXX published annual reports. These were 
supplemented by client data (Flick, 2009), which included business cases, 
organisational charts, performance data and consulting reports. I utilised the 
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documentation I collected as a means of corroborating facts and the authenticity 
of some of the historical claims (e.g., why the PBO was started). Beyond context, 
archival data helped to identify learning outcomes (performance of the PBO 
unit), learning output (included in Microsoft Power Point presentations), as well 
as details about the medical consumables market, in terms of scope, topography 
and distribution. Although attempts were made to access archival data on 
existing XXX protocols and processes to inform the intra-operative risk-taking 
process, due to a lack of documentation on the part of XXX, this was not 
available. Furthermore, in collecting archival data, every attempt was made to 
ensure that all the data I received met the four criteria of authenticity (genuine), 
credibility (distortion/error-free), representativeness and meaning 
(comprehensible and clear) (Flick, 2009). To achieve this I solicited documents 
through the Head of Strategy/the head of the PBO who played an intermediary 
role, checking the authenticity of the documents sent to me, ensuring I had the 
correct and latest version, since version control appeared to be a problem when I 
started collecting information.  
4.3.2.2. Participant Observation 
In contrast to archival data, participant observation was undertaken to gain 
insight of XXX’s operations at the BOP in situ (see Yin, 2003). Here, purposive 
sampling was used to identify relevant clients (hospitals and nursing homes) to 
visit. A visit comprised accompanying a PBO/XXX salesman to Tier B/C cities and 
towns. I negotiated access to as much variety as possible in my choice of sites 
(e.g., ten sites, rural and urban, public hospitals and private nursing homes) and 
XXX was accommodating. However, the topography and geographical expanse of 
India, combined with language barriers, made it impossible not to discriminate 
somewhat when weighing choices of places to visit, thus making some degree of 
subjective impressions unavoidable. In the end, given the transactional nature of 
the sales visits (I was only allowed a small window of opportunity to ask one or 
two questions, at maximum, and could not engage directly with patients) my 
existence was somewhat unobtrusive (Miles & Huberman, 1994), minimising my 
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contamination of the setting. The results of the participant observation exercise 
were recorded in notes. Whilst the conclusions drawn from ten days of 
participant observation were of course limited, this data collection method 
proved invaluable in helping me to understand the context within which the PBO 
operated, the XXX jargon and many examples provided in the interviews. It also 
provided some, although limited, exposure to the BOP as a general setting.  
4.3.2.3. The Interview 
The vast majority of my data was sourced via semi-structured interviews. In total, 
fifty (50) interviews ( See table 6) were conducted over four stages, to facilitate 
the analysis of dynamic changes over time in the learning and intra-operative risk 
processes associated with exploration under-adaptation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Flick, 
2009). This process also enabled me to use subsequent interviews to validate 
information and initial findings gleaned from prior batches of interviews. 
Interviews took place at XXX headquarters in Bangalore, with the exception of 
salespersons’ interviews, which were usually conducted via telephone due to the 
nature of their job, which required regular travel to other regions in India. My 
first interviews involved the Head of the PBO, the Head of Strategy and other 
members of the TMT, who then helped to identify other informants via 
snowballing. As the interview process evolved, I also proactively ensured that I 
sampled across: 
 three dimensions - Exploration (informants involved in PBO), Exploitation 
(informants involved in the Core Team), and Executives (TMT).  
 the different levels of hierarchy - heads to middle managers to sales force 
 the different functional areas (R&D, Marketing, Sales ).  
Gathering data from participants at multiple hierarchical levels and from multiple 
parts of the MNC (triangulation amongst respondents) is a well recognised 
approach for reducing potential biases, allowing claims to be confirmed and/or 
contradicted via multiple sources (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010).  
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At the beginning of most interviews in the earlier rounds, the Head of the PBO 
introduced me, illustrating his support for my research and requested that the 
informant be open/candid in answering my questions. Then each participant was 
informed that I signed a confidentiality agreement and the nature of the 
restrictions (which included anonymity). I then disclosed my background and 
broad research aims to put participants at ease and requested verbal consent to 
tape the interview, which was given by all participants, with the exception of 
one. The shortest interview lasted twenty-five (25) minutes and the longest one 
hundred and twenty (120) minutes, with an average of sixty-five (65) minutes. I 
stopped interviewing when I reached meaning saturation, which suggests that a 
more detailed understanding, new surprises, representations or insights would 
not be achieved by conducting more interviews (Gaskell, 2000).   
Each interview was roughly divided into 4 parts.  The first part focused on the 
PBO’s history (or as the research progressed, the more recent history since my 
last visit), in order to establish a chronology of events from different vantage 
points within the organisation. To achieve this, I asked open-ended questions 
that focused on the informants’ stream of experiences (e.g., Why did XXX initially 
enter the BOP?), in order to avoid broad speculation that was not grounded in 
specific realities (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). The second part of the interview 
represented more general questions about the performance of the PBO, which 
was used as a proxy for learning performance as outlined in my literature review. 
In the second part, I also asked about the challenges or advances being made 
with respect to the PBO. These questions were deliberately non-directive 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Bingham et al., 2007), in order to let the inductive process 
unearth new insights which were not predefined a priori. As an example, it was 
during this line of questioning that an informant indicated a staff freeze was an 
early hazard to the exploration agenda, and this precipitated more direct 
questions, which later informed my assertions about the intra-operative risk 
process. This approach accorded with Binghnam & Eisenhardt (2011:1443) who 
purport that “The technique of asking different questions (i.e., non-directive and 
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directive) provides a stronger grounding of theoretical insights and mitigates bias 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Bingham et al., 2007).” The third part of the interview 
addressed learning more formally, with direct probing questions like: “What did 
you do to try to understand the Tier B/C market?” (types of learning); “What did 
you learn from that?” (content of learning); “Describe the process – break it 
down for me step by step?” (sequence of learning); “How did you use that 
information/What was the result?” (learning outcome); “What changed as a 
result of that learning?” (learning output); “What additional insights did you 
gain?” (learning output). Of like importance was the last part of the interview, 
which focused on the intra-operative risk-taking process, which included 
questions like: “What are the most important things that frustrated your 
attempts to tackle the BOP market?”; “What established rules/protocols/routines 
placed major restrictions on the PBO agenda?” These types of questions focused 
on examining the sources of, and reasons for, intra-operative risk-taking whilst 
questions like: “How did the organisation deal with that hazard?” and “When 
there were challenges what did you do? Why was that considered the best 
option?” helped to identify the type of intra-operative risk-taking utilised; e.g., 
skirting rules.  [See Appendix A for a more detailed Topic Guide.] 
On the whole, most key informants were interviewed more than once. And as 
per Eisenhardt (1989), brief notes on each interview were made to capture my 
initial impression. With the exception of a few interviews (which were 
transcribed by myself), all interviews were transcribed verbatim by a third party 
transcription company, recommended by the Indian Institute of Management 
(IIM) for its professionalism and confidentiality. This approach was used to 
increase the accuracy of the transcription, given some of the informants’ strong 
Indian accents, references to complex product terms, regions/cities in India and 
occasionally Hindi terms, which made accurate comprehension of the tape 
recordings more difficult than face-to-face interviews. On receiving 
transcriptions, I reviewed each for accuracy and made changes where necessary, 
in line with my contextual understanding of the participants’ responses. I also 
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triangulated interview data with observations and archival data to improve 
accuracy and completeness. Furthermore, by juxtaposing real time and 
retrospective longitudinal data, potential informant bias was minimised (Golden, 
1992; Leonard-Barton, 1990) and this increased my confidence in my 
interpretation of the evolution of exploration under-adaptation and the factors 
and mechanisms that drive it (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009). Bingham & Eisenhardt 
(2011:1440) further outline the benefit of this approach “retrospective data 
enables more efficient collection of multiple observations of learning (leading to 
better grounding and external validity), while real-time data collection deepens 
the understanding of how events evolve (improving internal validity) (Leonard-
Barton, 1990)”.   
Table 6 – Interviewees  
Position/ Change of position First 
interview 
Second 
Interview 
Third 
interview 
Site visit/ 
discussions & 
observations 
TMT – Head Division 1  x x     
TMT –Head of Factory Project  
Head of  Strategy  
x x x    
TMT – Head of Strategy  Head  
Division 2  
x x x    
TMT – Division 3 Head x x     
TMT – Managing Director (former) x    
TMT – Managing Director (new) x x     
TMT – Quality/ Regulations 
Manager  
x x  *   
Head of PBO x x x x 
National Key Account Manager  x x   
National Sales Manager x x   
PBO Sales/Area Sales Manager  x x   
Regional Sales Manager  RSM & 
Product Portfolio Manager 
x x   
Black belt – Lean Six Sigma  x    
Marketing Manager exited XXX x x   
Management Trainee exited XXX x    
Head of R&D  x x x  
National Sales Manager– Division 1 
 
x x   
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Position/ Change of position First 
interview 
Second 
Interview 
Third 
interview 
Site visit/ 
discussions & 
observations 
Regional Market Development 
Manager – Asia/Pacific 
x x   
PBO Area Sales Manager x   x 
Team Leader – Sales x   x 
Marketing  Manager- Division 3 x    
Area Sales Manager – Division 3 x    
Area Manager - Project Outbreak x x   
Marketer – Division 3 x    
Regional Sales Manager – Division 1 x x   
Regional Sales Manager – Division 3 x x   
Marketing Manager – Division 1 x    
Regional Sales Manager- Division 3 x    
4.4. Data Analysis 
Having collected my data, I began by synthesising the data into a case history, 
which described the chronology/order of events and the rationale behind various 
changes. Then I utilised thematic analysis, which comprised three stages to 
analyse my data. My general approach was guided by procedures recommended 
by Miles & Huberman (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989), and I also utilised NVivo 
software (version 10) to help codify and analyse transcripts (Bazeley, 2007).  I 
chose to code the data from the two dominant perspectives together (rather 
than code learning first, and then intra-operative risk-taking), as this would help 
to examine the concepts individually, but also open up the potential to examine 
the interplay between the two constructs (Harrison & Rouse, 2015). I coded 
intra-operative risk from informants articulated statements. These statements 
emerged from the semi-structured interviews, as the archival and participant 
observation bore little relevance to this area. In contrast, the coding for the 
learning perspective relied heavily on responses to the semi-structured 
interviews, but also considered notes from the participant observation and 
archival data (particularly in the area of learning outcome). Here, I followed the 
approach utilised by Inkpen’s (2005) case study of the NUMMI, where the 
performance of learning was based on a combination of statements from senior 
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management and objective data, where available. Furthermore, for both the 
learning and the intra-operative risk views, I considered something relevant 
when two members of the TMT or two levels of persons; e.g., TMT and another 
level, concurred, reflecting a collective understanding which is appropriate, given 
that the level of abstraction of success traps theory is at the organisation level. 
Finally, at this stage I also used memos to make note of the more nuanced points 
about how intra-operative risk-taking affected learning and vice versa.  
The second phase of thematic data analysis involved developing second order 
themes through axial coding, which involved linking the first order categories 
together to suggest more abstract theoretical categories. Through an inductive, 
recursive process, I reduced the descriptive codes to interpretative clusters 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).  I assessed whether my new codes were qualitatively 
similar or different in character and purpose, using two questions to guide the 
clustering. The first question, “Is this code similar to that code?”, helped me to 
develop internally consistent clusters, and the second, “Are these codes different 
from those codes?”, was intended to ensure that the clusters were discrete. I 
reviewed this several times, going back to the data to refine codes and ensure 
categorical fidelity of the emerging codes. As my theory begun to emerge, I 
related my findings to ambisinisterity literature to highlight similarities and 
differences (Eisenhardt, 2009), making note of the confirming, as well as 
contradictory points. 
In the third stage, I began iterating between data and theory more frequently to 
inform the patterns I was beginning to see. Here, I focused on a wider array of 
theory – ambidexterity theory, incumbent failure theory, success traps, failure 
traps and process literature (e.g., see Burgelman, 1991/2002), and as a 
secondary exercise, learning and risk theory. I then consolidated the second 
order themes into two primary constructs – accelerated learning and divergence 
(see Tree diagram in Figure 5 below for details), and developed an initial 
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conceptual model. Chapter Five (5) presents the findings of this thematic 
analysis, the initial conceptual model and the chronology of key events. 
The final phase of my analysis involved understanding how accelerated learning 
and divergence mechanisms dynamically changed over time. Here, I focused on 
“detecting the patterns” among the various learning and intra-operative risk 
mechanisms and used tabular forms and charts to map the dynamic process. As 
this part of the analysis process progressed, there was a recognition that 
different combinations of accelerated learning and divergence occurred and 
interacted at different stages of the under-adaptation process and this bore fruit 
in a re-conceptualisation of the conceptual model, the identification of force 
fixing and force fitting mechanisms to explain the interaction between out two 
dominant research domains and other novel insights associated. The results are 
presented in Chapter Six (6). 
To close off this section on data analysis, it warrants mentioning that in both 
findings chapters, I highlighted parts of the narrative as thick descriptions 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985), which provided support for various elements of my 
theory. 
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Figure 5 - Tree Diagram: Schematic of outcome of thematic analysis 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Limitations 
Virtually all research has its limitations. “According to the positivist outlook, the 
biggest limitation of a case study has been its virtual inability to provide a sound 
basis for the generalization of study findings” (Mariotto et al., 2014:360). 
Mariotto et al. (2014) went on to say that where a single case study is involved, 
the implications of this limitation are even more significant. With that said 
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however, methodologically, in conducting a single case study I was able to reap 
the benefit that broad industry factors would be held constant, minimising 
potentially confounding influences. Furthermore, every effort was taken to 
observe rigorous research procedures, which are outlined in the section that 
follows. 
A further noteworthy limitation of this study was associated with the binding 
confidentiality agreement. As a result, detailed product/proprietary information, 
or competitive market position data ascertained through archival data could not 
be included in this thesis as evidence. Nevertheless, this was not viewed as a 
major restriction because the process-based nature of my research meant that 
the confidentiality agreement had little negative impact on the presentation of 
the findings of my analysis.   
In part related to the confidentiality agreement, there were two additional, but 
minor limitations with regard to the interviews conducted that also warrant 
mentioning. Firstly, interviews comprised only present employees, as the 
confidentiality agreement barred me from speaking to ex-employees without the 
permission of XXX. However, this proved not particularly restrictive because I had 
at least one interview with all informants who were heavily involved and who 
had influenced the decision-making in the period prior to the start of my unit of 
analysis, the PBO. Perhaps more challenging than the confidentiality agreement 
was the level of turnover and staff transfers during the period of my study. On 
the plus side, this piqued my interest for further enquiry, but on the negative 
side, it inhibited my goal to interview each key informant at least twice. Due to a 
change in the Managing Director and also the Six Sigma expert, I did not achieve 
this aim. This was initially concerning because, as Flick (2009) asserts, being able 
to interview informants multiple times proves critically important to facilitate the 
ability to work through an iterative process of data collection and theory 
development (Flick, 2009). However, the fact that all but two key informants 
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were interviewed twice (with some even three times) limited the impact of staff 
turnover on my study. 
4.6. Quality Standards 
Table 7 below summarises steps undertaken (some already discussed) to ensure 
the quality of this empirical research in line with the six quality indicators by 
Gaskell & Bauer (2000).  
Table 7 – Quality Standards 
Criteria Evidence 
Triangulation refers to 
approaching a phenomenon 
from two or more methods or 
perspectives.  
 
 
Triangulation: 
I employed different types of triangulation (Flick, 2006):        
- Theoretical triangulation by combining different theoretical 
perspectives (including learning, risk etc.) (Denzin, 1989). 
- Between method triangulation via the use of interviews, 
archival data and participant observation.  
- Triangulation amongst respondents - Gathering data from 
participants at multiple hierarchical levels and from multiple 
parts of the MNC reduced potential biases of individual 
participants by allowing claims to be confirmed and/or 
complemented by multiple sources (Martin & Eisenhardt, 
2010). 
Reflexivity implies that before 
and after the data collection, 
the researcher is no longer 
the same person.  
Care was taken during the participant observation not to 
contaminate the interactions. However, exposure to the BOP 
enhanced my need to explore research avenues that does no 
harm to the disenfranchised.  
Transparency and Procedural 
clarity relates to the way the 
data is collected. 
Many standard protocols for capturing emerging themes in 
field research were followed. e.g.,  With a single exception, all 
interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed 
verbatim, notes were taken after each meeting, etc. 
Corpus construction As stated above, a broad range of respondents was selected 
and I only stopped interviewing when I reached meaningful 
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Criteria Evidence 
“is functionally equivalent to 
representative sampling and 
sample size, but with the 
different aim of maximizing 
the variety of unknown 
representations” (Gaskell & 
Bauer, 2000:347). 
saturation. 
 
Thick description provides 
sufficient details for the 
reader to assess the 
assertions of the research 
Verbatim reporting of sources and where possible detailed 
quotes were used. Special care was taken to include quotes in 
relation to the context of the BOP so as to provide the reader 
with insight into the context in which this research was 
undertaken. 
Surprise as a contribution to 
theory and/or common sense 
suggests that it is important 
that the research bears some 
contrary findings to the 
reader’s expectations 
Initially I expected this research to generate factors in relation 
to Business model innovation. The emergence of 
ambidexterity during the preliminary research trip was 
unexpected. Particularly unexpected was also the combination 
of mechanisms which precipitated exploration under 
adaptation.  
 
4.7. Ethical Considerations  
Of like importance to the quality controls underpinning this research was 
attention to ethical considerations particularly because the research context 
touches on the most vulnerable and disenfranchised/poor individuals in 
emerging market contexts.   
Ethical considerations were guided by LSE’s Research Ethics Policy and were kept 
uppermost throughout my research process. According to Saunders et al. 
(2009:184), research ethics is about “how we formulate and clarify our research 
topic, design our research and gain access, collect data, process and store our 
data, analyse data and write up our research findings in a moral and responsible 
way.” The overarching ethical principle that I was guided by is that no harm 
should come to any party involved in the research, from those involved in 
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granting access, to those who actively participated in the research and those 
whom the results might impact upon.  
To ensure no harm came to the participants, I respected all tenets of the 
confidentiality agreement including interviewee anonymity which meant that 
quotations are not attributed to any named person or position within XXX (with a 
few rare exceptions), as in many instances only one or two persons held a unique 
post; e.g., Head of PBO. As a further precaution, I have liaised with the Research 
Degrees Unit and gained approval for redacting parts of this thesis before 
submitting it to LSE for electronic publication. Finally, it should be noted that 
although the focus of my research is on the BOP, I had very limited interaction 
with the poor and disenfranchised, and neither said interaction, nor any aspect 
of these research findings can be deemed to do them any harm.  
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research design and methodology utilised to address 
the research question: How and why does exploration under-adaptation evolve 
in resource-constrained emerging market contexts from a learning and risk 
perspective? What are the mechanisms by which it occurs? As such it outlines 
the logic behind the purposive sampling of XXX, as well as justification for the 
data collection approaches and a description of the data analysis methods. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the limitations, quality and ethical 
considerations, which were taken into account in this research.  
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CHAPTER 5: Findings - The Mechanisms (Accelerated 
Learning and Divergence) 
5.1. Chapter overview 
My research examines: How and why does exploration under-adaptation evolve 
in resource-constrained emerging market contexts from a learning and risk 
perspective? What are the mechanisms by which it occurs? This chapter 
presents my initial findings, which briefly touches on the first question (which 
will be addressed more fully in the next chapter), but is arguably more focused 
on the second research question. With respect to the first question I present a 
chronological description of the development of the PBO, from its emergence to 
the point at which exploration was rescinded in favour of exploitation. Then I 
address the second research question by describing two categories of 
mechanisms that led to exploration under-adaptation: accelerated learning and 
divergence, which accord with my two research domains - learning and intra-
operative risk-taking, respectively. By way of brief preview, from the learning 
perspective, I discovered two sets of mechanisms (rapid acclimatisation and 
compression) that precipitated under-adaptation by negatively impacting 
learning outcomes31 or learning output32. From an intra-operative risk-taking 
perspective, I postulate that the process of evading scrutiny and delaying 
scrutiny are key drivers of under-adaptation, as they signal that the MNC did not 
create formal discretionary space (e.g., through new protocols, schedules, and 
routines), to allow exploration to perpetuate. 
In this chapter, I also present my ‘emerging’ conceptual model (see Figure 6 
below), where I initially considered divergence on par with accelerated learning – 
both contributing equally to under-adaptation. At the point at which this early 
                                                     
31
 The outcome of learning based on a combination of objective data and statements from senior 
management. 
32
 The output of learning takes the form of new activities, knowledge, or insight gained (see Miner et al., 
2001). 
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iteration of the conceptual model was developed, the interaction between the 
two categories of mechanisms was not fully established. Furthermore, isolating 
them temporarily in this chapter allowed for a singular focus on each set of 
mechanisms, ensuring that analytic emphasis on reciprocity/interplay does not 
distract from inquiry into the core processes and mechanisms themselves. It 
warrants brief mention here, that in Chapter 6, I revise the conceptual model by 
considering more fully the interaction between learning and intra-organisational 
risk taking mechanisms, and I also extend the analysis to include some insights 
related to dynamic changes in the exploration under-adaptation process. 
Figure 6 – Emerging Process of Exploration Under-adaptation 
 
5.2. Chronology of Key Events 
This section establishes the chronology of key relevant events covering the 
period prior to XXX’s establishment of the PBO until the retraction of its 
exploratory agenda.33 It addresses the question how did exploration under-
adaptation evolve. The events associated with the key locus of my study are 
delineated over three phases: Conceptualisation, Ramping-up and Go-live. The 
                                                     
33
 To be clear, from a business standpoint the exploration initiative may be characterized as marginally 
successful as the organisation did achieve some new sales, albeit below expectations, as the PBO 
underperformed against its sales targets. However, the organisation failed to achieve its ambidexterous 
aspirations because by the end of the case, it retracted its exploration of the more disenfranchised 
segments of the market and refocused the organisation on exploitation 
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conceptualisation phase is associated with the first month of operation, where 
the primary objective was to determine the viability of the Tier B/C market, 
whilst the Ramping-up phase focused on structuring and resourcing the PBO. 
Combined, the Conceptualisation and Ramping-up stages comprise Birkinshaw’s 
(1997:207) definition of  “An initiative [being] essentially an entrepreneurial 
process, beginning with the identification of an opportunity and culminating in 
the commitment of resources to that opportunity.” The Go-live phase therefore 
represented the period during which the PBO was no longer considered a 
‘project’, but was considered a fully established Unit.  
I present my event chronology in tabular form (See Table 8) in the tradition of 
other process theorists (e.g., see Burgelman, 1991), so that as I progress through 
the findings, reference can be made to the tabular narrative via a simple coding 
system that links aspects of the findings of the three key phases. 
Table 8 – Chronology of Events (from inception to the retraction of exploration) 
  Mth/
Yr 
 
B
ef
o
re
 t
h
e 
P
B
O
 
E1 1998 XXX Healthcare division established in 1988, which forms part of XXX 
India, a diversified company comprising of a range of products and 
services from automotive to graphical display technologies. 
E2 1988-
2008 
For over 20 years XXX focused on the sale of imported medical 
consumables, such as medical tapes (plasters), antiseptic liquids and 
small surgical tools (like scalpels), as examples. Its target market 
included large and medium-sized hospitals and nursing homes located in 
the top richest cities across India (hereinafter, Tier A cities). Tier A 
comprised mainly the urban metros with good infrastructure (electricity, 
roads) and the existence of established intermediaries, such as 
distributors.  
E3 2000-
2010 
Over time, Healthcare division’s performance has been challenged. 
Performance has been sub-par (when compared with other subsidiaries) 
in the XXX group, due to:  
- imported product range, which exposed the subsidiary to substantive 
exchange rate risks, and 
- the highly mature/saturated market in which it operated. 
E4 2006 In 2006, XXX decided to extend its reach beyond Tier A markets. To 
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  Mth/
Yr 
 
achieve this they needed funds to construct a factory, which would 
allows XXX to customise products to the needs of the Indian market, 
thus XXX began requesting funds from XXX Global for the factory. 
E5 2011 After five (5) years of requests, XXX Global approves the construction of 
a factory (YYY) in India, to produce medical consumables that are more 
idiosyncratic to the needs of the Indian population.   
E6 2011 The approval of the factory coincided with the launch of a new strategic 
intent, defined as LOCALISATION, which utilised a tag line ‘For India, 
From India’. This involved manufacturing low cost products to meet the 
needs of the Indian market, and selling it to Tier B/C markets, which 
were defined as lower income, more price sensitive clients, located in 
less industrialised/geographically dispersed locations. 
E7 2012 Factory construction started with plans for release of the first batch of 
localised low-cost products targeted for Tier B/C in June 2013. 
P
B
O
 C
o
n
ce
p
tu
al
is
at
io
n
 
E8 Jan 
2013 
PBO established with one member of staff as the sales force for the 
localised low cost factory products due to come out of the factory in six 
(6) months. His remit to cultivate demand for the ‘localised’ factory 
products in the more disenfranchised Tier B and poverty prone Tier C 
segments of the markets without cannibalising the organisation’s Tier A 
strongholds. The emergence of the PBO meant that XXX Healthcare 
moved from a mono-dexterous firm (focused only on exploitation) to an 
ambidextrous firm (focused on balancing exploitation of the Tier A 
markets and exploration of the Tier B/C markets). 
E9 Jan 
2013 
Head of PBO develops business case with management trainee and the 
TMT – approval from the Six Sigma process granted. 
P
B
O
 R
am
p
 U
P
  
E10 Jan- 
Jun 
2013 
The Head of the PBO afforded six (6) months to build its organisation. 
New leads and early success, combined with wide geographical coverage 
meant that more staff was needed. 
E11 Mar 
2013 
In order to ramp up the PBO for localised product go-live, eight (8) 
Managers transferred from the core team, due to a wider organisation 
staff freeze.  
E12 June 
2013 
 During the six-month period, fifty (50) additional uneducated contract 
staff members were hired via a third party company, but controlled fully 
by XXX.  
E13 June 
2013 
PBO ready for factory product release. 
Li
ve
- 
Fu
lly
 
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 P
B
O
 
E10 Jun 
2013 
XXX fell behind in the production process. As such products were not 
ready by July as planned, even though the PBO was ready 
E11 Jun2 As a response XXX decided that the PBO should sell Tier A products, 
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  Mth/
Yr 
 
013 which had more complex features (sterility, water resistance, etc.), as 
well as more complex application processes. This was beyond the 
capability of the uneducated contract workers and led to lacklustre sales 
figures from the PBO. 
E12 Aug 
2013 
Second set back – When the low-cost products were ready, the unit cost 
was higher than anticipated, i.e., could not meet the liquidity and 
affordability requirements of the poor/disenfranchised. 
E13 Aug 
2013 
The organisation decided not to sacrifice margins and release the 
products at the higher price, placing pressure on the salesmen to 
acquire/increase sales. 
E14 Jun- 
Oct 
2013 
PBO sales continued to be lacklustre (40% of target). 
E15 Oct 
2013 
Representatives of the US Corporate headquarters visited to re-establish 
the primacy of XXX’s margin-driven approach to profitability. This 
demanded a high price, low volume logic similar to the Tier A model, as 
opposed to the volume maximising (low price, high volume) logic 
required to explore Tier B/ C.   
E16 Dec 
2013 
XXX recognised the difficulty in making the PBO productive by the new 
US standards. More specifically, the firm was able to estimate that it 
needed to sell ten (10) times more Tier B/C products than Tier A 
products, as the return per average hospital in Tier B/C was estimated to 
be 10% of the return per hospital in Tier A. 
E17 Jan 
2014 
In response, XXX decided to dissolve the structural separation between 
exploration (PBO) and exploitation (Core Team), replacing it with a dual 
reporting structure. In this new structure, the members of the 
exploration PBO team would be responsible to both the head of PBO 
(exploration), as well as the Regional Sales Managers (RSM) in the core 
team (exploitation). 
P
B
O
 e
xp
lo
ra
ti
o
n
 d
ec
lin
e
) E18  PBO continued to underperform, still operating at 40% of target on 
average.  
E19 Mar 
2014 
The Top Management Team reshuffled and a new CEO was appointed 
whose remit had a stringent focus on productivity, in line with the fiscal 
tightening emphasised earlier by American disciplining in 2013. 
E20 May 
2014 
PBO focus changed from Tier B/C to middle of the pyramid. This 
represented a retraction of exploration. 
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Having outlined the chronology, I now present the results of the thematic 
analysis focusing on learning (accelerated learning mechanisms) first, and then 
intra-operative risk-taking (divergence mechanisms) second. Figure 7 below is 
presented as a reminder of the key constructs in the thematic analysis, on which 
the discussions that follow are based. Additionally for each Section further 
supportive quotations follow at the end of the section. 
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Figure 7 - Tree Diagram: Schematic of outcome of thematic analysis 
 
5.3. Accelerated Learning Mechanisms 
I found evidence of accelerated learning mechanisms. The scope of these 
mechanisms include mobilising, soliciting, developing and integrating knowledge 
to meet organisational interdependencies without negatively affecting 
established Tier A/Core team operations. Whilst the range of accelerated 
learning mechanisms appears broad and diverse, the common denominator is 
the facilitation of faster entry and knowledge accumulation of the Tier B/C 
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market. In the early phases (E7-E9), XXX’s motivation to engage in accelerated 
learning was driven by external market forces vis-à-vis two important threats, 
which made establishing and progressing the exploration of Tier B/C urgent. 
Firstly, XXX was late to market (laggard) compared to other competitors. Many of 
its competitors of equal stature, like Johnson and Johnson and Becton Dickinson, 
had, as a XXX Executive described “an established Tier B/C play” and were 
beginning to generate revenue from that segment. Thus, it was felt that XXX was 
playing catch up, which motivated an accelerated approach to learning and 
knowledge development. 
“I know Johnson and Johnson and other people have this kind of model, so 
we are actually late in the game, so it made sense to do it now, rather 
than lose out later.” 
“While we were ignoring it [Tier B/C], or did not know too much about it, 
things were happening there; it was not just waiting for us to come and 
start selling there, so we find that there are companies who you may not 
innovative or something, but they just happened to be there … and are 
hence gaining ground.”  
The second reason for accelerated learning in the early phases was to counteract 
the imminent risks associated with Tier B/C competitors encroaching on XXX’s 
Tier A strongholds. Due to recent changes in regulations, a host of new 
indigenous, often smaller, Indian retailers of medical consumables were slowly 
encroaching on XXX’s segment of the market. A pattern was beginning to 
develop whereby they established some expertise in the lower income segments 
and use this experience as a base to approach niches within Tier A. XXX therefore 
saw it necessary to quickly encroach on their Tier B/C market as a defensive 
strategy. 
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“It was the threat of competition from there [Tier B/C] coming and hurting 
us in the Tier A strongholds that’s driving us to think more and more 
about Tier B and Tier C.”   
“This is more flanking to ensure that they don’t come and attack us here, 
so we need to go there [to Tier B/C]… so it’s really a defensive strategy.” 
As exploration progressed (E10-E13), XXX’s impetus for engaging in accelerated 
learning switched from external to internal motives. Firstly, XXX was motivated 
by the threat of idle capacity associated with the planned release of the localised 
laboratory products six (6) months after the PBO was established. Idle capacity 
would result if the PBO was not well-prepared (with deep knowledge of the Tier 
B/C market) to push the localised products as soon as they were launched. XXX 
therefore saw it necessary to invest heavily in accelerated learning. 
“An immediate compulsion is that the manufacturing units take off, so 
once you have a new plant, the most important thing is what is it that the 
plant should be running with some good capacity. You just can’t be 
running 10% or 20% because that will never make sense, so my immediate 
compulsion is that whatever we have made in our new plant needs to be 
sold, so there is special focus on the PBO from a very selfish perspective of 
making the plant run, and this is about asking the team to do what is our 
selfish objective.” 
Finally, XXX’s dedication to learning at pace was precipitated by self-induced 
pressures. These were based on promises made by the Managing Director to Asia 
Pack (a meeting where the Asia directors present their plans and set 
expectations), which predicted exponential short-term growth from its Tier B/C 
exploration initiative. 
“I guess X (Managing Director) was very clear even with our Asia Pack 
leadership that unless he sees the hockey stick (small dip in performance 
followed by exponential growth) in Tier B/C we are not going to invest in 
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this further, though the worrying thing for me at that point in time was 
that typically the hockey stick is plotted over the x axis for a number of 
years, he wanted to plot it over months.” 
Combined, these factors impelled the use of two broad categories of accelerated 
learning mechanisms: Rapid Acclimatisation and Compression. I start by 
discussing Rapid Acclimatisation first.  
5.3.1. Rapid Acclimatisation 
Rapid Acclimatisation relates to efforts to build, integrate and share XXX’s Tier 
B/C knowledge, whilst attempting to maintain high levels of performance in Tier 
A strongholds. It comprises:  (i) Mobilising: mobilising diverse types of learning, 
and (ii) Integrating: Integrating diverse types of learning. Both exhibited traits 
that negatively impacted learning outcomes, thereby precipitating exploration 
under-adaptation. 
5.3.1.1. Mobilising: Mobilising diverse types of learning. 
Initially, I was surprised by the diversity in types of learning that was mobilised 
particularly in the conceptualisation phase (E8-E9). Firstly, I found evidence of 
vicarious learning (Bandura, 1965), as XXX turned to other industry players for 
clues about how to interpret the unfamiliar Tier B/C market;  
“We looked into what business models other companies have been 
following, what have been the pros and cons of following a particular 
business model, how they have fought on the issues they faced, how have 
they been able to take corrective actions and what kind of corrective 
actions that have taken place, what kind of reporting structures they have 
… So before we went ahead, we looked at different and various models 
and then decided on our model.”  
“So basically he (the head of the PBO) would look at companies like J and J 
and Becton Dickinson, what are they doing in that market, he would look 
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at it from a business model perspective to determine what should his [the 
PBO] team look like, what kind of channel partners he should have, what 
sort of pricing he should have.” 
Consistent with past research, sometimes vicarious learning emerged from 
referencing 34activities (Bandura, 1965), as one Director aptly describes it:  
      “…studying and reading combined with imagination.” 35   
Other times, vicarious learning was achieved via socialisation (Bandura, 1965), 
where managers leveraged their relational networks for learning opportunities. 
This appeared to provide advantages over referencing in the form of increased 
specificity, with some information bordering on guidance and advice. As an 
example of socialisation, a member of the TMT described some advice about a 
rival institution gained by initiating a conversation with a friend about the 
profitability expectations in exploring Tier B/C:  
‘‘In fact, I was talking to someone from this company called Becton 
Dickinson (BD), they make IV needles and they did something similar, they 
did a sort of a PBO; so what he was telling me was that his experience 
was, that there is already a latent need for BD products in B and C 
markets that people were not able to access in the past because of lack of 
availability of those products. So he is saying just by having the 
distribution in place, for the first three years you don’t have to bother 
about anything else, because that latent need will start you off with good 
sales and then to expand you need education.” 
                                                     
 
35 Several instances of referencing related to low cost Jugaad innovation (‘make do’ in Hindi), Prahalad’s  work on the BOP 
(2004), Harvard Business review articles on business models. In rare cases (four informants) spoke of specific success 
stories in GE and Uni Lever, which they were exposed to via published material.  
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Furthermore, vicarious learning also emerged from leveraging serendipitous 
opportunities from chance encounters with chosen role models. XXX, in line with 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983), was selective in their choice of role models, focusing 
mainly on Johnson and Johnson and Becton Dickinson, based on their traits of 
visible success and comparable stature. A particularly interesting story involving 
one of these role models occurred at a social gathering, where a XXX Executive 
took the opportunity to approach the Managing Director of Becton Dickinson. He 
wanted to get the latter’s opinion on how far an MNC should go in reducing 
health-related product attributes (sterility, transparency, water proofing, 
adhesiveness) to meet the affordability and liquidity needs of the BOP, before 
sacrificing its quality brand name. As seen from the quote below, vicarious 
learning afforded XXX benefits beyond a purely commercial focus, to include 
philosophical and ethical advice to problems that perennially dog MNCs 
operating in poverty prone markets:  
 “So the CEO of Becton Dickinson [BD] had come [to an event] and I got an 
opportunity to ask him this question, so I said you have products which 
are amazing, like it is a typical MNC thing, you have awesome stuff, it has 
got real good quality, it has got nice attributes, great stuff, so my thing 
was the man on the street is a guy who probably hasn’t had lunch and he 
doesn’t know if he is going to get dinner or not and he has got a family to 
feed, so his reality is very different from what we are talking about so he 
would not be concerned if the needle is painless, he wouldn’t give a damn, 
he is more worried about getting food right now. So BD has these syringes 
and these needles and stuff that they were planning to make and sell to 
[Tier B/C], so my question was why would they build in stuff which adds 
cost, why don’t they make a basic stuff? So I think the answer he gave 
really sums up at a philosophical level why MNCs struggle with this thing 
[de-engineering products], his point was – I fail to find a reason not to 
give a human being in Delhi versus a human being in New York something 
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which my scientists tell me is a minimum, so if sterility is required, I need 
to give sterile product; if it adds cost, so be it.” 
In the conceptualisation phase (E8-E9), beyond vicarious learning, XXX also 
mobilised two additional types of learning:  immersion and analytical modelling 
mechanisms, which were used to garner more specific knowledge in situ. 
Immersion involved offline learning (Miner et al, 2001), where the Head of the 
PBO would travel for four weeks from town to town across India, engaging with 
potential clients to understand and map the needs of the Tier B/C market in 
more granular detail. An Executive explains in great detail the activities 
associated with immersion. 
“[The head of the PBO] would basically go as a novice, or a person who 
doesn’t understand the business, he will go and meet customers, he will 
go and meet 50-bed hospital owners, or a 100-bed hospital, he will go to 
200-bed hospitals and understand how does that function in terms of 
providing services to the patients, clearing goods and then what kind of 
practice they implement. So he would understand it from the customer’s 
perspective, and then he is meeting those customers and understanding 
from them their personal behaviour and their purchasing decision making; 
he would understand which are the key channel partners whom they buy-
in from and then he would go to those channel partners and understand 
what kind of role they play in this whole from the manufacturer to the 
hospitals, what kind of product portfolios they deal in, so it would give you 
a perspective of what channel partners should we look at, as we want to 
then grow rapidly so he would try to understand that. He would also try to 
understand what kind of margins they make at each level”  
Immersion was complemented by business analytics. This took the form of 
research undertaken by a management trainee who used sophisticated 
econometric analysis to map the structure of the Tier B/C market (liaising with 
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salesmen on the ground for additional information in situ). The management 
trainee explained the key activities in business analytics: 
“I just called them [sales men] up, gave them a product type, asked them 
to take a week or so find out from the market place how many products 
were moved last year and this year across all competitors, so we get an 
idea of what is the total surgical market for that particular product...then 
I built a regression equation. So the equation came to something like the 
estimated annual surgicals potential in a town X is 159,000 times the 
number of registered hospitals plus 19, 000.’’  
As exploration progressed, in the Ramp-up phase (E10-E13), XXX also mobilised 
new knowledge through a limited range of experiments undertaken by the PBO 
team. Experiments36 are a type of learning whereby the learner deliberately 
creates contrasting situations in order to generate systematic experience (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979 in Miner et al., 2001), or to see how actions under different 
conditions at one time produce varying outcomes at a later time. A Senior 
member of the PBO described how his unit created various sales pitches for the 
same product for target customers and went into the field to acquire first hand 
information about clients’ preferences, replicating this test across multiple 
products within the Tier B/C region. By focusing testing on a small range of 
clients, the typical costs and risks associated with experimenting were 
constrained (Miner & Haunschild, 1995 in Miner et al., 2001). 
“So, we have the first three months of test marketing where we check the 
product quality, we also took some select locations and decided to try our 
sales pitches in those places.  We did this and we saw improvement after 
the three months of testing in how we sell and the packaging, then we 
went ahead with this exact configuration moving forward.”   
                                                     
36
 Experimentation was dissimilar to XXX’s traditional/exploitation approaches, referred to as Voice of the 
customer, which typically unfolded through surveys as part of ongoing activities. 
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Contrary to my expectations, I found evidence that this wide range of learning 
types resulted in positive exploration adaptation (learning outcome), in the form 
of early successes, whereby specific benefits were outlined in relation to each 
type of learning. Firstly, consistent with extant research, vicarious learning 
allayed the challenges of uncertainty and primed XXX for rapid entry into Tier B/C 
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Cyert & March, 1963). 
“Because we wanted to be quick to reach there and then we can shuffle 
things around, because we are not good at Tier B/C and our 
understanding of the market, our best alternative was to look at other 
people who did it before.” 
Business analytics was used to compile a list of:   
 “Markets in Tier B/C where XXX can actually operate successfully, 
markets with a lot of potential, a lot of potential.” 
and  immersion  confirmed  that a Tier B/C strategy was valuable and achievable:  
 “The first phase of the PBO was market mapping, to understand what is 
the market there, what is the kind of products that are being sold and so 
from that criteria it has been quite successful [since] we have a much 
better fix on Tier B/C markets and their potential than before.” 
Furthermore, the outcome of the experiments were also positively assessed: 
“We are already seeing that using this approach [experimental] definitely 
improving our understanding of the specifics of what the channel 
partners, as well and the customers [nursing homes, hospitals] in Tier B/C 
want.”   
These findings were particularly unexpected, as it defied conventional logic 
presented by Levinthal & March (1993) that exploration returns are notably long-
term.  
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As the PBO matured through the Go-live phase (E10-E17), the range of types of 
learning significantly reduced, as did the performance of the PBO. 
“If you are trying to compare them [the PBO sales people] with 
expectations which are there, then they are not doing well, they are like 
40% of what was expected.” 
In fact, during the Go-live phase, there was little evidence of exploration-
oriented types of learning (characterised by mechanisms used for distant search 
(Cyert & March, 1963), experimentation and variation), with the exception of 
vicarious learning. Thus it appeared that using external sources of learning was 
not a perfect substitute for internal sources of learning, and a mix appears more 
optimal to deal with the inherent complexities/peculiarities of the BOP. In 
conclusion, the data illustrates that mobilising a limited range of types of 
learning was associated with negative learning outcomes, and therefore was 
recorded as a source of exploration under-adaptation.  
Table 9 – Supportive additional quotations: Mobilise diverse new types of learning 
Vicarious Learning Other- data analytics, experiments, 
immersion 
Socialisation: 
“One of the companies with the most successful 
similar model is J&J ….their Tier B/C model is very 
successful if you look at the figures; we were inspired 
by this and many other such companies as we entered 
the market.”  
“I found from a colleague that companies who have 
done it successfully like Johnson and Johnson, they 
have very strong information of the secondary sales, 
so whereas we still go by primary sales, what we sell 
to the distributor, so we know we have to eventually 
get that kind of info.” 
“J and J has this most awesome name in sutures 
across the world, so in their model sutures are a part 
Data analytics: 
“We had a management trainee 
working on understanding and mapping 
the whole market in terms of the 
opportunities, how many cities are there 
in India, how many hosp had > 1000 
beds, how many had 500-1000 - the 
whole classification. 
“He found that there is around 400 
crores of surgical business available in 
non-metro cities and if we are able to 
get about 15-20%, we can easily add 
some 70-80 crores of business from non-
metros, which is as good as or equal to 
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Vicarious Learning Other- data analytics, experiments, 
immersion 
of their PBO and their PBO model is very successful, 
but when I got some real data I found that out of… I 
have to convert all this data for you…. so they have 
like 2.5 billion Indian Rupees of sale from their PBO 
model after 6 years; but out of that 2.5 billion, 2 
billion is in sutures and only 500 million is in new [Tier 
B/C] products. In XXX my P & L (profit and loss) is 
made without Product X, which is like our ‘sutures’ 
and we have to sell only newer products. When people 
keep challenging me on the state of my P & L, I tell 
them [the Executives] just give me Product X; take it 
away from the core team [who focus on Tier A 
markets in XXX] and their P&L would be under threat 
too, and they [the Executives] do nothing, so right 
now, my P & L is the one under threat.” 
Referencing: 
“There is a lot of Harvard articles on why new 
business models [like the PBO] fail; the top articles 
give five reasons which are all so true and all of them 
are in place here [in XXX] so whenever I got frustrated, 
I just go and read those points and solutions again.” 
“I read about GE which has come up with lots of stuff, 
so they have the low cost ultrasound machine and the 
easy ECG machine and they have de-engineered a lot 
of stuff for that [Tier B/C market].” 
“Have you heard about Shakti [at Uni Lever]? – It’s a 
very good way / example where companies can really 
make meaningful outcome….. for the country 
prosperous, improving lives, as well as make money, 
there is no reason why XXX can’t do the same.” 
one of our biggest divisions.” 
Experiments (with reference to learning 
from experiments to improve selling 
techniques): 
“So we didn’t talk about products at all 
because if we go into a hospital and talk 
to them about tape they’d say forget it I’ll 
use masking tape either that or a duct 
tape. So, if you go to them and say that 
we can help you grow your profits then 
you’ve got the edge.”  
“I can assure you that nobody has 
thought of this final pitch which we use 
today.” 
Immersion: 
"So we wanted him [The Head of the 
PBO] to have an unbiased perspective of 
the whole thing to basically accelerate 
the whole process, so we had him spend 
the first few weeks going to the market 
with no preconceived notions.” 
5.3.1.2. Integrating: Integration of diverse types of learning 
Whereas mobilisation focused on the range of learning types that was 
marshalled by XXX, integration relates to the way XXX planned and combined 
(i.e., integrated) the various types of learning. This impacted learning outcomes 
in both positive and negative ways. I coin the term forward learning integration 
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to describe the adaptive version, which had positive consequences for 
exploration, and the term backward learning integration, which had maladaptive 
or negative consequences for exploration.  
With forward learning integration, XXX pre-planned and coordinated a wide 
range of learning types, their order, their timing and how learning 
responsibilities would be dispersed across the different relevant parties, and 
later integrated to provide XXX with a wide variety of experiences. This 
structured deliberate approach to learning allowed XXX to familiarise itself with 
new B2B customers, build relationships with new distributors and identify and 
understand competitors.  
“There were a few things happening parallely, so everyone was trying to 
get information on Tier B/C, but we also had [the head of the PBO] 
working on a very focused program of going out there to figure out what’s 
going on and then parallely we had another management trainee working 
on understanding the whole market in terms of the opportunity.” 
Forward learning integration was achieved via regular face-to-face sessions. At 
these sessions the objective was joint sensemaking (bridging perspectives from 
diverse domains (Weick et al., 2005) between the PBO, internal consultant and 
the Top Management Team (hereinafter TMT)). Here, negotiation of the 
meaning took place, as well as identification of gaps and additional information 
required to improve the reliability of the insights, which spurred further data 
collection activities.  
“In the beginning, I tried to build up the team to start thinking about Tier 
B/C now, brainstorm, think about what can we do, go out in the market 
and see how different people are behaving, talk to colleagues, review 
stories, whatever; start building up that whole thought process early, and 
then we would meet and chat about what we found.” 
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Again, quite surprisingly, forward learning integration was associated with 
positive learning outcomes, some similar to the benefits discussed under 
Mobilisation, but there were also links to early commercial benefits. First, 
forward learning integration was associated with the effective assessment of 
market potential:   
“We completed the market mapping to understand what is the market 
there, what is the kind of products that are being sold, and so from that 
criteria it has been quite successful [since] we have a much better fix on 
Tier B/C markets and their potential than before.”  
Second, it was credited for defining a business model:   
“When [the head of the PBO] started out, it was not a clearly laid out 
plan, it was a sketchy plan, and then he brought the moving parts 
together with X [the management trainee] and then we decided to move 
ahead.” 
Third, it led to new opportunities identification:   
“We had a coordinated effort and went into the other cities that we [XXX] 
had never gone to. We went and found many uncovered hospitals who 
were willing to take our product. So we found a lot of new opportunities 
early, it was a great success.” 
Fourth, it led to the identification of new leads:   
“They [the PBO] found all these new customers in new geographies; I was 
surprised how many good leads they found.” 
In contrast, during backward learning integration (where returns from learning 
were negative, as evidenced by PBO sales performance below target), much of 
the learning was uncoordinated and there were no longer regular joint 
consultations. I considered it backward because the knowledge and experiences 
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that existed were only integrated on the basis of concerns of need, productivity 
or profitability. As an example, when the relevant parties came together, the 
primary objective was no longer sensemaking about the idiosyncrasies of the Tier 
B/C market (which had played a prominent role in the joint consultation sessions 
in the earlier phases). Instead, these sessions focused on reporting and problem 
solving (assessing preliminary results and consulting about possible next steps to 
attain a useful outcome). On many occasions, there was also a final arbiter 
(generally a member of the TMT or an individual Executive), making a decision 
based on his/its conventions of validity, even though neither had direct 
experience or exposure to Tier B/C segments of the market.  In the absence of 
formal integration efforts, backward learning integration and its lack of a 
structured ‘joined up’ approach resulted in exploration under-adaptation. This is 
well aligned to Zollo & Winter’s (2002) proposition that deliberate approaches to 
learning are superior to “semi-automatic” experience accumulation in 
circumstances with high levels of heterogeneity and causal ambiguity, like the 
Tier B/C segment.  
Table 10 – Supportive additional quotations: Integration of diverse types of learning 
Forward Learning integration Backward Learning Integration 
“We met regularly and looked at what business 
models other companies have been following, 
what have been the pros and cons of following a 
particular business model, how they have fought 
on the issues they faced, how have they been 
able to take corrective actions and what kind of 
corrective actions that have taken place, what 
kind of reporting structures they have … So 
before we went ahead, we looked at different 
and various models and then decided on our 
model.” 
‘”We discuss Tier B/C on a regular basis and there 
is a buy-in from all the people [Executive] in 
terms of the strategy down to details of the 
implementation and execution of the plan.” 
“Absolute autonomy to the extent that the 
negative part about complete autonomy is 
they [the TMT] only get involved with the 
targets if they were more involved, then 
they will probably realize what’s not 
working.”  
“I [Head PBO] have a monthly meeting with 
them [the TMT] where I give them some 
performance, state some issues, some 
issues they say you need to figure out 
yourselves and there are some issues they 
do help out like for example training was 
becoming a big issue.” 
“Everyone looks at the new team as rogues 
and they are very afraid of any 
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cannibalization that is happening here, so 
no we don’t meet unless we have to.” 
 
5.3.2. Compression 
In contrast to rapid acclimatisation, which affected learning outcomes, 
compression relates to shortcuts taken that negatively impacted learning output 
(what was generated as a result of learning; e.g., new activities, knowledge, or 
insight gained (see Miner et al., 2001)). It comprises (i) Building: Building on the 
customary to define the novel, (ii) Generalising & Codifying: Premature 
generalisation and codification, and (iii) Synchronising: Synchronising learning 
with aggressive, fixed internal deadlines. 
5.3.2.1. Building: Building on the Customary to Define the Novel 
Building on the customary to define the novel placed limitations on the quality of 
XXX’s learning output. Here, XXX leveraged customary stakeholders (B2B 
suppliers, hospitals, nursing homes, distributors), to collect archetypical 
information (commercial oriented information) from novel sources (new 
clientele) to gain insights about Tier B/C.  Stated differently, the novelty in XXX’s 
learning process related solely to new clientele, but not the variety of 
information collected, or the variety of sources. A clear example of this is XXX’s 
approach to immersion, where its search remained biased to commercially viable 
opportunities and did not encompass the needs of non-client beneficiaries 
(patient, government), even though its objective was to increase its 
understanding of the Tier B/C market.  
OBJECTIVE: “The whole idea was to increase our local footprints to meet 
the local market requirements, and improve our whole understanding of 
the Indian market and customise our offering to what the Indian market 
needs.” 
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EXECUTION: “So although I was really focused in theory on the base of the 
pyramid market, right, or let’s say Tier B and C, or Tier C even particularly, 
the actual details of that market in terms of, you know, appealing to the 
poor and stuff is not part of the process internally in the organization, so I 
did not focus on that.” 
 “No, we did not consider interactions in terms of government offices, 
government was not a part of that exercise at this point.” 
Two key reasons were proffered for building on the customary to define the 
novel. Firstly, the firm wanted to place some structure to the high levels of 
uncertainty associated with the Tier B/C market. Secondly, there was the 
assumption that some sources of information were richer than others; i.e. can 
lead to faster productive outcomes (because XXX already knows how to work 
with these types of players).  
“It is just not productive to look into all these new things… The focus of 
our team is ideally localized products, it is, but we have also been told 
that to make these guys productive we have to ensure that they have 
someone to sell to.” 
However, XXX missed critical information, and as the exploration initiative 
matured, gaps in learning output due to these shallow search trajectories (Davis 
& Eisenhardt, 2011) that ignored beneficiaries/non-traditional players and 
Government became apparent. As an example, despite immersion and 
experimentation taking credit for collecting detailed product-related data in situ, 
there continued to be huge gaps in learning output, as it relates to which 
product attributes were valued by the Tier B/C market: 
“Even after all this, I don’t know what the market need is, maybe they 
[Tier B/C] don’t need all of these features, they just need [medical] tapes 
that are easy to fix and low cost, but everyone is now doing low cost 
tapes. We have a huge Tier A advantage in the market because we are 
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hypo-allergenic, waterproof, etc., so should we use some of that 
advantage but make it cheaper? - Do they [Tier B/C] even want that? – I 
don’t know.” 
Thus, XXX’s failure to forge deeper/vanguard relationships with parties who deal 
directly with the poor, limited its learning output and by extension its ability to 
unravel complex Tier B/C issues, precipitating exploration under-adaptation. 
5.3.2.2. Generalisation & Codification: Premature Generalisation and 
Codification 
The need to ensure that knowledge related to the Tier B/C segment of the 
market could be generalised and then codified37 quickly was noted by Executives 
as important. Two main reasons were proffered for this. Firstly, the business 
model used to explore Tier B/C was predicated on the use of primarily contract 
staff in the PBO, with an expectation that there would be potential for high levels 
of turnover. Early codification of XXX’s learning about Tier B/C was required to 
develop standardised work products like effective sales pitches, as an example; 
allowing exploration to continue, without periods of stagnation associated with 
high turnover.  
“I think the attrition levels, well the [Tier B/C] model normally assumes 
that there is some attrition because when you are talking about PBO it is 
a contract representative model, so that people will keep moving, but I 
don’t think there will be much of a challenge because we have some base 
set ups - guidelines, sales pitch, so that when new people come, they will 
not take too much time [to get up to speed].”  
                                                     
37
 Codification – A way to structure interactions, what needs to be done by whom, and these actions are 
stipulated based on information derived from the environment about Tier B/C.  
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The second reason for generalising knowledge for early codification was the 
need to demarcate the interactions between the existing core (exploitation) 
team and the new PBO, so as to pre-empt issues of cannibalisation. It therefore 
served an important coordinative function, driving decisions on how to allocate 
work between the two divisions. Thus, based on this early codification, XXX 
aimed to reduce task and role ambiguity: 
“The Tier A people would be more concentrated in terms of quality 
systems, in terms of implementing processes, which are defined as best 
practitioner’s guidelines and protocols, so those guys would be more 
quality … as you go down the tiers, say Tier B and C will be a cheaper 
resource … there will be more compromises in terms of quality.” 
However, the strong emphasis on early/premature generalisation and 
codification resulted in maladaptive learning outputs. A particularly compelling 
example relates to the problems associated with early generalisations made 
about the distinction between Tier A and Tier B/C markets. Based on data 
garnered in the conceptualisation phase, XXX codified Tier A as metro cities with 
large nursing homes and hospitals, and Tier B/C as rural cities with small to 
medium nursing homes and Government hospitals. On the basis of this broad 
distinction, it allocated different zones and types of clients to the PBO and the 
Core team. Whilst there was some expectation that there might be very small 
areas of overlap, the reality as the exploration initiative unfolded, proved far 
more complex. Given the topography of India, a Tier C hospital can be placed in 
an urban Tier A city, or a Tier A specialist hospital can be found in a remote Tier B 
town. These idiosyncrasies were far more common than expected, and resulted 
in far greater heterogeneity and overlap between the segments than was initially 
anticipated. This oversight/under estimation prompted conflicts between the 
PBO (responsible for Tier B/C) and the core team: 
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“A lot of conflicts have come in between the PBO and the core team; 
which territory is ours, which is not ours, which account is yours, which 
account is not yours, something or the other, there were lots of conflicts.”  
 “I guess the issues come also because of this territory demarcation….. 
there always used to be some business which used to happen in the Tier 
B/C markets that were awarded to the core team and all that, and they 
suddenly see a part of business going away and  given to PBO.” 
Thus early generalisation and coding precipitated missteps, which negatively 
impacted how the exploration agenda unfolded. In the example above, it 
resulted in predefined work patterns which failed to accurately reflect 
interdependencies leading to conflicts, which contributed to maladaptive 
learning outputs (exploration under-adaptation).  
5.3.2.3. Synchronising Learning with Aggressive, Fixed Internal Deadlines  
XXX’s learning output also appeared to be encumbered by reciprocal obligations 
to several fixed internal deadlines, such as Six Sigma approval process at the end 
of the first month, and the release of factory products at the end of the sixth 
month, etc. This excerpt from an interview about the immersion process 
provides a good example of a learning output driven by time horizon limitations: 
Executive: “After he went out to these town [BOP market], he [Head of 
PBO] reported back after his trips and we ensured that it did not get out 
of hand.”  
Interviewer: “Out of hand?”  
Executive: “Yes, in terms of time, we had some internal deadlines which 
we had to keep.” 
Another example of synchronising that affected learning output related to 
restraints placed on patient capital learning (where a firm or department is 
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allowed a period of time to search/increase its repository of knowledge about 
the Tier B/C market dynamics, unfettered by sales targets). Typically, a patient 
capital approach is advocated because firms operating at the BOP find it difficult 
to develop and prove their concepts within a short time frame. Kennedy & 
Novogratz (2013) (although writing in relation to patient investment capital in 
the BOP) state that the benefit is really derived over longer-term periods, years 
even. However, XXX, in an effort to align the end of the patient capital period 
with the release of factory products, compressed the former to six (6) months. 
 “He said six months you guys just go out and explore, no questions asked, 
no targets, nothing asked.”  
Of course having stringent deadlines is no proxy for pressured learning, and as 
such, repeated observation of aggressive deadlines alone does not fully 
demonstrate its overriding importance to the under-adaptation process. The 
important consequence is that these independencies between learning and fixed 
deadlines placed extensive pressure to produce learning at pace, which was first 
and foremost toilsome. One Executive stated that one reason why it was 
particularly difficult was due to the complexities of healthcare products, which 
has safety standards, lots of competitors, complex regulations and thus entails 
potentially significant planning and preparation that would precede the 
development of commercially viable options. 
“I think some timelines that we took were too aggressive …we could have 
maybe done more work and taken it more slowly; taken time and planned 
it out and maybe that might have helped. I think there were too many 
things coming out at the same time, too many new processes coming out 
at the same time… we should have realised that it would take longer time 
because being in this field that we are in, things are more complicated 
than the regular products.” 
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In addition to being toilsome, other interviewees stated that Synchronising 
compromised the quality of the learning output, as nuances were not allowed 
time to unfold, especially in relation to product attributes demanded by Tier B/C. 
“We just don’t know how much [product] differentiation had been enough 
or even if we do less of it … in the past we just over did it too much [too 
many attributes].” 
In consequence, close synchronisation between learning and fixed internal 
deadlines negatively impacted learning output, precipitating exploration under-
adaptation. 
Table 11 – Representative quotations for compression mechanism 
Building on the customary to 
define the novel 
Premature generalisation 
and codification 
Synchronise learning with 
aggressive fixed internal 
deadlines 
Interviewee: so there is a breed 
of people called the daily 
passengers and they are guys 
who work and stay 100km 
away, in the suburbs and they 
come to the city to work and 
then go back in the evening. So 
they will keep the same bus or 
the same train these guys 
besides the normal thing will 
generally go and carry product 
pack and forth, so they will go 
to the wholesaler and they will 
have a list of products that they 
need which the doctors and the 
pharmacists have told them and 
buy them in small quantities 
and put them in that small 
packs they have. At the end of 
the day they will go back home 
and then they will go to the 
chemist and give, they will give 
the material to them, so you 
“The truth about what they 
did in market is all over-laps, 
more over lap than tier 
segments, so you will find a 
small hospital in a Tier C city 
but doing some best neuro-
surgeon of that place, doing 
work there and they don’t 
mind buying the best or 
recommending the best. You 
see that and you see a large 
hospital, a Delhi or a 
Bangalore, having the 
fanciest infrastructure, but 
still it is penny-pinching as 
much as they can, so the 
market is full of over lapse 
but still, to generalize, the 
large and the big cities do 
end up getting classified as 
Tier A overall, even when we 
tried to spot these finer 
points, we still pitched them 
“The down side a little bit is 
that a really good R & D 
requires a lot time, you need 
people just to be able to 
dream, you need people to be 
able to just read, you need 
people to be able to think to 
potter around the lab. Tried 
doing something and the 
productivity led model hurts a 
little bit because you have 
already got program that they 
are working on, that already 
limited on the resource list, so 
it doesn’t too many people too 
much free time and I think 
that’s most in R & D because R 
& D is expected to dream up 
the next big thing, and I think 
that in the long-term we will 
find that to be negatively co-
related with this fast paced 
productivity approach, so my 
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Building on the customary to 
define the novel 
Premature generalisation 
and codification 
Synchronise learning with 
aggressive fixed internal 
deadlines 
have a distribution network 
which is totally unorganized 
sector, so the gap probably 
makes enough to pay for his 
daily fare so he is good with 
that. 
Interviewer: So why doesn’t XXX 
engage these guys? 
Interviewee: How would I take 
the guy, he would not have a 
vendor code, he would not have 
a ten pin number? It is all 
because if I need to make a 
payment that’s what I need to 
follow the local laws, the local 
law says that the guy should be 
registered with the sales tax; he 
is not registered with the sales 
tax guy, so I could never use 
that model so this is called the 
‘jholawala model’; ‘jhola’ is the 
small bag that they carry and 
you will find that they carry 
anything.” 
as Tier A.”  
“From when we looked at 
the market in the early days, 
the logic [early codified & 
generalised] we initially 
believed in, is we don’t need 
smart people (salesmen for 
the PBO), we need to have 
people who will run from one 
hospital to the next and 
show their faces and use 
some tactic, but get some 
orders. But now I think that 
is not working very well, 
seeing the results we have, I 
would again go back to the 
key account thing, saying 
that more than 50-60 % of 
sales we do comes from just 
a few accounts per person, 
so he will get most of the 
sales from five accounts [in 
Tier B/C], and everything 
that is left is almost nothing 
at times.” 
hope is that the productivity 
model is temporary.” 
5.4. Divergence Mechanisms 
The outcome of exploration under-adaptation was not only contingent on 
accelerated learning mechanisms. Examination of intra-operative risk-taking 
resulted in the identification of divergence mechanisms. Given that much was at 
stake should exploration not be successful (e.g. idle capacity, etc.), divergence 
mechanisms ideally aim to perpetuate exploration, but were inherently 
maladaptive because the firm did not fully adapt/create formal discretionary 
space (e.g. through new protocols, schedules, and routines), to allow exploration 
to perpetuate. The insights contained in this section were therefore drawn from 
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an examination of data associated with the following: sources of, reasons for, 
and forms of intra-operative risk-taking. From these, I identified two types of 
divergence mechanisms, one aimed at evading scrutiny and the other at 
deferring scrutiny. I describe each in turn. 
5.4.1. Evading scrutiny 
Evading scrutiny comprised process evasion and resource manipulation, 
whereby the firm relaxes established policies and procedures when following 
them would have taken too much time, caused a delay or permanently cripple 
the exploration agenda. Evading scrutiny was for the most part, a judgement call 
of the TMT and other senior members of XXX, who engaged in intra-operative 
risks-taking by going against best practices that have been established in the 
company through its long history of exploitation.  
5.4.1.1. Process Evasion  
Certain processes were identified early in the conceptualisation phase as 
potential hazards to the smooth continuation/survival of PBO exploratory 
initiative, therefore were deemed sources of intra-operative risk-taking. These 
formal organisational processes can sometimes be tricky to navigate because 
opinions may differ; rules were originally defined for exploitation and they 
require employees from different functions/foci to agree, which can lead to an 
impasse that can negatively affect exploration. For example, the PBO Head may 
want to progress the initiative quickly, but the Head of Regulation might see 
traps in moving forward so aggressively, and the Six Sigma expert may be 
concerned about the danger posed if they approve something that has not been 
properly vetted. In describing the intra-operative risk-taking in response to 
these hazards, several Executives and other Senior members of staff stated that 
XXX relaxed strict adherence to the official stage gate/Six Sigma criteria and 
process to allow the approval of the PBO business case with lenient levels of 
scrutiny.    
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“Yes there is the stage gate process which sanctions the strategy, but it 
did not sanction business model to achieve that strategy … it did not 
require anything to be clearly outlined.” 
The head of a key function alluded that it was typical for rules to be relaxed for 
Tier B/C related projects when compared with the approval process of other 
projects, which hinted that these initiatives were given preferential treatment: 
“XXX has a lot of emphasis on the bottom line, so we may not get 
approval or may have to go back and forth before we convince our 
stakeholders, BUT purely in a Tier B/C innovation space, our ideas are 
really welcomed and are really easily supported and it [the approval 
process] doesn’t hamper us at all.” 
The reason for process evasion as an intra-operative risk-taking response 
emanates from the importance of the initiative to the achievement of the larger 
localisation strategy to which the firm was committed. Several Senior informants 
also stated that this was necessary because of the high levels of uncertainty 
surrounding the Tier B/C market. This made it difficult to define a priori the level 
of detailed information required for the approval process. 
”The reality on the street is this, people don’t have food, their 
requirements are not brand conditional, they are just managing to get 
some piece of road where they can sleep probably and not get squashed 
by a truck or something, so that’s what the reality is right there, its so 
different from XXX’s reality.” 
From a larger perspective however, more lenient protocols upset expectations 
within the company and is a form of unnecessary risk-taking from the 
perspective of some interviewees. As an example, a Six Sigma expert (who was 
not involved in adjudicating the original Tier B/C business case) states: 
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“Of course I don’t know the details, but my feeling is that the gate process 
should be stringent on [the presenters] understanding Tier B and C very 
clear needs, or else we should have not gone forward. The process is there 
for a reason to safe guard the company … and if the [business] case can’t 
pass the internal test, there is very low likelihood that it can pass the 
market test.” 
In summary, process evasion is a type of divergence mechanism, which is used 
when time-critical cross-disciplinary decision-making has to occur. Here, the 
process boundaries are temporarily relaxed rather than adapted to allow 
exploration to perpetuate in the short-term, and as such is associated with 
under-adaptation.  
5.4.1.2. Resource manipulations 
The second form of evasion relates to resource manipulations. The source of this 
intra-operative risk-taking emanates from the need to compromise resource 
limits in order to progress the exploration agenda in the short-term. The reason 
for this is that existing exploitation-oriented limits aim to enhance productivity 
and efficiency at the expense of flexibility required for new exploration-oriented 
projects, like the PBO. Another reason for resource manipulations as a form of 
intra-operative risk-taking relates to the potential for disaster in terms of idle 
laboratory capacity, as an example, should the appropriate resources not be 
released.  
On account of these reasons, the firm engaged in three types of resource 
manipulations, in order to evade scrutiny. The first I refer to as the transfer 
mechanism, whereby XXX transferred employees from the Core team to fill the 
eight Area Service Manager positions in the PBO, in order to bypass the hazards 
of resource constraints brought on by a hiring freeze. An Executive explains:  
“This was a huge decision because this year we have been squeezed on 
man power; there is a global squeeze in man power and no replacements, 
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forget new additions, there has been no replacements. Despite that, both 
[Division Heads] gave four key resources of sales guys. For their team to 
do it, especially when there was no sales, because the factory had not 
started, for six months, is unprecedented.”  
XXX also utilised an off-budget expenditure38 mechanism to evade scrutiny. As 
an example, it hired the rest of the PBO sales force (beyond those that were 
transferred from the core team) via a third party company, making the PBO staff 
a variable operating expense. In so doing, the contract staff is recorded in the 
Profit and Loss statement as an expense, escaping payroll oversight, allowing the 
firm to skirt restrictions related to the staff freeze rule: 
“So the rest of the PBO is outsourced [beyond the 8 ASMs] because of the 
staff freeze, so it is only a variable cost, that’s a smart part of the business 
model.” 
Additionally, there was evidence of other forms of resource manipulations in 
order to evade scrutiny through the use of a splitting mechanism. Here, a full 
time job would be subdivided into two parts, each role being filled by a different 
individual. In consequence, salary costs remain constant, whilst increasing the 
effective manpower in the firm.  
A common denominator of the resource manipulation mechanisms was their 
emergent, and contextualized nature, and thus could not be predicted. Several 
Executives simply stated that you need to accept a certain amount of increased 
risk in order to provide an immediate and flexible response that would allow 
exploration to progress:   
                                                     
38
 Evades effective budgetary control by concealing the true amount of staff working for XXX 
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“In this case, because it was such an important project for localisation and 
we believed in it, we took a decision that we needed to resource this and 
move forward much faster than usual.” 
However, such intra-operative risk-taking resulted in the commitment of large 
amounts of resources to the unproven Tier B/C project, exaggerating the 
potential cost of failure. Later during the Go-live phase there was evidence of the 
maladaptive qualities of these early resource manipulations, which frustrated 
performance. An Executive explained that early resource manipulations resulted 
in investment led growth (growth/penetration of Tier B/C, fuelled by increases in 
resource allocation), as opposed to productivity led growth (growth motivated by 
increases in per worker output). The former was simply not sustainable within 
XXX.  
“You must have heard about productivity led growth versus investment 
led growth, so there is a lot of investment in the PBO, and that I think is 
going to stop for some time because we want to see what we are doing 
and get some benefits from what we have invested already.” 
5.4.2. Deferring scrutiny 
In addition to evading scrutiny, the findings show mechanisms which aim to 
defer scrutiny. As a bit of context, exploration is by definition stochastic process, 
which cannot be predetermined a priori or controlled (e.g. Levinthal & March, 
1993), and as such it takes time for the value of the investment to be brought to 
fruition. In response, deferring scrutiny mechanisms are forms of intra-operative 
risk-taking that allow the PBO time for its benefits to fully emerge. Stated 
differently, deferring scrutiny mechanisms divert attention from the 
shortcomings of the exploration agenda until it becomes/in hopes that it will 
become consequential. This contrasts with evasion mechanisms, which skirts 
convention, thereby immediately making the PBO consequential. 
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5.4.2.1. Framing 
The first mechanism used to defer scrutiny was framing. Framing was used to 
address threats to the personal reputations/tenure of those championing 
exploration should it not be successful. These professional reputations were at 
stake because the members of the TMT, having lobbied for the development of a 
local laboratory and the targeting of Tier B/C, now have a personal stake in 
seeing the PBO prosper. Should the Tier B/C agenda not prosper, blame could be 
directly apportioned to them, not only within the country setting (in larger XXX 
India), but at the Asia Pack level. Thus, the TMT utilised framing mechanisms to 
deflect attention off the shortcomings of the PBO in the short-term, in hopes 
that it will become consequential in the longer-term (typical of deferring 
scrutiny). These intra-operative risks only pay off if the PBO becomes 
consequential in due course. 
Interestingly, as the Tier B/C agenda unfolded, new interdependencies arose, 
which were positive initially in the Conceptualisation and  
Ramping-up phase, but then became increasingly negative in the Go-live phase. 
During the early/successful phases I found very limited instances of positive 
framing, even though the period was deemed a success. Instead, there was an 
overwhelming recognition that there were too many unknowns, that the path 
ahead for the PBO would be arduous and early benefits were not a predictor of 
future performance (See Table 12).   
Table 12 – TMT early perceptions 
Top Management Team  
“Intuitively, I think we are very almost certain that this is the right way to go. Of course 
we don’t know what troubles and what blocks will be there, that is always there, but we 
think we are in the right path, in the right direction.” 
“It is too early to say, we just implemented these things about two months back.” 
“All of us are in a learning phase still, so we don’t have all the answers perfectly well.” 
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“How we are currently, I think we have a long way to go; we have our intentions, we have 
our aims, we don’t have anything figured out, that’s my beliefs.”  
“We have a strategy of entering the low cost market, we are learning also as we go along 
and we plan to make a success of it, but it will take time.” 
“It’s in India, it’s for India …… I keep saying this, that it is good to declare your intention, 
but to get there we can learn only by playing and following the best.” 
 
However, during the Go-live period where performance was lacklustre, the TMT 
engaged in various forms of positive framing as a form of intra-operative risk-
taking.  One form of positive framing emphasised past successes as opposed to 
present performance gaps. This often came in the form of blanket statements of 
optimistic sentiments about the PBO initiative: 
“I think the strategy is very clear, we want to execute it and our brand is 
committed to execute it, so if you want to really know what it means that 
we have put a lot of money and resources to localize the healthcare 
products and once the factory ramps up, the sales will start rolling in and 
we will make it a success.” 
At other times it manifested in making pros out of cons, as in the example 
below. This illustrates an overwhelmingly positive response in the context of a 
question about the one of the poorest performing PBO sales territories which 
was plagued with high levels of contract worker turnover.  
“I think the attrition levels are high, but the model normally assumes that 
there is some attrition because when you are talking about project 
outbreak it is a contract representative model so that people will keep 
moving, but I don’t think there will be much of a challenge because … You 
will have some new people coming, they will take some time too, but they 
will take their sales to the next level.”  
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Positive framing activities also occurred at regional (Asia Pack) XXX meetings in 
order to save face (laj rakhane vala). The concept of saving face is rooted in the 
Indian ethos where people act to minimise loss of dignity.  The quotation below 
aptly highlights the concept of saving face given that these comments were 
made well into the period of PBO under performance.39   
“When we presented this idea [of the PBO] to the Asia Pack (a meeting of 
XXX’s Asia divisions) level and to the global XXX healthcare level, people 
are hugely excited because they are now realizing that the India story is 
not just about the Tier A metros, but also about B and C, and they know 
that XXX has now done this so they are closely watching, waiting and 
watching to see how is this progressing, so I am very excited about this 
project. Other groups and other businesses have been asking me to 
explain this and to give suggestions on that because they are also keen on 
grabbing this. So from outside healthcare and from outside India, the 
feedback has been hugely positive; everyone wants to know about this 
project, they want to know how we are doing this stuff, so very good 
feedback about the whole thing.”  
When a positive spin could not be placed on an issue, I also found positive 
reframing as a means of intra-operative risk-taking. A particularly interesting 
example relates to the association between XXX’s Tier B/C strategy and the BOP 
predicate, which was well recognised in India in the slogan ‘doing well by doing 
good’. In the early phases of the project, the TMT allowed associations between 
the Tier B/C strategy and the morally loaded BOP paradigm comprising discourse 
such as ‘positively impacting poverty’ and ‘doing well by doing good’. Once it was 
clear however, that XXX’s Tier B/C strategy lacked evidence of social goals, 
relationships with NGOs or non-traditional village leaders, engagement of the 
                                                     
39
 Such positive framing was deemed necessary in the context of prior presentations made by the 
Healthcare MD to the Asia Pack about XXX’s positive plans for exponential growth in Tier B/C. 
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poor, all typical of means by which MNCs illustrate coherence with an authentic 
BOP strategy, the TMT reframed the organisation’s focus:   
“We used to talk about going down to the base of the pyramid, now it’s 
about managing the pyramid … that’s what we are doing: managing the 
pyramid.” 
Unfortunately intra-operative risk-taking via positive framing did not pay off, as 
the PBO did not become consequential in sufficient time, and the US intervened.  
“When the going is good, you don’t bother about little inefficiencies you 
see and lots of things are swept under the carpet, but when your 
profitability is under pressure, everything goes under scrutiny and you 
have to look at everything in detail.” 
As a result of this review, the TMT was reshuffled and a new member (Head of 
Regulations) and a new Managing Director were appointed, whose remit was to 
make the PBO more productive.  
“Under X (the old MD) and I guess the healthcare global team before the 
current one, we were growth focused, so I guess this is where localisation 
came in. Now, with the new MD in India and global, I guess productivity, 
and efficiency, reduced costs and increased profit and margin game – all 
these things are key words right now in India. Yes, three years ago growth 
and expansion was the focus, right now its consolidation, right now its 
operational efficiency, and removing all the flab completely, removing 
unnecessary cost.” 
In conclusion, positive framing was a form of intra-operative risk-taking utilised 
by the TMT to allow the PBO time to become more consequential within an 
exploitation-oriented environment. Such positive framing during periods of 
negative performance was inherently risk-taking, as the TMT was putting its 
reputation on the line should the PBO performance not rebound in adequate 
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time to be aligned with the positive perception it was projecting. Thus, while XXX 
can defer scrutiny in the short-term, it was not a sustainable practice for 
addressing exploration challenges and therefore considered under-adaptive.  
5.4.2.2. Perennial Stop-gapping  
Stop-gapping is the final form of intra-operative risk-taking used to defer 
scrutiny in order to cope with time-critical task demands and high levels of 
uncertainty of exploring Tier B/C. The reasons for the use of stop-gapping 
mechanisms were multiple, but primarily the source of this form of intra-
operative risk-taking was driven by incomplete knowledge or emergent 
complications XXX had not foreseen in the exploration process. On the basis of 
this, XXX switched to a new trajectory, where “typical” ways of evaluating 
problems, testing solutions, etc. appear to take a back seat to providing urgent 
intervention to pre-empt potentially negative fallout that could threaten the 
morbidity of the exploration agenda.  
An interesting example of stop-gapping is when the TMT found out that the local 
factory products, which were designated to be sold by the PBO, were delayed. 
This meant that the PBO team would be idle. Instead, the TMT made an 
instantaneous decision to self cannibalise by allowing the PBO to sell Tier A 
products and compete with the core team. 
“I guess that happened because there was a delay in the launch of few of 
the products … the team found that the outbreak team had more time on 
their hands so why leave them idle.”  
“This was the organisation’s decision, that the PBO should sell the same 
products as the core team, rather than remain idle in response to the 
factory being late, it is just not productive to have these guys sitting 
there.”  
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“So the simple solution is that we don’t do it [because the factory was 
late], but then [the Executive’s] point very clearly was, how will you make 
them [the PBO] productive enough? If we wait on the factory, they will 
never show that they are productive enough.” 
Another example was when the unit cost of production of the localised products 
was higher than anticipated, and XXX decided to release the localised products at 
a higher price, even if it meant that they were more expensive than its 
competitors. 
“So if you ask me on the exact volume to volume basis of a particular 
product, we are definitely still more expensive. We try and offer a better 
value proposition, that’s what we do, because we won’t compromise on 
margin.” 
These two examples show the inherent nature of stop-gapping, which involves 
dynamic improvisation and an element of bricolage; that is the patching together 
working solutions with the knowledge and resources at hand (Weick, 1993). The 
third element of stop-gapping was the intention that the course of action was 
temporary, with the expectation that these problems would be addressed with 
time as the factory becomes more adept at manufacturing, decreasing its 
average cost of production with time. 
“The XXX overheads and all are initially overwhelming, but with volumes 
when you add more and more products, when you spread the cost across 
many products, when you spread the cost across volume, there is bound 
to be an economic advantage to us, which is immediately not visible when 
you get in and you come in because there the cost is loaded among fewer 
products and smaller volumes.” 
However, whilst stop-gapping itself is risky, XXX engaged in perennial stop-
gapping, where these temporary measures were often not rescinded and 
perpetuated in the long-term. A key reason that accounted for this was the high 
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degree of organisational flux within the organisation, in the form of a new CEO, 
shifting Executives, visits from XXX’s headquarters, etc. It was indicated that the 
pace of these changes were not typical within XXX and occupied a large part of 
its TMT mindshare. As a result, the stop-gap measures were allowed to fester 
and resulted in long-term maladaptive consequences. As an example, the 
decision to sell products at a higher price than the market can bear created 
incompatibilities between its product range and the Tier B/C niche, precipitating 
exploration under-adaptation. 
“I just don’t think that is very realistic because I think our probability of 
our success would drop because the market is a market which can only 
afford that much price for such value. Just because we decide internally 
that we won’t sacrifice our margins does not mean anything to the 
market, so I still feel like having cost effective products is the only way to 
penetrate the Tier B and C market.” 
“XXX’s problem continues to be pricing. XXXs pricing is conservative, does 
not like to make a loss, have loss leaders, or even experiment with pricing. 
XXX’s pricing strategy results in XXX sales man having to spend too much 
time in defending the price versus expanding the sales.” 
As a result: 
“Our sales are not as it could be because the market is a market which 
can only afford that much price for such value. Just because we decide 
internally that we won’t sacrifice our margins, does not mean anything to 
the market so I still feel like having cost effective products is the only way 
to penetrate the Tier B and C market.” 
 ”We are not still not in a position to do the exponential growth [in Tier 
B/C] for multiple reasons, because I still don’t think we have the right cost 
points, we fool ourselves by thinking setting premium prices, our products 
are going to sell because of their benefits, it doesn’t work.” 
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In conclusion, XXX utilised stop-gapping as a temporary expedient, to be replaced 
in the long-term with more optimal solutions. Stop-gapping is inherently risky, as 
it often warrants short-term inefficiencies with the assumption that it will be 
counteracted by more optimal solutions and future returns. It aims to delay 
scrutiny, by addressing immediate challenges, allowing exploration space to 
become more consequential whilst it works on finding more sustainable 
solutions. However, perennial stop-gapping results when these temporary 
measures become permanent fixtures, preventing the firm from being long-term 
adaptive. 
Table 13 - Representative quotes: Evading and Deferring scrutiny 
Evade scrutiny Defer scrutiny 
Process evasion: 
“[The Head of the PBO] gave the 
presentation on the business model and 
then the opportunity presentation was 
also done by that management trainee, 
and [we used] both of them combined to 
take an informed decision on how fast we 
wanted to move, and then we had the 
approval of all the members to go ahead 
with this program.”   
Resource manipulation: 
“The [Director of Division 1] gave us four 
people from his group – he gave us a lot 
of time, six months we go out, explore 
areas (untapped markets), no question 
asked, nothing asked, all resources 
given……….Other Division head gave four 
people also.” 
“we have given [Project Break Out] some 
of our brightest people…… but down 
below that we will hire people who will be 
doing the leg work. Actually, we hoping 
on hiring a brand new organisation 
Positive framing: 
“In terms of results I think we need to talk next year. 
Next year I am sure I am going to be one of the 
happiest persons in XXX next year……. I am sure that 
next year we would have exceeded all of them [sales 
targets] and then let’s see who they are going to be 
talking to. So that’s what I keep telling all my guys, 
don’t crib about your issues right now to anyone, 
just start doing some sales, you will see who they 
will talk to next year.” 
“There is no shifting strategy, there is an evolving 
strategy for sure and which is always for the 
improved our operation. The strategy is only 
improved continuously, from when we started to 
now it has only improved.” 
“If you ask me, the emergence of a project like 
project outbreak to the business, the overall 
execution and philosophical understanding, 
inception and over execution and journey, so far has 
been very right to this project, so the future looks 
promising in this. The only thing I would like to give 
a word of caution to myself and others also is that 
this project needs to be made successful, and the 
amount of effort required are still very high so at no 
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Evade scrutiny Defer scrutiny 
through a contract model to deal with 
some challenges we have.” 
“There was no constraints on resource 
allocation other than don’t want long-
term commitments, so the sales reps were 
hired in a way that they could be 
expensed rather than become part of the 
full time staff.” 
“So then we got these eight people, and 
these eight people started to work, and 
when they started to work, one thing 
came out again, because of all the leads 
and opportunities we realised then even 
with these eight people we can’t do 
enough….so we then hired more staff 
…….by outsourcing  because of the staff 
freeze.”  
 
point in time, myself or anybody, my regional 
managers, my team can be casual about it. This 
project surely has promise because this is the most 
relevant and right project we have embarked upon.” 
“Is just a matter of time because eventually B and C 
is a market which is growing at a very fast pace, the 
only thing is that the right infrastructure and facility 
has to be put in place for them to overtake, and I am 
sure that eventually B and C will be bigger market 
for a country like India.” 
Stop gapping: 
“Because the localised product took time to come 
and the PBO team was ready and were getting 
leads, we were told to sell everything.” 
“The focus of our team is ideally localized products, 
it is, but we have also been told that to make these 
guys productive we have to ensure that they sell 
everything that can be sold.” 
“Is a little confusing for them [the PBO sales force]; 
they were supposed to focus on the factory, but then 
suddenly it became Tier A products also.” 
5.5. Discussion 
The key question this chapter aims to address is related to the mechanisms of 
exploration under-adaptation in a low munificence environment, from a learning 
and risk-taking perspective. I found, consistent with the sensitizing questions, 
that accelerated learning and intra-operative risk-taking did indeed precipitate 
exploration under-adaptation in the long-term although surprisingly there was a 
period of success in the first months, during the initial phase (Conceptualisation 
and Ramping-up stage).   
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5.5.1. Learning 
From a learning perspective, exploration under-adaptation was associated with 
accelerated learning mechanisms, such as a lack of deliberate integrated learning 
approach which inhibited internal knowledge transfer (Argote & Ingram, 2000) 
during the Go-live phase. More specifically, the findings illustrated that the 
difference between success and failure in the learning process was associated 
with the level of intentionality (Zollo & Winter, 2002), which is defined as the 
dedicated investment in planning, articulating (e.g., mentoring systems, de-
briefing processes) and codifying knowledge (e.g., in information systems, 
manuals). Broadly, high levels of intentionality were associated with success and 
low levels associated with failure in our case.  However, the findings depart from 
Zollo & Winter’s (2002) assertions in showing that early codification also made 
XXX susceptible to errors and were a source of under-adaptation later in the 
process. Recall the case of early codification of the Tier B/C boundaries and the 
negative impact it had on the interaction between the Core Team and PBO 
because it precipitated an over lap in tier sales territories. An Executive stated 
that it caused the PBO and the core team to compete rather than collaborate, 
and led to palpable tensions / negative fall out within the organisation.  
One caveat however, is that the negative fall out of early codification on 
exploration under-adaptation may be contextualized (that is, very specific to low 
munificence markets). Indeed, international business literature illustrates that 
cultural differences [as in our case, between the TOP and the BOP] can create a 
knowledge gap that prevents a MNC from fully deciphering elements of the local 
environment (Luostarinen, 1980; Petersen, Pedersen & Lyles, 2008 in Zang et al, 
2013), inhibiting the effectiveness of early coding. 
Other learning-related reasons for under-adaptation included shallow search 
trajectories (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). Evidence from development scholars and 
practitioners (e.g., see Mair & Martí, 2009; Anderson et al., 2010) who deal with 
low munificence environments, like Tier B/C, emphasise that failure to consider 
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‘deeper search trajectories’ that include the role of non-traditional partners 
(religious, NGOs) puts exploration of the BOP/Tier B/C at risk. This is because it 
lacks authentic engagement with complex implementation issues and 
beneficiaries of the health services (patients) in the market. Although these 
shallower search trajectories may temporarily ameliorate MNC’s uncertainty and 
increase speed of entry, deeper relationships with taken-for-granted institutions 
that "identify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or 
relationships" (Barley & Tolhert, 1997:97) are paramount to success. In 
consequence, XXX’s shallow search trajectories (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011) 
therefore also jeopardised its exploratory efforts, precipitating under-
adaptation.   
In general, much of the learning related findings perhaps appeared well aligned 
with current theorising, with the exception of one important point, that early 
exploration led to success which is counter-intuitive to the dominant perspective 
that exploration generates distant returns (See Levinthal & March, 1993). At first 
it appeared that early successes could be partially attributed with the extensive 
use of vicarious learning, which, according to Gavetti & Levinthal (2001) is 
associated with improved exploration performance. However, during the failure 
period I also found evidence of vicarious learning being extensively used, which 
suggests that it may not have been a key differentiating factor. Instead, success 
appeared to be associated with employing a wide range of types of learning 
concurrently (vicarious, experimentation, immersion, experiments, as examples). 
This challenges established precepts that “too much experience heterogeneity 
complicates the identification of causal relationships” (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008:613) and is often problematic for firms in early stages of exploration.40  
                                                     
40
 The underlying logic being that high levels of heterogeneity stymie learning because it impels a high level 
of causal ambiguity making it difficult to unravel  “causal relationships between the decisions or actions 
taken and the performance outcomes obtained” (Zollo & Winter, 2002: 348).  
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5.5.2. Intra-operative risk-taking 
Perhaps the more novel findings in this chapter relate to the intra-operative risk-
taking perspective. I contend that this construct allowed for a number of 
significant advances for theorising success traps, as it specifically focused on 
exploration-oriented risk-taking within an exploitation-oriented context. Here, I 
identified unique mechanisms – evading scrutiny and deferring scrutiny, which 
have not been previously defined in the ambidexterity literature to the best of 
my knowledge. Evading scrutiny implies a more permissive and benign selection 
system, allowing the PBO to go forward without being seriously challenged or 
questioned, whilst deferring scrutiny allowed the PBO time to mature. Stated 
differently, deferring scrutiny mechanisms divert attention from the 
shortcomings of the exploration agenda until it becomes/in hopes that it will 
become consequential. Whilst evading scrutiny mechanisms, skirts convention, 
thereby immediately making the PBO consequential. From the case, we saw a 
broad range of antecedents which precipitate these divergence mechanisms: the 
inflexibility of the exploitation protocol, the market did not react as expected, 
TMT reputations at stake, emergent complications and unexpected negative 
discoveries.  
Another particularly interesting observation was that evading scrutiny was 
associated with early successes, and deferring scrutiny was associated with 
under-performance. Although the reasons for this difference could not be 
confirmed with a high degree of certainty from the data, this could perhaps be 
attributed to the fact that it would be difficult to evade scrutiny once there was 
objective evidence of under-performance in the form of sales targets (which was 
not present in the early stages). An alternative explanation is that during periods 
of success, more serious forms of subversion (like breaking explicit directives of a 
staff freeze) may be considered innocuous/benign/an exercise of creative 
initiative, but during periods of under-performance an organisation will be hard 
pressed to explain support for the use of such mechanisms.  
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5.6. Conclusion 
This initial findings chapter highlights the key mechanisms associated with 
exploration under-adaptation and as such addresses the second research 
question – What are the mechanisms by which exploration under-adaptation 
occurs? Although, arguably, this chapter also touched on How and why does 
exploration under-adaptation evolve in resource-constrained emerging market 
contexts? by outlining key events and an emergent conceptual model. The next 
findings chapter aims to address the latter question in more detail by building on 
the insights of this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS – INTERACTION, CONCEPTUAL 
MODEL, DYNAMICS 
6.1. Chapter overview 
The purpose of this final findings chapter is to build a more integrated and 
dynamic perspective in order to answer the primary research questions: How 
and why does exploration under-adaptation evolve in emerging market 
contexts?  
In the previous chapter, I established two mechanisms which precipitated 
exploration under-adaptation – accelerated learning and divergence, in 
accordance with the two research domains associated with a success trap, 
learning and (intra-operative) risk-taking respectively. By way of brief review, 
accelerated learning resulted from processes associated with rapid 
acclimatisation and compression. Whilst divergence resulted from evading 
scrutiny and deferring scrutiny (see Table 14 below for a brief review of the core 
concepts). For reasons of parsimony and tradition (i.e. in line with Levinthal & 
March’s (1993) conception of a success trap), these mechanisms were explained 
in isolation from each other in the last chapter. However, to effectively respond 
to the research question above, it is imperative to determine if accelerated 
learning and divergence interact as a pre cursor to illustrating how they catalyze 
exploration under-adaptation as it dynamically evolves over time. Then on the 
basis of this assessment, refine the emerging conceptual model which was 
developed in the last chapter into one that exhibits greater fidelity with empirical 
reality. I therefore dedicate the first part of this chapter to illustrate how the two 
mechanisms (acceleration and divergence) work together, then focus on the 
different patterns of interaction moves, examine how they seem to give rise to 
different changes in exploration and describe how these patterns unfold over the 
course of the PBO project. Thereafter based on this assessment, I present a 
conceptual model of the process of exploration under-adaption. What resulted 
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was a vastly different and rather interesting set of dynamics that precipitate 
exploration under-adaptation 
Table 14 – A summary of the mechanism of exploration under-adaptation. 
Accelerated learning mechanisms 
The scope of these mechanisms include mobilising, soliciting, developing and integrating 
knowledge to meet organisational interdependencies without negatively affecting 
established Tier A/Core team operations. 
Accelerated learning resulted from processes associated with rapid acclimatisation and 
compression. 
Rapid Acclimatisation Rapid Acclimatisation relates to efforts to build, integrate and 
share XXX’s Tier B/C knowledge, whilst attempting to 
maintain high levels of performance in Tier A strongholds. It 
comprises:  (i) Mobilising: mobilising diverse types of learning, 
and (ii) Integrating: Integrating diverse types of learning. Both 
exhibited traits that negatively impacted learning outcomes, 
thereby precipitating exploration under-adaptation. 
Compression In contrast to rapid acclimatisation, which affected learning 
outcomes, compression relates to short cuts taken that 
negatively impacted learning output (what was generated as 
a result of learning; e.g., new activities, knowledge, or insight 
gained (see Miner et al., 2001). It comprises (i) Building: 
Building on the customary to define the novel, (ii) 
Generalising & Codifying: Premature generalisation and 
codification, and (iii) Synchronising: Synchronising learning 
with aggressive, fixed internal deadlines. 
Divergence mechanisms 
Divergence mechanisms ideally aim to perpetuate exploration, but were inherently 
maladaptive because the firm did not adapt/create formal discretionary space (e.g., 
through new protocols, schedules, and routines), to allow exploration to perpetuate.  
I identified two types of divergence mechanisms, one aimed at evading scrutiny and the 
other at deferring scrutiny.  
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Evading scrutiny Evading scrutiny comprised process evasion and resource 
manipulation, whereby the firm relaxes established policies 
and procedures when following them would have taken too 
much time, delay or permanently cripple the exploration 
agenda. It comprises (i) process evasion – a form of intra-
operative risk taking that aims to evade scrutiny by 
temporarily relaxing protocols/boundaries to allow 
exploration to perpetuate in the short-term, and as such is 
associated with under-adaptation, and (ii) resource 
manipulation – a form of intra-operative risk-taking that 
evades/emanates from the need to compromise resource 
limits, in order to progress the exploration agenda in the 
short-term. 
Deferring scrutiny The second type of divergence mechanisms which aims to 
divert attention from the shortcomings of the exploration 
agenda until it becomes/in hopes that it will become 
consequential. It comprises (i) framing (positive) – a form of 
intra-operative risk-taking used to defer scrutiny, in order to 
combat threats to the personal reputations/tenure of those 
championing exploration should it not be successful, and (ii) 
Stop-gapping (perennial) – a form of intra-operative risk-
taking used to defer scrutiny in order to cope with time-
critical task demands and high levels of uncertainty of 
exploring Tier B/C. 
 
6.2. Interaction between Learning and Risk-taking 
The first ambition of this chapter was to determine whether there was any 
interaction between the accelerated learning and divergence/intra-operative 
risk-taking mechanisms which comprise the two dominant processes in 
exploration under-adaptation (as outlined in the previous chapter).  This was 
important because extant literature remains silent on the issue (Levinthal & 
March, 1993; March, 1991) and without articulation and consideration of this 
constituent element, it is impossible to assert whether accelerating learning and 
divergence account separately for exploration under-adaptation. 
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As regards to interaction therefore, I investigated longer portions of data where 
both divergence and accelerated learning occurred, as opposed to focusing on 
the dichotomous discourse specific to each mechanisms individually (Harrison & 
Rouse, 2015). As a result, I discovered two types of interactions between 
accelerated learning and divergence: force fitting and force fixing. 
6.2.1. Force Fixing versus Force Fitting  
Figure 8 – Force fitting  
 
 
By way of illustration (see Figure 8 above), within the context of the first 
divergence mechanism (Six Sigma policy evasion), the following interaction 
emerged. This interaction starts with XXX engaging in (forward learning) 
INTEGRATION by planning and deliberately MOBILISING a diverse range of 
learning types – vicarious learning, business analytics, immersion, etc., to 
develop new insights about the Tier B/C market segment. Experiences and 
insights were drawn from BUILDING on the customary, focusing on XXX’s 
archetypical relationships with nursing homes, distributors, etc. These two 
mechanisms had a circular relationship, in that MOBILISING led to BUILDING, 
which led to more MOBILISING, until the point that the learning from these 
various sources were GENERALISED, CODIFIED and SYNCHRONISED, in 
preparation for the Six Sigma gate review, one month into the project. At this 
point, the organisation hit a roadblock/hazard to the exploration project, when 
the learning derived from this accelerated learning process was not 
adequate/sufficient to meet the requirements of the typical Six Sigma approval 
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process. The Six Sigma process, being historically exploitation-oriented, 
demanded information on the Return on Investment and detailed financial 
forecasts, which is difficult to obtain reliably for the Tier B/C market due to its 
high levels of uncertainty and XXX’s lack of familiarity with that niche.  As a 
result, XXX could only produce a crude commercial schemata, which illustrated a 
rough estimate of the market potential within Tier B/C and the number of 
resources needed to serve that market. At this point there were four options – 
disband the PBO, adapt the Six Sigma process, collect additional data which 
would have delayed exploration, or engage in PROCESS EVASION (the option that 
was chosen). PROCESS EVASION allowed the firm to deviate from conventional 
practice to allow exploration to progress onto the next stage with scant 
scrutiny.41 As an example, the Head of the PBO states: 
“We [the PBO] needed at least one direction to go ahead, and so we 
broadly use that [Six Sigma] framework. And we ensure that we answer 
specific questions right on time and move ahead. But beyond that, of 
course we have been given a high level of freedom for exploring, because 
this is so different from how we usually operate.” 
Noteworthy in this instance, the interaction between learning and risk did not 
catalyse an adjustment response in exploration. Instead, it forced a fit (hence the 
term force fitting) between the incompatibilities of exploration and the 
organisation’s exploitation-oriented protocols and rules; without adjusting either 
one. 
                                                     
41
 Thus process evasion avoided generating early pressures on learning to elevate to the company 
standards, instead force fitting compatibility with exploration.  
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Figure 9 - Force fixing 
 
Consider another example of an instance comprising an interaction between 
accelerated learning and divergence mechanisms (see Figure 9 above), which 
took place in the period after the PBO obtained approval from the Six Sigma 
stage review process to continue with exploration of the Tier B/C segment. XXX 
was still engaged with MOBILISING diverse types of learning, having now starting 
to conduct experiments in the Tier B/C market. The organisation also continued 
BUILDING on the customary to define the novel in the Tier B/C market. From 
these experiences it GENERALISED its understanding of the resource needs 
necessary to geographically cover the BOP, and CODIFIED that a team of fifty (50) 
new members of staff would be adequate for geographic coverage of the Tier 
B/C market. The exploration project then hit a roadblock/hazard due to a staff 
freeze rule that would prevent hiring new staff for the PBO. As background, the 
staff freeze rule ensured that XXX’s Head Office still exerted considerable 
influence over resource allocation in its Strategic Business Units, like the 
Healthcare division in India. Given the Headquarters tight control on specifying 
conditions upon which resources would be made available, XXX utilised 
RESOURCE MANIPULATION and hired staff on contract, which would not surface 
in the payroll account, but in an expense account, an area where XXX Head Office 
had little direct oversight. In this case, the interaction between learning and risk 
catalysed, or forced, a change in exploration, expanding its manpower in an 
attempt to fix, not fit, the problem (hence, the term force fixing).  
In the aforementioned two examples, I purposefully elaborated on examples, 
which were referenced in the last chapter to distinguish between the different 
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forms of interaction for reasons of continuity and clarity, but many examples 
abound throughout the dynamic process of exploration under-adaptation of 
force fixing and force fitting. Again: 
 Force fitting is defined as the interaction between learning and intra-
operative risk-taking that drives a fit between incompatible exploration 
and exploitation-oriented systems, processes, protocols and rules, 
without adapting either one.  
 Force fixing is defined as the interaction between learning and intra-
operative risk-taking that prioritises a fix for exploration, when there are 
incompatibilities with the organisation’s exploitation-oriented protocols 
and rules.  
The conceptual distinction between these two kinds of interactions addresses a 
black box where previous research has remained silent (Levinthal & March, 1993, 
March, 1991).  Thus, having made a conceptual distinction between force fixing 
and force fitting, I depart from postulations that exploration is solely associated 
with disequilibrium-creating [Volberda, 1996] activities, where the firm 
constantly upsets the status quo/changes in order to break new 
ground/penetrate new exploration-oriented markets (such as force fixing). 
Instead, I illustrate that managers employ, quite counter-intuitively, equilibrium-
creating responses (such as force fixing) to force alignment between the 
‘incompatible’ exploration and exploitation. 
Dynamic process overview: Drawing on the findings above, I developed a multi-
stage process model, separating out accelerated learning mechanisms and 
divergence mechanisms, for each instance of interaction. For best comparison I 
compare the successful performance period; i.e., the first six months of the 
exploration project (referred to as the Conceptualisation and Ramping-up phase), 
with the first six months of the underperformance/Go-live phase. More 
specifically, within the model (see Figure 10),  
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 the top line/area relates to learning and interactions during the six-month 
successful period;  
 the grey boxed area relates to how the interaction affected exploration, 
and  
 the area under the grey box illustrates the learning and interactions 
during six months of the underperformance period.  
Figure 10 – Nature of interaction – success versus failure 
 
 
 
Important similarities and differences emerged. Firstly, in both periods, 
exploration appears to be guided by an admixture of both force fitting and force 
fixing interactions, as labelled in Figure 10. However, an interesting finding was 
that during the failure period there was much greater focus on interaction 
arrangements, whereas during the success phase, it was more of an exception. 
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This suggests that under-adaptation resulted, because exploration developed by 
making exceptions whenever trouble arose, as opposed to fully adapting. Case in 
point, when the organisation allowed the Tier B/C business case to pass through 
the Six Sigma stage gate process with low levels of scrutiny. In doing so, it never 
placed additional pressure on learning mechanisms for more meaningful 
information, as the interaction arrangements were always available to supplant 
the need for additional learning in times of emergency. In such a case, these 
sources of good will allowed exploration to progress uncontested, resulting in an 
almost a self-confirming plan (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), making subjective 
assessment of early success practically inevitable. Figure 10 aptly shows that 
these interaction arrangements between accelerated learning and divergence 
mechanisms were becoming a fundamental and indispensable condition for a 
range of routine activities, like furnishing resources to market exchange (as 
outlined in the grey area). Thus, exploration under-adaptation was associated 
with fervent use of interaction arrangements, prompting a stronger and stronger 
reliance on the discretionary (force fitting and force fixing) to advance 
exploration.  
6.3. Conceptual Model 
The above examples and the proof of interaction between accelerated learning 
and intra-operative risk-taking begs a review of the emerging conceptual model 
(presented in the last chapter - see Figure 11 below).  
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Figure 11 – Emerging Conceptual Model  
 
The underlying assumption of the under-adaptation model is that the MNC has a 
joint interest in the continuous development of exploration, as well as 
maintaining its exploitation strongholds. A review of the emerging model from 
the last chapter (Figure 11 above) suggests that learning and intra-operative risk-
taking account separately for exploration under-adaptation, with no interaction. 
However, evidence of force fitting and force fixing necessitates an amendment of 
the model, to increase its fidelity to empirical reality. 
Figure 12 – Revised Conceptual Model 
 
The revised conceptual model  (Figure 12 above) is initiated by a firm with a 
history of a success trap (over-specialisation in exploitation) aiming to pursue 
exploration (Part A of Figure 12).  In this traditional mode of exploitation, the 
“firm develops routines – these routines specify which behaviours are 
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appropriate and search processes that are reasonable and consistent with prior 
learning“ (Nelson & Winter, 1982 in 1:359). Thus, to engage in exploration, 
where prior learning will not suffice, the organisation must initiate an 
organisational learning process (Part B of Figure 12 above). The importance or 
dominance of this learning perspective aligns well with theorists who explicitly 
conceptualize exploration as a process of information-acquisition and pursuit of 
new knowledge (e.g., see Voldeba, 1996).  
This dominant learning trajectory comprises two processes: rapid acclimatisation 
(which comprise mechanisms: Mobilising and Building) and compressing (which 
comprise mechanisms: Integrating, Generalising and Codifying and 
Synchronising). In principle, the list of learning mechanisms used to explore are 
theoretically well grounded in extant literature, as outlined in Table 15 below. 
Table 15 – Link between accelerated learning mechanisms and theory 
Mechanisms Theoretical equivalent 
Mobilising diverse 
types of learning 
Appears similar to exploration, characterised as the boundary-
spanning search for discovery of new approaches to technologies, 
businesses, processes or products (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
McGrath, 2001), OR as a quest for new routines or practices, to 
increase survival odds in evolutionary models (Nelson & Winter, 
1982); 
Building on the 
customary to define 
the novel 
Appears similar to exploration, characterised as gaining fresh 
information to improve present and future returns in rational-
choice models (Radner & Rothschild, 1975); 
Synchronising 
learning with 
aggressive, fixed 
internal deadlines 
Appears similar to exploration, characterised as a target or 
aspiration-dependent collection of information in bounded-
rationality models (Simon, 1955); 
Integrating diverse 
types of learning 
Appears similar to exploration, characterised as a process that is 
amenable to ex ante planning and control (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996),  
Generalising and 
codifying 
Appears similar to exploration, characterised as the absorption of 
external information in models of learning and innovation 
(Levinthal & March, 1993). 
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Adapted from Volberda (direct quotations), 1996  
However, it is important to distinguish between these concepts in principle and 
XXX’s approach to learning, which was accelerated. In this case, accelerated 
learning precipitated early success before impelling failure (exploration under-
adaptation). Thus the learning trajectory appeared to support Barkema & 
Vermeulen’s (2002) assertions that an increased pace of learning can result in 
diseconomies of time compression (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). This emerges when 
an organization is less able to absorb varied new experiences and apply them 
within the organisation, resulting in diminishing returns to learning. In summary, 
while the learning trajectory (Part B of Figure 12 above) is represented in a linear 
form in the diagram, in reality it may be fraught with variance, with phases of 
success and failure.  
In addition to the learning trajectory, my findings illustrate a second trajectory- 
the intra-operative risk-taking trajectory. My findings highlight that intra-
operative risk-taking is subordinate to (but not fully encapsulated within) the 
learning trajectory, which was rather interesting. The process of intra-operative 
risk-taking42 is triggered when there is a threat to exploration (signified by the 
lightening rod sign in Figure 12 above). These challenges trigger interaction 
between learning and intra-operative risk-taking. From the dynamic process 
diagram (Figure 10), I found that this interaction unfolded along a common 
pattern, where learning begets intra-operative risk-taking and intra-operative 
risk-taking in turn grants temporary allowances for exploration, via force fixing or 
forced fitting. Furthermore, from the dynamic diagram (Figure 10), I also found  
that fervent use of force fixing and force fitting precipitated exploration under-
adaptation. Perhaps the most succinct explanation of why this paradox occurred 
                                                     
42
 This concept of risk-taking as a response to hazards is very much in line with March & Shapira’s (1987) 
article ‘Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk-taking’, which eschew normative definitions of risks 
associated with probabilities for the more empirically accurate risk-taking that results from emergent 
threats. 
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(whereby the firm appears to be providing exploration preferential treatment, 
via accelerating learning, evading and subverting, force fixing and force fitting) 
and yet exploration under-adaption resulted, is defined in the quotation below 
by a Senior Member of the PBO, reflecting on why XXX continued to 
underperform in the Tier B/C market  
“They gave us so much up front, but sometimes you build enough rope 
that you hang yourself, not because the strategy is not good, but possibly 
because we were allowed too much.’’         
This suggests that a reason for exploration under-adaptation was because the 
unwarranted good will from the organisation towards the PBO allowed 
exploration to progress uncontested and therefore did not demand enough from 
the learning processes of the PBO for the investment made/for the 
approvals/support and executive mindshare it obtained.  
6.4. Conclusion 
Principally, my results show that exploration under-adaptation is the result of 
accelerated learning, or interaction between accelerated learning and 
divergence/intra-operative risk-taking mechanisms. This insight is particularly 
important because by recognising interaction, I reveal how XXX responded to the 
ambiguity, complexity, etc. related to exploration in a historically exploitation-
oriented setting (success trap), thereby enabling under-adaptation. My findings 
therefore suggest that previous categories of risk and learning that have 
developed along separate streams, such as a success trap, can actually be 
considered complementary. In so doing, I eliminate a somewhat artificial 
separation between the two aspects of exploration and add a different and 
richer voice to success trap theory (Levinthal & March, 1993). These 
contributions have both theoretical and normative implications for 
ambisinisterity, BOP literatures, which I will explore in the concluding chapter of 
this thesis.   
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CHAPTER 7:  Conclusion (& The Way Forward) 
7.1. Chapter overview 
The central ambition of this research is the due examination of ambisinisterity or 
ambidexterity failure. It is divided into two parts. The first part of the research is 
conceptual, starting with a systematic review of the ambidexterity failure 
scholarship and culminates by integrating insights from institutional theory, to 
explain MNC underperformance at the Base of the Pyramid. The second part of 
this thesis is empirical. It focuses on one of the dominant, yet empirically 
untested theories within ambisinisterity – the success trap (from an exploration 
under-adaptation perspective) and examines how this unfolds within XXX 
Healthcare in India. This chapter addresses the principal contributions of this 
thesis to both theory and practice of the primary literatures that have been the 
foci of my research domain. It then addresses the limitations, opportunities for 
future research and then the conclusion. A summary of the major findings, and 
contributions to theory and practice are outlined in Table 16 below. 
Table 16 - Major findings, contribution to theory, contribution to practice 
Th
e
si
s Major findings Contribution to theory Contribution to practice 
P
ar
t 
1
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o
n
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p
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The propensity for MNC failure to 
exploit the TOP, whilst exploring 
the BOP, is well addressed by 
consideration of the aggregate 
effect of ambidexterity literature 
appended by various institutional 
perspectives. 
Demonstrating the utility 
of ambisinisterity as a 
separate and important 
domain within 
ambidexterity research. 
Illustrating the usefulness 
of a dual ambidexterity 
and institutional focus. 
The findings suggest that 
MNCs may wish to give more 
attention to the role of 
institutional factors when 
assessing the viability of BOP 
exploratory operations.  
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s Major findings Contribution to theory Contribution to practice 
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t 
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An over-specialisation perspective 
and an under-adaptation 
perspective of a success trap can 
be meaningfully differentiated.  
Regarding an under-adaptation 
perspective, both learning and 
intra-operative risk taking appear 
to be apposite lenses.  
Exploration under-adaptation is 
associated with accelerated 
learning (key driver), as well as 
divergence mechanisms were only 
triggered when there were 
hazards to exploration. Once 
triggered, it interacted with 
learning to precipitate 
maladaptive consequences 
through force fitting and force 
fixing. 
The process of exploration under-
adaptation exhibited differential 
performance over time – firstly 
success, then failure.  Failure was 
particularly associated with:  
- a fervent use of force fitting and 
force fixing mechanisms; 
- non-deliberate semi-automatic 
approach to learning; 
- shallow search trajectories 
(Further details are provided 
below.) 
Demonstrating the utility 
of an exploration under-
adaptation perspective to 
understanding failure of 
MNCs to explore the BOP. 
Development of the intra-
operative risk-taking 
construct.  
Introduction of novel 
mechanisms to the 
learning and 
ambidexterity field (such 
as force fitting, force 
fixing, evading scrutiny, 
delaying scrutiny) 
 
 
The findings suggest that:  
- organisations should 
consistently seek to engage in 
deliberate learning 
throughout the development 
of the BOP initiative;  
- vicarious learning is not a 
sine qua non for effective 
knowledge building at the 
BOP  (as practitioner 
literature states), but is most 
effective when integrated 
with other forms of learning; 
- MNCs need to genuinely 
adapt systems and protocols 
and resist the fervent use of 
force fixing and force fitting 
to advance exploration. 
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7.2. Theoretical Contributions: Conceptual Section 
The first part of this thesis addresses the much under explored domain of 
ambisinisterity in incumbent firms.  Notwithstanding growing scholarly attention 
to ambidexterity (e.g., see Raisch & Berkinshaw, 2008; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004), I found a gap in the literature. Here the current theorising about the 
failure of ambidexterity was both fragmented and could not wholly account for 
empirical realities of MNC underperformance in low munificence environments. 
By focusing on failure therefore, this thesis helps overcome a notable limitation 
of extant ambidexterity research related to sample selection biases towards 
investigating success cases (e.g., see Raisch & Berkinshaw, 2008; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004). This resonates well with Whetten’s call (1980, in Schmitt et 
al., 2010) for a greater focus on failure research across the academic spectrum 
of management. 
The second theoretical contribution of this section of the thesis relates to the 
development of the much neglected integration between ambidexterity failure 
theory and institutional theory. Whilst other theorists recognise that there can 
be fruitful synergies (e.g., Greenwood et al. (2011) recognise the usefulness of 
the paradoxical nature of ambidexterity in examining organizational responses to 
institutional complexity characterised by multiple logics), little has been done to 
progress this very promising avenue. Yet this thesis contends that continued lack 
of conversance between the literatures will leave the former ill-suited to explain 
incumbent failure within the BOP. This is fundamentally because MNCs 
operating in low munificence environments in emerging markets are 
subjugated to weak institutional environments (Khaima & Palepu, 1997 in Mair 
et al., 2012), which create additional constraints on strategic choices available 
to them and places pressure on their ability to commercialise and scale. By 
appending the literatures, the conceptual section of this paper indicates quite 
concretely how environmental, firm and leadership factors combined with 
institutional complexity, distance, relatedness, as examples, precipitate 
ambidexterity failure. Testing these theoretical considerations in the future can 
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help the field to develop more comprehensive and fine-grained theory of 
ambisinisterity in emerging market contexts. Beyond that however, at its most 
fundamental, this chapter signals the value of integrating and extending 
constructs and propositions of two distinct mature literature streams, in order to 
facilitate new understandings of a contemporary phenomenon (the BOP 
postulate).   
7.3. Theoretical Contributions: Empirical Part 
The empirical part of this thesis focuses on examining a success trap within the 
setting of XXX Healthcare in India, from the unique perspective of exploration 
under-adaption (Sato, 2012). Given its underexplored nature, a priori assertions 
were eschewed in favour of an approach, which allows the true mechanisms to 
emerge from empirical observation. Furthermore, the under-adaptation vantage 
point embodies a number of significant advances for theorising MNC exploration 
of disenfranchised segments like the BOP over the prevailing exploitation -
oriented view of the success trap (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Critically, while a 
wide range of research has been associated with a success trap (exploitation 
crowding out exploration) in extant literature, they either focus on inertia and 
resistance (e.g., see Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), or alternatively stray too far from 
the learning and risk-taking theoretical lenses. Consider Leonard-Barton (1992) 
who describes a capability–rigidity paradox in product innovation, where 
exploiting existing product innovation capabilities may have restrictive rigidity 
affects that crowd out exploration of new competencies. Also Burgelman 
(2002:326) describes a Co-evolutionary lock-in as “a positive feedback process 
that increasingly ties the previous success of a company’s strategy to that of its 
existing product-market environment, thereby making it difficult to change 
strategic direction.” I contend, that these theories either under-represent the 
complexity of success traps, or do little to enhance its conceptual and empirical 
rigour. Instead, a focus on exploration in an organisation that has historically only 
engaged in exploitation provides a more rigorous basis for theory development, 
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extending beyond the simulation research of Walrave et al. (2011), which as far 
as I am aware, is the one scholarly paper that addresses the elements of the 
success trap in its entirety.  In the end however, the utility of departing from the 
pre-established exploitation-oriented view of a success trap was validated by the 
emergence of insights which have been otherwise unobtainable.  More 
specifically, I: 
(a) discovered antecedents of exploration under-adaptation (being 
laggard/late to market, hyper-competition in market segments that are 
considered firm strongholds; Executive exuberance);  
(b) found that accelerated learning and divergence drove exploration under-
adaptation  
(c) developed and explored a new construct – intra-operative risk-taking, 
and proved its effectiveness in assessing exploration under-adaptation; 
(d) discovered novel mechanisms – evading scrutiny, deferring scrutiny, force 
fitting, force fixing which were distinct from the exploration-oriented 
mechanisms in a typical success trap, namely, specialisation and 
simplification43 (Levinthal & March, 1993); 
(e) assessed the dynamic effects that affect the fate of exploration over time 
– illustrating how fervent use of force fitting and force fixing, unplanned 
learning, deferring scrutiny, all contributed to exploration under-
adaptation; 
(f) developed a new conceptual model that illustrates that learning and 
intra-operative risk interacts, which is distinctive from prior success trap 
models, and 
                                                     
43
 Simplification involves buffering and enactment. Buffering separates learning goals across different units 
(departmentalisation), or across different time sequences. Enactment decomposes problems so that they 
can be allocated, so relatively few interactions need to occur between the different units or sequential 
periods. Simplification works hand-in-hand with specialisation. Specialisation focuses attention on one 
area/goal at the expense of the other, so that the whole organisation does not have to adapt all at once. 
Thus, simplification reduces complexity and specialisation renders focus, and together they promote 
exploitation-oriented learning associated with a typical success-trap. 
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(g) confirmed select aspects of extant learning theory; e.g. I found  a broad 
and planned learning process was associated with early learning success.  
In conclusion, a key contribution of the empirical section of this thesis is that an 
exploration under-adaptation perspective displays utility by opening up what 
was previously something of a ‘black box’ in success trap literature and that the 
perspectives contained herein provides an analytic framework for subsequent 
examination.  
7.4. Theoretical Contributions: The BOP 
Another notable contribution of this thesis is to the BOP literature stream. Recall, 
MNC performance within the BOP environment has been disappointing (Hart & 
London, 2005; London & Rondinelli, 2003). Such markets appear antithetical to 
the MNC DNA in terms of tangible factors (focus, market structure, revenue 
model and capabilities) and intangible factors (core beliefs, culture, and 
embedded assumptions). To date, the lion’s share of the literature that 
addresses this phenomenon has been practitioner oriented (see Khanna et al., 
2005; Simanis, 2012), which provides a host of prescriptive best practices to help 
successfully navigate the BOP. These invariably include, vicarious learning 
(Simanis et al., 2008), patient capital (Kennedy & Novogratz, 2013), business 
model innovation (Markides & Oyon, 2010; Markides & Charitou, 2004) as 
examples, all of which, quite interestingly, were employed by XXX, which still 
failed to explore the BOP (Tier B/C). A major contribution of this thesis therefore 
has been to eschew these normative prescriptions for scholarly analysis. In so 
doing, a host of novel and somewhat counterintuitive mechanisms (accelerated 
learning and divergence) surfaced as an explanation for MNC failure at the BOP. 
On a wider level, this thesis also illustrates the saliency of ambisinisterity as a 
useful theoretical lens for examining failure of MNCs within the BOP context. 
Stated differently, this study illustrates that research into the BOP is capable of 
being facilitated through the application of well-established theories to a 
historically (fairly) atheoretical domain. 
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7.5. Practical contributions 
Both sections of this thesis provide credible opportunities for practical 
application. Firstly, the conceptual section illustrates that institutional factors 
influence the propensity for ambisinisterity at the BOP. Thus, integrating 
institutional considerations into business cases and other protocols/tools used 
(e.g., see Kaplan & Norton, 1993) for the assessment of the market potential of 
the BOP, can largely enhance the MNC’s ability to develop more realistic 
expectations of the pace and scalability of exploration. It would also force the 
company to formally consider the informal ecosystems and subcultures in 
poverty prone markets in its analysis of the BOP potential. The implications of 
this could be a matter of life or death, as it is not uncommon for lack of formal 
consideration of norms within the BOP to lead to infanticide and suicides (Prasad 
& Ramesh, 2007). 
The second half of this thesis also bears much utility in the real world.  It forces 
MNCs to consider the extent to which they use accelerated learning and 
divergence (evading and deferring scrutiny) mechanisms to progress their 
exploration initiatives. Due to the parsimony of the conceptual model, it can be 
used in two ways. One, as a litmus test to help assess whether there is evidence 
in the company of these behaviours, and two, as a trade-off model (2x2 matrix), 
to determine the appropriate mix of accelerated learning and divergence that is 
adaptive and maladaptive.  
Furthermore, there are additional specific insights which may be useful to 
practitioners: 
- Organisations should consistently seek to engage in deliberate learning 
throughout the development of the BOP initiative;  
- Vicarious learning is not a sine qua non for effective knowledge building 
at the BOP  (as practitioner literature states), but is most effective when 
integrated with other forms of learning; 
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- MNCs need to genuinely adapt systems and protocols in order to both 
explore and exploit, and resist the fervent use of force fixing and force 
fitting, to advance exploration. 
7.6. Future Research 
Given the burgeoning nature of empirical examination of the success trap theory 
there are many opportunities for further empirical testing. As suggested above, 
this conceptual and case-based thesis can be used to inform future quantitative 
studies (derive testable hypothesis within larger samples). A potentially fruitful 
avenue is to determine relationship between MNC failure and intra-operative 
risk-taking. At the same time, it can also drive new multi-case qualitative 
research, which can probe more deeply into the core constructs of accelerated 
learning and divergence, both within the BOP environment, but also in new 
contexts. As a general point though, within the confines of future research, I 
encourage scholars to more carefully define and explicitly articulate the extent to 
which they address particular levels of analysis, sensitising lenses and outcomes 
in relation to the success trap theory, not only to guard against improper 
conflation with similar theories but also to advance its empirical and conceptual 
rigour. Thus this thesis provides ample opportunities for ensuing research. Such 
efforts will not only further promote a more profound appreciation of 
ambisinisterity, but of some of the novel propositions outlined in this thesis.  
7.7. Limitations 
In developing the conceptual part of this dissertation, every attempt was made 
to survey a wide breath of ambidexterity and institutional theory literature, with 
priority being given to scholarly articles in peer reviewed management journals. 
It is plausible that insights from the developmental studies stream of literature 
may have added further richness to the propositions in the context of low 
munificence environments in emerging market contexts. However, I decided to 
focus on elements that appeared to be most relevant to MNCs, choosing instead 
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to develop a parsimonious set of influences that can be later adjusted/further 
dimensionalised to suit various contextual environments at the BOP. Indeed, 
because the BOP is heterogeneous (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007) with new 
distinctions contrasting mainstream BOP to the last mile, including conflict zones 
(Anderson et al., 2010), this may be a fruitful contextual extension to my 
research in the future.   
In the empirical chapters, as with any single case study, a critical issue which 
clearly merits consideration is the degree to which the results are replicable 
(Mariotto et al., 2014; Flick, 2009), and if other patterns of ambisinisterity 
abound. In order to address this, there is a need to disentangle the enduring 
from the ephemeral dynamics. This requires repeated observation over time and 
within different boundary conditions, beyond the single case study contained 
herein (Flick, 2009). At the same time, I felt that the use of the single case study 
was particularly apposite, due to the very embryonic nature of this field of study; 
i.e., empirically examining an exploration under-adaptation view of a success 
trap. As Kennedy (1979, in Mariotto et al., 2014:362) postulates “the value of 
single cases in generating non-statistical inferences should not be 
underestimated, especially in situations where new paths arise for which the 
inference rules have not been established.” Furthermore, “since it is a theory-
building approach that is deeply embedded in rich empirical data, building theory 
from cases is likely to produce theory that is accurate, interesting and testable’ 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:25-26). 
The other key limitation of the empirical part of this thesis is that data collection 
focused primarily on self-reported assessments of the interviewees, which has 
been associated with potential validity problems (Flick, 2009). To address this 
limitation I consequently sought to validate interview data against archival data, 
participant observation, as well as multi-source assessments (separating 
responses from the PBO, the Executive and Other), even if only to confirm 
whether consistent biases exist in the perceptions of different stakeholders. In 
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the future a multi-method approach to assessing ambisinisterity may also prove 
useful. 
7.8. Conclusion 
In closing, the findings and propositions of this research are timely. Almost two 
decades after Prahalad’s BOP (1996) postulate was proffered, little is still known 
as to the drivers of MNC failure in that context. I hope that the outcomes of this 
research, as well as the application of the well established theoretical construct 
of ambidexterity/ambisinisterity to this phenomenon will form part of a 
resurgence of scholarly interests associated with incumbent operations at the 
BOP.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 – Topic guide 
 
Critical Initial interviews: Head of the PBO, Head of Strategy (sponsor), MD, 
other members of the TMT. 
Identify other informants via snowballing across three dimensions –  
 Exploration (informants involved in PBO), Exploitation (informants 
involved in the Core Team);  
 the different levels of hierarchy - heads to middle managers to sales 
force, and  
 the different functional areas (R&D, Marketing, Sales).  
 
INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE 
 
PART A – Informant’s background/ role/historical knowledge of the PBO 
- Can you tell me about the reasons why you joined the project? When did 
you join?  
- What is your role in XXX? / What do you understand as the role of project 
outbreak? 
- How heavily involved were you? 
 
PART B – General Knowledge (real time or historical knowledge about the PBO/ 
localisation). 
- Why did XXX initially enter the BOP? 
- What led to that decision? 
- What do you see as the potential for Tier B/C? 
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- What are the challenges the organisation is facing with regard to the Tier 
B/C market? – (prompts: Head office, competitive, internal) 
- What advances are being made with respect to tier b/c market?  
- Can you explain by giving a specific example? 
 
PART C – Learning related questions:  
- What did you do to try to understand the Tier B/C market? (types of 
learning);  
- What did you learn from that? (content of learning);  
- Describe the process – break it down for me step by step? (sequence of 
learning); What exactly happened in each step?; 
- Who were important?  
- How did you use that information/What was the result? (learning 
outcome);  
- What changed as a result of that learning? (learning output);  
- What additional insights did you gain? (learning output).  
 
PART D - intra-operative risk related questions 
The sources of, and reasons for, intra-operative risk-taking:  
- What are the most important things that frustrated your attempts to 
tackle the BOP market? 
- What established rules/protocols/routines placed major restrictions on 
the PBO agenda?  
To help identify the type of intra-operative risk-taking utilised, for e.g., skirting 
rules: 
-  How did the organisation deal with that hazard?  
- When there were challenges what did you do? Why was that considered 
the best option?  
